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ABSTRACT 
Background: The concept of ‘safety voice’ captures the extent to which individuals 
speak-up about safety. The behaviour is deemed important for preventing accidents, yet 
interventions are needed because people often fail to speak-up (‘safety silence’), thus 
contributing to harmful outcomes across safety-critical domains. However, the concept remains 
disintegrated and grounded in limited evidence and methodologies. Thus, the utility of ‘safety 
voice’ for safety management remains unclear, prohibiting effective interventions. This thesis 
therefore aims to evaluate how the behavioural nature of safety voice may be optimally 
conceptualised, assessed and intervened on. Approach: Four articles presented a systematic 
literature review (n = 48 publications), twelve experimental studies (ntotal = 1,222) and an 
analysis of Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) transcripts across 172 aviation accidents (1962-
2018; n = 14,128 conversational turns). Article 1 synthesised evidence from across theoretical 
domains. Article 2 presented the first experimental paradigm for safety voice (‘Walking the 
Plank’) to address nine methodological challenges. Article 3 observed safety silence in the 
laboratory to establish and conceptualise how the behaviour manifests in relationship to safety 
voice and interventions. Article 4 captured safety voice during real-life safety accidents, and 
investigated how risk, safety listening, power distance and CRM training impact on safety 
voice. Findings: Safety voice is a distinct concept that is highly ecological and situated, and 
that is important for understanding how safety voice contributes to accidents. A methodological 
reliance on self-reports and post-hoc methodologies was identified and addressed through the 
Walking the Plank paradigm. Safety silence, identifiable through assessing safety concerns, 
was scalable based on the degree of safety voice speech, with interventions uniquely impacting 
on five safety themes and hazard stages. Safety voice was found to occur frequently during real 
accidents, with the developed Threat Mitigation Model underscoring that safety concerns, 
safety voice and safety listening all contribute to preventing harm.
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PERSONAL STATEMENT 
In the spirit of my alma maters (i.e., the London School of Economics and Utrecht 
University), I care about conducting rigorous research in order to create a better world and 
address real-world problems. Conducting research on safety voice fits this personal mission. 
This is because by investigating the nature of the safety voice I can contribute new insights into 
how people may be enabled to prevent harm. The problem posed by people withholding safety 
concerns is not merely academic but has a very clear application for understanding and 
improving situations in which people encounter hazards: these situations can have serious 
outcomes such as injuries, accidents, or organisational decline. Whilst I acknowledge that 
mishaps are a normal part of social and institutional life (Perrow, 2011), I assume that at least 
a portion of adverse events are preventable through policies and behaviours that mitigate 
contributing causes (Nabhan et al., 2012). This assumption is important to me because it 
provides me with a hope that a better world is possible, one in which people can manage risks 
effectively, and that knowledge may be developed to support this. This drives me to investigate 
ways for people and institutions to create better outcomes, and motivates me to become a better 
researcher. Of course, I do not claim that creating a better world through solving real problems 
is the only worthy endeavour: arguably, pursuing knowledge is virtuous in and of itself. Yet, 
this simple motivation (to apply fundamental knowledge in order to enable people to do good) 
and hope (that harmful outcomes are preventable) drives me to investigate phenomena such as 
safety voice. 
Through investigating safety voice, I continue my line of work on the psychology of risk 
within social and organisational environments. As an under- and postgraduate student I 
researched the effect of threat perceptions (e.g., from immigrant or religious outgroup 
members) on the extent to which individuals adopt more social distance (unpublished 
undergraduate thesis at Utrecht University) and show prejudiced behaviour (unpublished 
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postgraduate thesis at the LSE). Based on my interest in the psychology of risk, I took up a 
position as research assistant at the LSE (2012-2015) to work with Dr Tom Reader on a project 
investigating safety culture (i.e, “the norms, values, and practices shared by groups in relation 
to risk and safety"; Noort et al., 2016, p.516) across the European air traffic management 
industry. In this highly enjoyable period, Dr Reader introduced me to a wealth of knowledge 
on the intersection of social psychology, organisational safety and safety management, and he 
mentored me in becoming a better researcher. As a side-project I worked with Dr Bradley 
Franks and Dr Martin Bauer on how risk perceptions (e.g., in terms of threat, uncertainty, 
alienation) shaped sense-making amongst conspiracy theorists. Thus, I became a published 
scholar on safety and risk (Franks et al., 2017; Noort et al., 2016; Reader et al., 2015), and I 
deeply enjoyed the mixture of writing and travelling across Europe to facilitate focus groups 
on safety culture. 
To understand how safety culture operates in practice and gain hands-on understanding of 
safety management I worked at NATS (British air traffic control) in 2015-2016. Here, I was 
involved in projects involving safety management (e.g., safety culture, safety assurance for a 
new voice communication system, human performance assessment) and training (e.g., on 
human factors, Crew Resource Management). This period taught me two valuable lessons. 
First, that the world is safer with me handling theories and methods rather than planes (i.e., a 
hilarious simulation to familiarise myself with the work of air traffic controllers went painfully 
wrong). Second, that even within organisations with a strong safety culture people can withhold 
safety concerns. The management and operational staff I worked with (e.g., air traffic 
controllers, engineers, Royal Airforce Force personnel, pilots) demonstrated excellent 
commitment to safety, and I observed that air traffic controllers handled flights in one of 
Europe’s largest and most complex airspaces with skilled precision and excellent three-
dimensional planning capabilities whilst using advanced technologies and following detailed 
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protocols. In 2015-2016, these air traffic controllers handled 4,494,000 flights (i.e., aircraft 
taking off, landing, or passing through British airspace; NATS, 2018b, 2018a) yet only saw a 
single serious aviation incident that was attributable to the organisation (NATS, 2018b). 
However, conversations provided me with anecdotal evidence that people across the aviation 
industry were able to recall situations in which they were concerned but felt unable to raise 
this. I was puzzled by the possibility, though unverified, that even in organisations with the 
strongest safety records people may find it difficult to speak-up about safety. In particular, it 
made me curious to understand the behavioural nature of interpersonal relationships that 
constitute safety culture such as safety voice. 
Thus, in 2016 I started with the research (undertaken for this thesis) into the behavioural 
nature of safety voice. This project came about after discussions between Dr Tom Reader, Dr 
Alex Gillespie and myself, and could be said to originate in 2012. This is when, in an LSE pub, 
the three of us (alongside my dear friend Adam Engstrom) first brainstormed new ways to 
improve safety performance through enabling better communication. In this thesis I therefore 
investigate the behavioural nature of safety voice because this is a culmination of my 
motivations, hopes, previous experiences and discussions with others. Researching safety voice 
is important for understanding the degree to which harm can be prevented though speaking-up 
about safety, and if any good may come from this work, may it be this: that someone was able 
to prevent harm through speaking-up because they applied insights developed in this thesis. 
 
 
He alone is my refuge, my place of safety. 
Psalm 91:2, NLT 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The importance of safety voice for mitigating accidents 
Accidents can emerge when people and institutions fail to manage hazards. Reducing the 
probability that hazards lead to harmful outcomes is desirable because hazards can lead to 
unwanted consequences such as significant financial costs (Novak, 2019), injuries (e.g., wrong-
leg amputation) and fatalities (e.g., due to air crashes; NTSB, 1983). Hazards can emerge from 
daily life (e.g., motor accidents, trip hazards, sport injuries; Wilson, 1979), natural hazards 
(e.g., floods, fires, viral infections) and institutional failures in safety management (e.g., 
nuclear disasters, harm to patients, use of pesticides; G. W. Fischer et al., 1991; Slovic, 1987), 
and are considered unsafe to the extent that they provide a higher “likelihood of physical harm 
– whether immediate or delayed – to persons, property, or the environment” (Beus et al., 2016, 
p.353). A substantial literature on safety management (Beus et al., 2016; Swuste et al., 2020) 
has therefore aimed to understand how safer outcomes may be assured for organisations (e.g., 
improved safety performance) and the public (e.g., patient safety; Vincent, 2010) through the 
optimal design of technical, social and human factors (Swuste et al., 2020). 
Research on safety management draws on a broad range of domains (e.g., management, 
organisational behaviour, human factors, engineering, social psychology) and contexts of 
application (e.g., transportation, healthcare, construction, etc.; Beus et al., 2016; Hosseinian & 
Torghabeh, 2012; Swuste et al., 2020; Zanko & Dawson, 2012). As Hosseinian and Torghabeh 
(2012) highlight, early theories such as Heinrich’s Domino Theory (developed in the 1930s) 
proposed that accidents are caused by linear cause-effect relationships and emphasised human 
error (Reason, 2000). In contrast to these person-centred approaches, ‘systems approaches’ to 
safety management (Leveson, 2002; Reason, 2000) emphasise that human behaviour is part of 
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sociotechnical systems (i.e., interactions between human, social and technical factors; e.g., 
Appelbaum, 1997) with human errors “seen as consequences rather than causes, [and] having 
their origins not so much in the perversity of human nature as in ‘upstream’ systemic factors” 
(Reason, 2000; p.370). For instance, this may involve the design of organisations and technical 
tools (e.g., ineffective training standards, protocols, tecnical specifications, etc.; Zanko & 
Dawson, 2012) that enable hazardous situations and unsafe acts.  
Systems approaches to safety management gained prominence in the 1980s (Swuste et al., 
2020) after nuclear disasters at Three Miles Island (in 1979) and Chernobyl (in 1986) prompted 
researchers and practitioners to better understand and manage the systemic causes of accidents. 
This period gave birth to seminal theories including James Reason’s (1990) Swiss Cheese 
model, Charles Perrow’s (2011) Normal Accident Theory, and Diane Vaughan’s (1996) 
normalisation of deviance. These theories stress that humans can provide a source for high 
reliability (e.g., through behaviourial variation enabling adaptive responses to novel threats; 
Reason, 2000) and argue that accidents can emerge when suboptimal behaviours are habituated 
(e.g., through training or observing uncorrected poor practice; Vaughan, 1996), or when 
typical, normal failures in the tight alignment between factors in safety management systems 
(Perrow, 2011) coincide in unfortunate ways (Reason, 1990).  
For instance, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFCAS; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2000), a development of Reason’s Swiss Cheese model, highlights that accidents 
can emerge from the interplay of organisational influences (e.g., processes, climate), unsafe 
supervision (e.g., planned inappropriate actions, failure to correct problems), preconditions for 
unsafe behaviour (e.g., physical and technical issues, poor training, physical/mental 
limitations) and unsafe behaviour (i.e., errors and violations; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2016). 
This is supported by studies that indicate that accidents can emerge from common, every day 
behaviour of people in response to their environments (e.g., Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; 
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Jacobsson et al., 2012) and accident investigations that typically identify that mishaps in 
aviation (Tarnow, 1999, 2000), offshore oil drilling (Reader & O’Connor, 2014), space travel 
(Moorhead et al., 1991) and healthcare (Francis, 2013) occur when social environments (e.g., 
providing poor norms, values, and leadership) and technical problems (e.g., equipment failure) 
enable unsafe acts (e.g., the decision to proceed with the launch of the Challenger space shuttle; 
Vaughan, 1996). 
For effective safety management, it is therefore important to consider how accidents emerge 
from the dynamic relationship between people’s behaviour and the social and technical 
characteristics of hazardous scenarios. For instance, from i) the lack of hazardous scenarios 
eliciting risk perceptions (Slovic, 1987), ii) unfavourable organisational norms and values on 
coordinating about safety (Guldenmund, 2000), iii) human tendencies for deferring to authority 
figures (instead of contradicting them; Phelps & Reed, 2016), or iv) the ineffective flow of 
safety-related information when individuals are concerned about hazardous situations 
(Westrum, 2014). Because of this, the literature has proposed theories to explain how social 
environments can enable better safety performance in hazardous contexts, including safety 
climate (Zohar, 1980, 2010), safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000), safety leadership (Barling et 
al., 2002), safety participation (M. A. Griffin & Neal, 2000) and safety citizenship (Didla et 
al., 2009). Based on these theories, high reliability industries such as air traffic management 
and healthcare have established safety strategies to coordinate activities for safety management 
around the principle that “people create safety” (e.g., NATS, 2020; p.5; for a case study on how 
NATS' strategy enables the raising of concens, see Francis, 2013), or have adopted training 
programs (e.g., Crew Resource Management, TeamSTEPPS; Kanki et al., 2019; King et al., 
2008) that enable environments in which safety-related information can flow freely (Westrum, 
2014). 
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In particular, the concept of safety voice – the extent to which people can speak-up about 
safety concerns (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Conchie et al., 2012; Tucker et al., 2008) – is 
considered important for safety management because it explains how accidents may be avoided 
through the extent to which social environments enable people to communicate concerns about 
encountered safety threats. This behaviour ensures the essential flow of safety-related 
information (Westrum, 2014), but is often challenging: risks are difficult to identify a-priori 
(Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991), imperfect intuitions and heuristics can bias 
estimates of risk (Kahneman & Klein, 2009), responses to risk are socially constructed (Turner 
& Gray, 2009) by people with distinct access to safety information, risk appetites and levels of 
experience, and others may respond unfavourably (e.g., Edmondson, 1999), contest the 
presence of risk (Weick, 2010), or even deny that concerns have been raised (Burris et al., 
2013). Crucially, and of importance for situating this thesis within the safety management 
literature, where safety concerns are withheld – termed safety silence – this can contribute to 
injuries, accidents and significant financial damage (Novak, 2019). This is best, and tragically, 
illustrated by mishaps in safety-critical industries such as space travel, oil-and-gas, aviation 
and healthcare that were, in part, attributable to ineffective safety voice.  
For instance, in the case of the NASA Challenger space shuttle disaster (for detailed 
analyses, see: Moorhead et al., 1991; Vaughan, 1996), an engineer at NASA’s supplier Thiokol 
was concerned about the cold-weather performance of a key piece of equipment (i.e., O-rings), 
yet was poorly listened to when he raised this concern in a safety meeting due to pressures for 
proceeding with the launch emerging from a contract that was up for renewal and a time-
sensitive lecture from space. Whilst a concern was initially raised, the dismissal and eventual 
withholding of concerns about the uncertainty of the O-ring performance in cold weather 
contributed to eight fatalities and a temporary halt to the space shuttle program.  
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In the case of the blow out of BP Deepwater Horizon, a complex system of interdependent 
factors (e.g., poor safety culture, production pressures, inadequate regulation) led to 
unfavourable preconditions such as poor communication between Halliburton contractors and 
BP operators (Reader & O’Connor, 2014). This enabled a situation whereby safety concerns 
about performing a negative pressure test (i.e., indicating well integrity) were not raised. 
Accordingly, “those performing the [negative pressure test] did not have findings from the 
cement evaluation log available and were unaware of […] the need to take a more conservative 
approach to assessing well integrity” (Reader & O’Connor, 2014, p.422). This contributed to 
hydrocarbon entering the well and travelling up to the oil rig, eventually resulting in the blow 
out and sinking of the offshore oil rig and eleven fatalities.  
In the case of the air crash of United Airlines Flight 173 (NTSB, 1978), flight crew were 
distracted by a loud sound and a lack of a green signal that wrongly suggested the landing gear 
was not appropriately locked in. However, when junior flight crew became concerned about 
fuel, they were unable to effectively raise this to the attention of the distracted captain because 
their initial concerns were dismissed (indicating poor listening to safety concerns), and safety 
voice only became explicit when it was too late. This contributed to a crash with ten fatalities 
and twenty-three persons seriously injured. Similarly, Driscoll (2002) described how poor 
decision-making and the lack of sharing of crucial safety information (between flight crew, or 
with air traffic control) contributed to the crashes of Markair Flight 3087 (resulting in three 
minor injuries and one severe injury), US Air Flight 1016 (resulting in three minor and sixteen 
severe injuries and 37 fatalities) and American Airlines Flight 965 (resulting in 159 fatalities).  
Finally, the Francis inquiry into patient neglect at the NHS Mid-Staffordshire hospital trust 
in the United Kingdom indicated that safety silence and poor listening to safety concerns were 
systemic problems for the UK’s National Health Service: whilst senior staff did not share this 
view, concerning trends were found amongst members of staff reporting they had been 
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victimised after speaking-up about safety, or had withheld safety concerns due to a widely 
shared fear of being victimised. This culture, characterised by unfavourable norms and values 
for speaking-up, was identified as a key contributor to up to 1200 fatalities at the Mid-
Staffordshire hospital trust (Francis, 2013), and led to recommendations for system-wide 
changes such as the installation of safety voice ambassadors that support staff in raising safety 
concerns (i.e., ‘Freedom to Speak Up Guardians’; Francis, 2015).  
Examples like these (for more cases, including on postive outcomes, see for example: 
Driscoll, 2002; Westrum, 2014) indicate that safety voice poses a fundamental problem for 
safety management (e.g., Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009): in order to overcome the momentum of 
hazardous situations towards harmful outcomes (e.g., through safer actions; Barton & Sutcliffe, 
2009), people need to coordinate effectively on safety concerns and address distinct and 
imperfect risk perceptions (e.g., risky conditions, safety limits; Slovic, 1987), yet well-meaning 
individuals often fail to speak-up about safety1. Research estimates that even highly trained 
safety-critical staff (e.g., air crew, surgeons) only raise approximately 50% of their safety 
concerns (e.g., Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Jacobsson et al., 2012). Because of this, safety 
management theories have tended to include safety voice within larger measurement suites 
(e.g., questionnaire items). For instance, i) research on safety culture has partly conceptualised 
dimensions for error reporting and just culture in terms of the extent to which employees feel 
able to raise safety concerns (Noort et al., 2016; Reader et al., 2015), ii) the 60-item Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire includes nine items on teamworking that reflect the ability to 
                                                 
1 This corresponds to seminal findings in the field of social psychology. As Van den Bos and colleagues 
(2011) pointed out aptly, the field of social psychology has long-established that because the majority 
of people are prosocial (e.g., people value close relationships, adhere to social norms) they do not 
always act on their perceptions of the situation (e.g., conformity; Asch, 1956), or behave in desirable 
ways (e.g., obedience to authority, the bystander effect; Darley & Latane, 1968; Milgram, 1974). In a 
similar way to Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 2011), this highlights that harmful outcomes can 
emerge from typical, normal, social psychological processes. 
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effectively speak-up about safety (e.g., 'the physicians and nurses here work together as a well-
coordinated team', 'in this ICU, it is difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with patient 
care'; Sexton et al., 2006, p.7), and iii) studies on safety leadership (e.g., Nembhard & 
Edmondson, 2006) have conceptualised safety voice as a key outcome variable. 
However, and despite the safety management literature recognising the importance of safety 
voice for preventing harmful outcomes (e.g., Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Conchie et al., 2012; 
Driscoll, 2002; Neal et al., 2000; NTSB, 1978; Reader et al., 2015; Reader & O’Connor, 2014; 
Sexton et al., 2006; Tucker et al., 2008), the concept of safety voice remains poorly understood. 
That is, whilst important insights have emerged on the themes that people use to describe their 
safety voice behaviour (e.g., perceived efficacy of voicing concerns, the motivation to help, 
hierarchies, policies and role expectations; Morrow et al., 2016) and antecedents to speaking-up 
(Okuyama et al., 2014), the concept remains imprecise because evidence is disintegrated and 
draws on distinct theoretical domains (Guldenmund, 2000; Morrison, 2011). Moreover, the 
relevance of safety voice for safety management remains unclear because the field i) has poorly 
developed how people actually raise their concerns (cf. Krenz et al., 2019), ii) has not 
systematically evaluated safety voice during hazardous situations posing actual risks (Krenz et 
al., 2020), iii) has assumed that the concept of employee voice (Morrison, 2011, 2014) can be 
applied to safety voice in full (e.g., Okuyama et al., 2014) or part (Tucker et al., 2008), iv) has 
reduced conceptual complexities by adopting positivist approaches (Kenny et al., 2020), v) has 
rarely established safety silence because studies tend not to assess the extent to which people 
are in fact concerned (cf. Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c), and vi) has provided inconsistent 
evidence on the success of interventions for promoting safety voice (O’Donovan & McAuliffe, 
2020).  
A poor understanding of the nature safety voice is problematic because without a clear and 
precise conceptualisation we do not know the extent to which safety voice poses a problem in 
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seeking to avoid accidents (e.g., to what extent people actually voice concerns during 
hazardous situations, or across levels of analysis) and may not be able to design effective 
interventions for reducing safety silence (e.g., if interventions only work for specific contexts 
or safety concerns, this would explain mixed findings on interventions; O’Donovan & 
McAuliffe, 2020). Thus, in order to advance safety management theory and application, a need 
exists to draw together evidence on safety voice, synthesise this into a conceptual framework, 
clarify the behavioural nature of safety voice, explain the relevance of the concept for safety 
management, and identify and address gaps within the literature. 
In this thesis, I therefore aim to contribute towards the field of safety management by 
drawing together evidence from distinct literatures that capture safety voice, and clarifying the 
extent to which, and how, the concept of safety voice is relevant for understanding accidents. 
More specifically, I i) provide a precise conceptualisation of the behavioural nature of safety 
voice, ii) evaluate how safety voice may be optimally assessed, and iii) appraise the 
implications of the nature of safety voice for designing interventions. Through four articles that 
emphasise conceptual and methodological aspects that relate to safety voice and safety silence, 
I aim to achieve this. In the remainder of this chapter, I present a broad review to scope the 
literature on safety voice (a systematic literature review is presented in Chapter 3) and develop 
three high-level research questions that capture the specific research questions developed 
within the presented articles (also see Table 1.1). I conclude this chapter with an overview of 
the thesis by delineating the intended contributions, mapping research questions onto the 
presented articles, and outlining the thesis structure. 
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Defining the safety voice concept 
The concept of safety voice captures the extent to which individuals speak-up2 about safety 
concerns (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Conchie et al., 2012; Tucker et al., 2008) and has been 
explicitly defined as: “communication motivated toward changing perceived unsafe working 
conditions that have implications for individual and organizational health (…), [flowing] 
through formal and informal channels, and (…) directed toward numerous targets (e.g., 
supervisors/managers, coworkers, union officials, government officials)” (Tucker et al., 2008, 
p.320). The behaviour is intrinsically social: i) it occurs through communication that reflects 
people’s participation in safety (Neal & M. A. Griffin, 2004), ii) is rooted in organisational and 
national cultural values for harm-prevention (Guldenmund, 2000; Noort et al., 2016) and iii) is 
reflected in group and organisational practices on safety (e.g., safety citizenship behaviours; 
Didla et al., 2009). For instance, individuals engage in safety voice when they communicate 
perceived hazards (e.g., ‘I am concerned this may not be the correct patient’), safety 
information (e.g., ‘I understood that runway was closed’, ‘you should not drive faster than 40 
km/h through that turn’), potentially harmful outcomes (e.g., ‘that stepladder might fall’) and 
desired actions to mitigate harm (‘abort!’, ‘look out!’).  
Safety voice manifests in speech (see Chapter 5) and is contrasted with the withholding of 
safety concerns, which, following Tucker and colleagues (2008) in adopting employee voice 
terminology, may be labelled ‘safety silence’ (compare with 'employee silence'; Morrison, 
2011). Whilst research has tended to operationalise safety voice as a binary opposite to safety 
silence (e.g., Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Conchie et al., 2012), the acts may be better understood 
as a matter of degree to which concerned people speak-up about distinct safety themes (e.g., 
                                                 
2 I use the hyphen in ‘speaking-up’ to capture the act in a single term: unlike Liu, Zhu and Yang’s 
(2010) terminology, I do not distinguish between speaking-up’ to seniors and ‘speaking out’ to 
colleagues within the terminology itself. Instead, because I acknowledge voice behaviours are target-
sensitive, I specify the target of safety voice when appropriate. 
Chapter 1: Introduction and theoretical background 25 
safety information, stopping ongoing action; see Chapter 5). However, to date, safety silence 
remains poorly described because studies that capture safety voice have provided no explicit 
definition of the behaviour (e.g., McLaughlin et al., 2014), simply referring to ‘speaking-up 
about safety’ (e.g., Habyarimana & Jack, 2011), or did not explicitly distinguish the acts of 
raising and withholding safety concerns (e.g., Tucker, et al, 2008). For clarity, throughout this 
thesis, I indicate whether I refer to the concept of safety voice (i.e., capturing the broader 
phenomenon) or the specific acts of safety voice and safety silence3. 
Engaging in safety voice is considered beneficial for preventing harm by changing the 
dysfunctional momentum of hazardous situations towards harm (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009). As 
discussed above and in Chapters 5 and 6, safety silence has contributed to fatal accidents across 
high reliability industries such as aviation, space travel, oil and gas and healthcare, with studies 
estimating that safety silence produces steep financial costs (Novak, 2019) and that people 
engage in substantially less safety voice during safety incidents than near-misses (Blanco et 
al., 2009). By speaking-up about safety, people can highlight risky and deficient actions (e.g., 
human error; Okuyama et al., 2014), establish a shared understanding on hazardous conditions 
(Edmondson, 1999; Reader et al., 2007), make observations actionable (Barton & Sutcliffe, 
2009) and promote the identification of system weaknesses and learning from mistakes (Reader 
                                                 
3 For instance, the ‘behavioural nature of safety voice’ refers to the concept that captures both acts of 
speaking-up and withholding concerns. This does not fully resolve terminological confusion because 
‘safety voice’ can still refer to the act and the concept; however, I have aimed to explicitly define the 
behaviour throughout this thesis to address this. Arguably, terms such as ‘the extent to which concerns 
are raised or withheld’ or ‘the degree of safety concern communication’ might be used to accurately 
capture both acts, but I consider their widespread use as conceptual labels undesirable in terms of 
conciseness and the link with other voice literatures (e.g., employee voice). The use of ‘safety voice’ 
to refer to the broader phenomenon also corresponds to related fields such as ‘obedience to authority’, 
which capture the extent to which people obey or resist authority figures (Kaposi, 2017). Crucially, in 
Chapter 5, I show that safety silence is scalable in terms of the degree of safety voice for concerned 
individuals and this adds to the argument for conceptualising the phenomena as distinct but highly 
related. 
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et al., 2015). When others listen effectively to concerns raised this can increase safety 
performance (Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016; Manias, 2015), prevent harm (Tucker & 
Turner, 2014; Turner et al., 2015), and benefit organisational outcomes (Novak, 2019; see 
Chapter 6). For example, safety can be maintained when junior doctors highlight to operating 
surgeons that a critical step (e.g., burning before cutting) has been omitted (Barzallo Salazar et 
al., 2014) and surgeons listen and act on this. 
Theory on safety voice arose from person-centred and political studies indicating that 
management practices (e.g., leadership styles, commitment to safety) and team attributes (e.g., 
hierarchy, workload, norms for collaborating on safety) shape whether employees 
communicate their concerns (Hirschman, 1970; LePine & Van Dyne, 1998). The original 
development of the concept is attributed (Tucker et al., 2008) to the development of the Exit-
Voice-Loyalty-Neglect (EVLN) framework. In his seminal work, Hirschman (1970) proposed 
that customers can respond to organisational decline (e.g., declining product quality) by doing 
business with competitors (i.e., Exit), actively raising dissatisfaction about an “objectionable 
state of affairs” (Hirschman, 1970, p.30) to management in charge, higher authorities or the 
public (i.e., Voice), or remaining silent in the face of adversity (i.e., Loyalty). Here, voice was 
considered a constructive step in which people actively aim to improve situations. Rusbult and 
colleagues (1982) and Farrell (1983) expanded this framework in terms of conceptual width 
and application to individuals’ behaviour by proposing that romantic partners and employees 
can passively allow conditions to decline (i.e., Neglect).  
After, approximately, 1985 (for historical reviews see: Brinsfield et al., 2009; Morrison, 
2011), a second wave of voice research incorporated concepts, such as whistleblowing, in 
organisational behaviour into voice research (Near & Miceli, 1985). Yet, as Ma (2016) 
highlights, research interest in voice only became more widespread after voice was i) 
conceptualised as an observable and constructive extra-role behaviour (van Dyne & LePine, 
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1998) and ii) methodological progress was made through the development of questionnaire 
scales (Edmondson, 1999; LePine & Van Dyne, 1998). Whilst these two developments were 
arguably at odds (i.e., voice was now conceptualised as a behaviour, but new measures captured 
perceptions of behaviour), during the 2000s this led to a considerable body of research on 
employee voice and silence (i.e., the act of employees raising/withholding work-related issues 
and suggestions; Morrison, 2011, 2014) and the identification of antecedents and the 
conceptualisation of key processes such as psychological safety (i.e., the extent to which people 
expect others to respond well to voice; Edmondson, 1999), the expected utility calculus (i.e., 
expectations on the effectiveness of voice; Murphy & Dingwall, 2007b) and inclusive 
leadership (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006).  
Arguably, from the late 2000s a new wave may be distinguished whereby research has 
started to refine the understanding of voice by proposing sub-types (e.g., upward versus 
sideways, promotive versus prohibitive; Liang et al., 2012; Wu Liu et al., 2010) and facet-
specific types of voice. Whilst research had been interested in cases where employees warned 
others about safety hazards (e.g., Barnett, 1992; Seiden et al., 2006), in the 2000s a trend 
emerged whereby i) safety research reconceptualised concepts from organisational psychology 
in terms of their nature and relevance for safety management (Didla et al., 2009; Guldenmund, 
2000) and ii) voice concepts were distinguished in terms of the content raised rather than the 
target or motivation of voice (Brinsfield et al., 2009). Fitting this trend, the concept of safety 
voice emerged when Tucker and colleagues (Tucker et al., 2008) introduced the term 
‘employee safety voice’. As indicated above, they defined this in terms of communication with 
others about unsafe working conditions through diverse communication channels. In particular, 
employee safety voice was argued to be distinct from employee voice (Morrison, 2011) and 
safety participation (Neal & M. A. Griffin, 2004) because it is often protected by legal 
frameworks and may be understood as dissent when people challenge managers’ safety 
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accountabilities4. Conchie and colleagues (2012) shortened the term to ‘safety voice’, and this 
was subsequently adopted in a systematic review on safety voice within healthcare (Morrow et 
al., 2016).  
Whilst different labels have been used to describe the behaviour (e.g., “speaking-up”, “nurse 
voice”; Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Bickhoff et al., 2016; Habyarimana & Jack, 2011; Krenz et 
al., 2020; Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016), throughout this thesis I adopt Conchie and 
colleagues’ (2012) ‘safety voice’ and its counterpart ‘safety silence’. This is because these 
terms i) are concise, ii) highlight that the nature of the behaviour involves communication (i.e., 
the extent to which people raise or withhold concerns), and iii) emphasise the content that is 
communicated (i.e., safety) rather than a target (e.g., seniors) or context of application (e.g., 
organisations, healthcare). 
The conceptual scope of safety voice 
Safety voice involves the communication of safety-related content and has a unique 
conceptual scope (Tucker et al., 2008). That is, safety voice should be distinguished from 
constructs within the domains of communication and safety, and from concepts that consider 
voice as collective action rather than individuals’ behaviour.  
First, safety voice is distinct from communication phenomena such as advocacy (e.g., 
Windle, Mamaril, & Fossum, 2008), whistleblowing (Near & Miceli, 1985), constructive 
deviance (Vadera et al., 2013), upward dissent (Kassing, 2002), patient complaints (Reader et 
al., 2014), and especially employee voice (Burris et al., 2013; LePine & Van Dyne, 1998; 
Morrison, 2014). Safety voice appears similar to these phenomena because they capture 
constructive communication of suggestions or dissatisfaction with perceived conditions. 
                                                 
4  The extent to which employee voice and safety voice are conceptually related is addressed below and 
especially in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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However, the scope for safety voice is narrower than these phenomena because the concept is 
contingent upon people encountering safety threats and only captures communication that 
involves the extent to which safety concerns about hazardous conditions are raised.  
Furthermore, whilst research on safety voice tends to emphasise the raising of concerns 
within organisation-based dyads or teams (see Chapter 3), arguably, it is not limited to 
organisational environments: hazards can occur across social (e.g., private transportation), 
natural (e.g., floods) and organisational contexts (e.g., medicine dispensation). If this 
proposition is accepted, safety voice has a broader context of application (i.e., incorporating 
non-institutional environments and stakeholders) and this distinguishes the phenomenon from 
concepts limited to organisational environments such as advocacy, patient complaints, and 
employee voice (for further comparisons with employee voice, please see Chapter 3). 
Moreover, raising safety concerns is more frequently protected by legal and policy frameworks 
(e.g., the UK employment rights act, the NHS constitution; for a review see: Mannion et al., 
2018) and perceived as critical of management decisions (Tucker et al., 2008), and it has a 
unique set of antecedents (e.g., the speed and impact of hazards) and consequences that can be 
more severe (e.g., fatalities) than failures in achieving other organisational goals (e.g., 
maintaining financial performance).  
Finally, I distinguish safety voice from post-hoc sensemaking about mistakes because safety 
voice has the explicit aim to prevent harm (i.e., it is future-oriented). This means that I consider 
phenomena such as voluntary error reporting (i.e., which have a clear aim of learning from 
mistakes to improve future safety) a type of safety voice to the extent that they are aimed at 
preventing harm instead of understanding the reasons for unfavourable outcomes. Thus, in 
short, in comparison to other concepts capturing communication about perceived issues, safety 
voice is simultaneously more specific (i.e., it only involves the communication of safety 
concerns to prevent harm) and broader (i.e., safety voice can occur in response to any hazard).  
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In contrast, safety voice should be distinguished from other safety-related concepts. Due to 
its emphasis on preventing harm, safety voice naturally fits with safety management research 
into concepts that capture the psychological processes through which regular human behaviour 
(e.g., conforming to social norms) can lead to human error when conditions are unfavourable 
(Kohn et al., 1999; Perrow, 2011; Reason, 2000). Because of this, research on safety voice 
draws upon a broad range of supporting safety literatures such as safety culture (Guldenmund, 
2000), safety leadership (i.e., emphasising leader behaviour and influence on followers; Barling 
et al., 2002), safety citizenship behaviours (i.e., capturing extra-role behaviours beneficial to 
safety; Didla et al., 2009), and safety participation (i.e., capturing “behavior that does not 
directly contribute to an individual’s personal safety but that does support safety in the wider 
organizational context”; Neal & M. A. Griffin, 2004, p.16). These phenomena capture safety-
related activities (or perceptions thereof) within organisational environments and contribute 
important insights on the nature of safety voice (e.g., that it constitutes an important process 
for organisational learning on safety) and other safety-related behaviours and their antecedents 
(e.g., management commitment to safety; Reader et al., 2015). However, and distinguishing 
safety voice, these safety constructs have a broader scope because they capture phenomena 
beyond interpersonal communication about safety concerns (e.g., perceptions of management 
practices, safety behaviours such as handwashing, participation in decision-making on safety) 
and their effects on mitigating harm are less direct. Specifically, safety voice may warrant its 
own investigation besides broader safety concepts because safety voice i) directly captures the 
interpersonal dynamics that capture how people prevent harm through making sense of safety 
threats, ii) is directly contingent upon situational characteristics of discreet hazards (e.g., that 
elicit safety concerns, ‘safety listening’; e.g., see Chapters 5 and 6) and less on trends across 
situations (e.g., safety leadership, safety culture), and crucially, iii) does not merely contribute 
to better organisational safety performance (e.g., safety citizenship) but is considered essential 
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for mitigating accidents (as discussed above, also see Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Driscoll, 2002) 
across hazardous situations within and beyond institutional environments.  
Furthermore, safety voice is relevant for classic social psychological research on bystander 
intervention (P. Fischer et al., 2011; Latané & Darley, 1970) and disobedience to authority 
(Kaposi, 2017; Milgram, 1974). These fields also aim to promote prosocial and safe behaviours 
in hazardous settings (e.g., harmful experimental designs), and the fields have provided 
findings that appear similar in terms of the inhibiting effect of authoritarian versus inclusive 
leadership on prosocial behaviour (e.g., Weiss et al., 2018). However, the extent to which these 
concepts may be applied to safety voice and vice versa remains unclear because i) few safety 
voice studies have framed their research in terms of these domains (cf. Bienefeld & Grote, 
2012; Pian-Smith et al., 2009; Weiss et al., 2018) and ii) these concepts capture more (e.g., 
helping victims through intervening in fights; P. Fischer et al., 2011) and distinct behaviours 
(e.g., resisting continued pressure from authority figures after concerns have been initially 
raised), and, to the best of my awareness, have provided few insights into how people behave 
during actual accidents posing real safety threats. 
Finally, in the context of this thesis, I treat safety voice as individuals’ behaviour rather than 
collective action. Hirschman’s original conceptualisation of voice as communication to 
improve “an objectionable state of affairs” (Hirschman, 1970, p.30) sparked research programs 
across human resource management, organisational behaviour, political science, transaction 
cost economics, and labour process theory (Wilkinson et al., 2014). As Wilkinson and 
colleagues highlighted, these domains vary in the extent to which they focus on behaviour from 
individuals within social contexts (e.g., human resource management, organizational 
behaviour) versus collective action such as union representation or communication channels 
(e.g., political science, transaction cost economics, labour process theory). Whilst investigating 
safety voice within these domains would be a valid endeavour, here I am solely interested in 
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the behaviour of individuals engaging in interpersonal (or intragroup) communication within 
social settings (e.g., dyads, groups, institutions). 
In summary, the concept of safety voice describes the extent to which individuals speak-up 
about safety concerns to prevent harmful outcomes (e.g., accidents) and draws upon distinct 
literatures within the domains of communication and safety. Safety voice is situated at the 
intersection of these literatures and this provides a distinct scope: it only involves i) 
communication about safety concerns and ii) safety behaviour that involves communication 
about safety threats. Moreover, and unlike most voice and safety concepts, the contextual scope 
of safety voice is not limited to organisational environments because the behaviour is 
contingent upon perceived risk from hazards that can occur within and beyond institutional 
environments. 
The need to conceptualise the behavioural nature of safety voice 
Because well-intended individuals can withhold safety concerns upon encountering hazards, 
safety management needs to design interventions for promoting safety voice/reducing safety 
silence5 in order to prevent harm from mishaps (e.g., Francis, 2015; Moorhead et al., 1991; 
National Oil Spill Commission., 2011; Tarnow, 2000). Due to this, the investigation of safety 
voice has emphasised the identification of the extent to which people speak-up (Maxfield et 
al., 2013; Tucker et al., 2008) and the variables that promote safety voice (e.g., antecedents, 
interventions; O’Donovan & McAuliffe, 2020; Okuyama et al., 2014). To this end, the field 
                                                 
5 For conciseness, henceforth I only refer to promoting safety voice or reducing safety silence. 
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has contributed important insights in terms of how people attribute their safety voice and 
silence to individual and situation-specific antecedents. For instance, to the perceived efficacy 
of voicing concerns, the motivation to help and institutional hierarchies, policies and role 
expectations (Morrow et al., 2016). Other studies have highlighted that safety voice may be 
promoted when people i) are aware of hazards (Lindberg et al., 2013; Manias, 2015), ii) feel a 
personal responsibility for contributing towards favourable situational outcomes (Aydon et al., 
2016; Bickhoff et al., 2016; Jackson et al., 2010; Lyndon, 2008; Malvey et al., 2013; Manias, 
2015; Nembhard, Yuan, et al., 2015; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014a), or iii) deal with leaders 
that act in psychologically safe ways (Bickhoff et al., 2016; Detert & Burris, 2007). Okuyama 
and colleagues (2014) reviewed available research in healthcare and indicated that antecedents 
interact with people’s motive to help based on encountered safety threats. Thus, upon 
commencing this thesis, the conceptual model for the safety voice literature may be depicted 
as stating that antecedents have an impact upon the extent to which safety voice is able to 
mitigate the dysfunctional momentum of safety threats (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009) towards 
accidents (see Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1. Threat Mitigation Model of safety voice upon commencing this thesis.  
Note: this model highlights that the dysfunctional momentum of threats towards accidents 
(Barton & Sutcliff, 2009) can be mitigated through safety voice when antecedents are 
favourable for speaking-up (Okuyama et al., 2014). For the purpose of conciseness, 
antecedents are summarised. 
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However, whilst at least 48 publications have investigated safety voice (e.g., to establish 
antecedents, see Chapter 3), the concept remains nascent and disintegrated and we do not 
exactly know what the behaviour looks like in practice, or how it contributes to the mitigation 
of safety threats and accidents. That is, the extent to which the behavioural nature of safety 
voice (i.e., the nuanced manifestation of speaking-up and withholding concerns in relationship 
to hazardous scenarios) is important as understanding and mitigating the causes of accidents 
remains uncertain. For instance, it is unclear how safety voice actually occurs during hazardous 
scenarios beyond likelihoods of its occurrence, and whilst research on employee voice suggests 
that safety voice is shaped by many antecedents (Morrison, 2011, 2014), it remains unclear to 
what extent the content of safety concerns and context of hazards provides a different type of 
voice, whether safety voice is different across contexts (e.g., public versus organisational 
environments), or how safety concerns and safety listening (i.e., the extent to which others 
respond constructively or dismiss safety concerns; see Chapter 6) are important for 
understanding the role of safety voice in avoiding accidents. This is because studies on voice 
more generally (e.g., on whistleblowing; Near & Miceli, 1985) tend to adopt positivist 
approaches that aim to predict voice rather than conceptualise the complexities that characterise 
the nature of the phenomenon (Kenny et al., 2020). For instance, how its multilevel nature, 
relationship to safety threats, manifestation in speech, or effectiveness when others do not listen 
are important for conceptualising how the behaviour is relevant for preventing accidents and 
designing interventions. Indeed, at the start of the present research6, evidence on the extent to 
which safety voice poses a problem for safety management remains limited, and it is unclear 
to what extent methods are appropriate for establishing the behaviour, and interventions have 
                                                 
6  Where relevant literature has been published during the research for this thesis (prior to June 2020), 
I aimed to integrate relevant findings where appropriate. New findings were no longer included in the 
presented articles after these were published or submitted for publication. 
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had mixed success in promoting safety voice (O’Donovan & McAuliffe, 2020). In addition, 
conceptual and methodological assumptions remain unclear and unevaluated. For instance, 
whilst Tucker and colleagues (Tucker et al., 2008) conceptualised safety voice in relationship 
to employee voice, reviews on employee voice (Bashshur & Oc, 2014; Chou & Chang, 2017; 
Islam & Zyphur, 2005; Morrison, 2011, 2014; Mowbray et al., 2015) have not addressed to 
what extent it is appropriate to apply the construct to specific types of content (e.g., safety) or 
to hazards beyond organisational environments.  
Thus, to better conceptualise and assess safety voice and design interventions that increase 
the degree and effectiveness of safety voice, research is needed to evaluate the field’s 
constitutive assumptions and advance safety voice theory in terms of i) conceptualising the 
behavioural nature of the phenomenon, ii) evaluating optimal methodologies for investigating 
the behaviour, and iii) assessing the implications of the behavioural nature of safety voice for 
designing interventions. By doing this, insights may be developed into the ecological nature of 
safety voice (i.e., the dynamic relationship between safety voice and other variables across 
levels of analysis), its conceptual distinctiveness from employee voice, the extent to which the 
behaviour is contingent upon risk, the extent to which safety silence may be scaled upon safety 
voice (e.g., as a degree to which silent people engage in types of safety voice in speech), and 
the degree to which safety concerns (see Chapters 4 and 5) and safety listening (see Chapter 6) 
are essential for the effectiveness of safety voice for mitigating safety threats. Moreover, 
challenges for designing research and interventions for promoting safety voice (and reducing 
safety silence) may be identified and addressed. In this thesis I aim to contribute these insights 
by evaluating how safety voice behaviour should be optimally conceptualised, assessed and 
intervened on, and I develop these high-level and related aims in more detail below. 
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Aim 1: Precisely conceptualising the behavioural nature of safety voice 
Research on safety voice has provided initial insights towards conceptualising safety voice 
behaviour. For instance, and emulating insights from research on employee voice (Morrison, 
2014) and organisational safety (Guldenmund, 2000; Perrow, 2011; Reason, 2000), the field 
has defined and conceptualised the behaviour (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Tucker et al., 2008), 
outlined motives for people to engage in it (Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016), precisely 
described the likelihoods for safety voice across contexts and professional groups (e.g., 
Bienefeld & Grote, 2012), proposed how antecedents may elicit safety voice (e.g., Schwappach 
& Gehring, 2014a), and evaluated interventions for improving safety voice (e.g., Delisle et al., 
2016; Habyarimana & Jack, 2011). In 2016, two systematic reviews were available on safety 
voice and these thematised antecedents (Morrow et al., 2016), and outlined a model for safety 
voice in healthcare (integrating safety voice outcomes and processes; Okuyama et al., 2014) 
that draws on Morrison’s (2011) model for employee voice. 
Yet, these systematic reviews had a limited scope (i.e., qualitative or healthcare-based 
research; Morrow et al., 2016; Okuyama et al., 2014). Despite drawing out important themes 
on safety voice and ways through which people can raise concerns in healthcare (i.e., a highly 
relevant domain for safety voice due to medical staff, patients and relatives frequently 
encountering hazardous situations), these reviews did not clarify to what degree the concept of 
safety voice i) may be distinguished based on its content (e.g., safety concerns), ii) may be 
delineated across levels of analysis (e.g., individual, group, institutional; Erez & Gati, 2004), 
or iii) occurs across social and organisational contexts. This is important because, as discussed 
above, safety voice draws upon distinct supporting literatures that use diverse labels for the 
phenomenon, emphasise unique contexts, use varied methodologies, may be interested in 
diverse antecedents and outcomes, and have distinct driving assumptions. For instance, safety 
voice has been distinguished from employee voice in terms of distinct contextual factors such 
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as legal protection and safety accountabilities of leaders (Tucker et al., 2008), yet the 
appropriateness of applying employee voice concepts (e.g., psychological safety or the 
expected utility calculus; Edmondson, 1999; Murphy & Dingwall, 2007b) to safety voice 
remains unclear (e.g., it is unclear whether concerns about physical safety impact on 
interpersonal safety). 
Crucially, few insights exist into the behavioural nature of the acts of safety voice and, in 
particular, safety silence. By adopting positivist approaches (Kenny et al., 2020), safety voice 
research tends to emphasise antecedent effects in favour of assessing and conceptualising how, 
why and whether safety voice manifests effectively. It therefore appears that the field has 
assumed that concepts, measures and interventions sufficiently address the extent to which 
well-intended individuals engage in safety silence upon encountering hazardous situations. 
However, this assumption may be inappropriate because we know little about safety silence. 
This is because studies were not designed to specifically capture safety silence, few studies 
have captured the extent to which silent individuals were concerned about safety, and no study 
has observed safety voice or safety silence directly during actual hazards (Krenz et al., 2020). 
Whilst it has been argued that employee silence is contingent upon people having something 
to say (Morrison, 2014), safety voice and silence have not been investigated in relationship to 
actual risk and it remains assumed that hazards provide sufficient reason for people to speak-up 
and that silent individuals are concerned about safety. A rare exception, Schwappach and 
Gehring (2014c) highlighted that people expect to speak-up more during scenarios which they 
rate as more harmful. Yet, they indicated the need to generalise this to behaviour by directly 
observing safety voice.  
Thus, presently, the extent to which the behavioural nature of safety voice is contingent 
upon risk from hazards is unclear because we do not know the degree to which people need to 
be concerned in order to raise or withhold concerns, to what extent speech reflects the concerns 
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that people have, or even if people raise concerns in response to encountered hazards. This is 
especially important for understanding safety silence because whilst, arguably, concerns may 
be gleaned from speech when people speak-up, it is unclear to what extent silent people 
withhold safety concerns, or if concerned individuals may express their concerns in different 
ways (e.g., different strengths, types of speech, across levels of analysis, over time). Addressing 
this is important because without evaluating how the behavioural nature of safety voice is 
contingent upon risk, it remains unclear to what extent research is able to capture the raising 
and, in particular, the withholding of safety concerns (i.e., it is unclear to what extent people 
withhold concerns).  
Furthermore, whilst the importance of safety voice for mitigating risk is recognised and 
many antecedents have been described for eliciting it (e.g., psychological safety, also see 
Chapter 3; Edmondson, 1999), incidents keep happening despite people speaking-up (see 
Chapter 6). For instance, the case of United Airlines Flight 173 (NTSB, 1978) highlights that 
people may not effectively raise their concerns when others listen poorly to safety voice. This 
means that it is important to understand when safety voice is effective for mitigating harm, and 
whilst listening has been proposed as important for improving voice (Barlow et al., 2019; 
Burris et al., 2013; A. Jones & Kelly, 2014), the evidence base for this remains limited for real 
accidents, and a need remains for a systematic evaluation of how the concept of safety voice 
relates to others listening to safety voice. 
Finally, it is unclear how safety voice actually manifests. Whilst safety voice can potentially 
manifest in distinct ways (e.g., ‘I am concerned’, ‘are you sure about doing that?’, ‘hmm, 
really?’), due to limited observation of the behaviour it is unclear how people raise their 
concerns and if there is variation in its occurrence. Whilst a few notable exceptions have 
directly observed safety voice (e.g., Krenz et al., 2019; Pian-Smith et al., 2009; Weiss et al., 
2018), as far as I am aware, only three empirical studies have evaluated how people actually 
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engage in safety voice (Krenz et al., 2019; Wei Liu et al., 2016; Lyndon, 2008)7. Yet, these 
established limited behavioural variation, and to my awareness no studies have addressed how 
safety silence manifests in speech. Conceptualising this is important for understanding to what 
degree safety silence is a problem for safety management (e.g., if people only withhold 
particular themes) and it would enable the identification of the phenomenon through alternative 
means (e.g., textual analysis), and targeted interventions. A need remains to evaluate to what 
degree safety silence may be scaled in terms of the extent to which people engage in safety 
voice, or as distinct types of speech (e.g., based on safety beliefs and motivations, see 
Chapter 5), and to propose theoretical models that capture the acts of safety voice and safety 
silence in relationship to risk. One way to achieve this is by directly observing safety voice and 
safety silence (whilst assessing safety concerns) and evaluating how thematic variations in 
speech exist that explain both safety voice and silence.  
Thus, conceptual gaps remain in terms of the behavioural nature of safety voice. Ambiguity 
exists in terms of the factors that are important for understanding the behaviour (i.e., its multi-
level nature, contingency upon risk, actual manifestation, adoption of employee voice concepts, 
extent to which others listen) and there is a need to synthesise a broader range of literature into 
an integrated conceptual framework. Furthermore, safety voice theory would benefit from an 
evaluation of assumptions in terms of the behavioural manifestation of safety voice across 
levels of analysis, the relationship between safety voice and safety silence, and its lack of 
occurrence during accidents. Addressing this is important for understanding the aspects of 
safety voice behaviour that need to be targeted by measures and interventions to enable 
individuals to raise their concerns and prevent harm. I especially address this in Chapter 3 by 
                                                 
7  The study by Weiss and colleagues (2018) is not included here because this study investigated the 
effect of variation in leaders’ speech (i.e., inclusiveness) on safety voice, not how safety concerns are 
raised or withheld. 
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conceptualising the ecological nature of safety voice, in Chapter 4 and 5 by identifying the 
importance of safety concerns, in Chapter 5 by conceptualising the manifestation of safety 
voice and safety silence, and in Chapter 6 by evaluating the role of actual risk and safety 
listening (for a precise mapping of research questions onto the presented studies, please see 
Table 1.1 in the section below). In doing so, I conceptualise the behavioural nature of the safety 
voice concept and answer the first research question for this thesis: 1) What is the behavioural 
nature of safety voice? 
Aim 2: Evaluating optimal methodologies to assess safety voice 
Due to the emphasis on identifying variables that alter safety voice, the safety voice 
literature has emphasised methodologies that enable the evaluation of antecedent effects. For 
instance, through case studies (Seiden et al., 2006), focus groups (Malloy et al., 2009), cross-
sectional surveys (Gkorezis et al., 2016), simulations (Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Krenz et 
al., 2020), vignettes (Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c) and time-lagged interventions using 
experience sampling (Kines et al., 2010). However, few studies have directly assessed safety 
voice because investigating the behavioural nature of safety voice is challenging. For instance, 
safety voice occurs spontaneously in natural environments and may therefore not be readily 
obtained, and hazardous situations are difficult to ethically introduce to participants (see 
Chapters 2 and 4) or compare in standardised ways (see Chapters 4 and 6). Moreover, if 
participants are aware of being observed this may alter their behaviour (e.g., acting in a more 
socially desirable manner) and the extent to which they are concerned (e.g., because they 
understand scenarios are simulated). Yet, because of this, few insights have been provided into 
the extent to which people actually engage in safety voice (or safety listening), or how the 
manifestation of the behaviour varies in terms of types or the strength with which safety 
concerns are expressed during hazardous scenarios. Additionally, studies that have directly 
assessed safety voice behaviour (Aubin & King, 2015; Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Hu et al., 
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2016; Hughes et al., 2014; Kolbe et al., 2012, 2014; Reime et al., 2016; Sundqvist & Carlsson, 
2014) have not established the extent to which participants were concerned about safety (cf. 
Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c). This appears essential for distinguishing safety silence from 
other forms of silence (e.g., when participants have nothing to say, see Chapter 5), yet presently 
it is unclear to what extent studies need to assess safety concerns. Thus, because few studies 
have directly observed safety voice behaviour whilst assessing safety concerns, we have few 
insights into the manifestation of safety voice and especially safety silence.  
Thus, a need exists to evaluate how safety voice and safety silence manifest, yet a gap 
remains because it is unclear which methodological and ethical challenges need to be addressed 
in order to establish safety voice behaviour through direct observation (see Chapters 2 and 4). 
Methodologies have specific benefits and limitations for conceptualising results (e.g., Almeida 
et al., 2017), with triangulation of methods compensating limitations (e.g., to address the 
limited generalisability of findings from experiments; Heale & Forbes, 2013), but it is not self-
evident how safety voice behaviour may be optimally assessed. Challenges and limitations to 
obtaining data through techniques such as self-reports (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) and 
simulations have been discussed (Kolbe et al., 2015; Nestel et al., 2017), but questions remain 
in terms of how available evidence should be optimally obtained and interpreted (e.g., what is 
the role of recall and imagination in self-report studies).  
Evaluating the optimal way to investigate safety voice behaviour is important to enable the 
evaluation of the behavioural nature of safety voice and to design effective interventions. For 
instance, for improving training programs aimed at improving coordination on safety (e.g., 
Crew Resource Management training programs; Kanki et al., 2019), or revealing how the 
behaviour manifests for people that realise safety problems early on, but hold onto their 
concerns for a prolonged period (Krenz et al., 2020), or only speak-up to a small degree. When 
the safety voice literature relies on a single type of methodology (e.g., surveys), theoretical 
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insights may be limited by the constraints of the methodology used and may rely on confounded 
insights (e.g., by a common method bias; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Furthermore, without 
clarity on optimal methods, the effectiveness of interventions may not be ascertained. Thus, a 
need exists for evaluating how the behavioural nature of safety voice may be optimally 
investigated. This might be addressed by, for instance, evaluating how experimental and field-
based methodologies contribute unique insights by enabling direct access to variation in the 
nuanced, non-binary, manifestation of safety voice behaviour and safety concerns. Specifically, 
I address this in this thesis by evaluating the ethical and methodological challenges of assessing 
safety voice and designing an experimental methodology in Chapter 2 and 4, analysing the 
types and degrees of safety voice and silence in Chapter 5, and illustrating how safety voice 
behaviours in the field may be investigated through archival analyses of historic aviation 
accidents (Chapter 6). In doing so, I evaluate the second research question for this thesis, which 
I formulate as: 2) What is the optimal way to investigate safety voice behaviour? 
Aim 3: Evaluating how interventions should be optimally designed  
Finally, the design of effective interventions may be optimally realised based upon sound 
concepts that theorise the behaviour targeted by the intervention. This is because interventions 
(e.g., to provide more encouraging leadership; Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014) may be optimal at 
targeting distinct subtypes of the behaviour (e.g., for concerns based on safety knowledge 
versus safety motivation; Christian et al., 2009) and may only be effective when certain 
prerequisites are met (e.g., if people are highly concerned). However, whilst studies have 
proposed subtypes of safety voice (Krenz et al., 2019; Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016), I have 
not been able to identify studies that addressed the extent to which interventions are contingent 
upon the behavioural nature of safety voice.  
Evaluating to what extent the conceptual and methodological gaps described above have 
implications for designing safety voice interventions is important because evidence for the 
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success of safety voice interventions remains mixed. That is, in their review on healthcare-
based interventions, O’Donovan and McAuliffe (2020) identified nine studies that used 
education methods combined with simulation (Pian-Smith et al., 2009), leadership videos 
(O’Connor et al., 2013) and case studies (e.g., H. L. Johnson & Kimsey, 2012). These studies 
indicated positive (e.g., H. L. Johnson & Kimsey, 2012), unfavourable (Raemer et al., 2016) 
and mixed effects for safety voice interventions (O’Connor et al., 2013; Pian-Smith et al., 
2009). Because of this, I agree with O’Donovan and McAuliffe (2020) that further research is 
needed to evaluate when interventions are effective. Furthermore, the implications of the 
behavioural nature of safety voice for designing interventions remain unclear because the 
relationship between interventions and antecedents remains poorly conceptualised (e.g., in 
terms of mechanisms; Peadon et al., 2020) and a need remains to evaluate how safety voice is 
shaped by variables across levels of analysis and in terms of subtypes of the behaviour. 
Moreover, it remains unclear whether accidents may be better prevented by improving the 
likelihood of safety voice, or the extent to which others listen effectively. 
Thus, in short, a need exists to evaluate the extent to which interventions are effective at 
improving safety voice and to conceptualise the relationship between interventions and the 
behavioural nature of safety voice. I address this across Chapters 3-6 and especially Chapter 5 
and 6 by evaluating available evidence on safety voice antecedents and interventions and 
evaluating how interventions need to be tailored to the behavioural nature of safety voice. This 
addresses the third question for this thesis, which I formulate as: 3) To what extent do 
interventions for promoting safety voice and reducing safety silence need to be tailored to the 
behavioural nature of safety voice? 
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Thesis overview 
Overview of intended contributions 
In summary, currently the safety voice literature emphasises that whilst safety voice is a key 
contributor to preventing injuries and accidents, interventions are needed because people often 
withhold safety concerns during safety-critical scenarios. To improve safety management 
(Beus et al., 2016; Swuste et al., 2020) and to design interventions to reduce safety silence, it 
is therefore important to consider the extent to which safety threats with a dysfunctional 
momentum towards accidents (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009) elicit safety concerns, safety voice 
(or safety silence) and safety listening. However, currently the literature provides limited 
insights into how people create safety through speaking-up and a need exists to better 
understand safety voice in terms of how the behaviour should be optimally conceptualised (aim 
1), assessed (aim 2) and intervened on (aim 3). By doing this, I intend to contribute conceptual 
and methodological insights specific to the safety voice literature, and to the fields of safety 
management and social psychology more generally. In this section, I provide an overview of 
intended contributions to the specific areas of research that I contribute to.  
First, I intend to contribute specific conceptual and methodological insights to the safety 
voice literature. These include clarifying i) the relationship between employee voice and safety 
voice (i.e., testing a central proposition of the field; Tucker et al., 2008), ii) the relationship 
between safety voice and antecedents across levels of analysis (i.e., disentangling previously 
collapsed antecedents; Okuyama et al., 2014), iii) assumptions in theory (i.e., which remain 
unidentified), iv) the relationship between risk and safety voice through evaluating the extent 
to which people speak-up during actual hazards (i.e., because safety voice has not been studied 
during actual hazards; Krenz et al., 2020), v) the extent to which safety voice manifests in a 
distinct way (i.e., expanding the understanding of the manifestation of voice and silence in 
speech; e.g., Krenz et al., 2019), and vi) the importance of safety concerns and safety listening 
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for the effectiveness of safety voice in preventing harmful outcomes. Furthermore, I aim to 
make tractable new ways of researching safety voice by i) evaluating optimal safety voice 
methodologies, ii) providing a controlled, standardised and generalisable method for 
investigating safety voice (i.e., an experimental paradigm), iii) providing baseline data on 
safety voice, iv) evaluating the need for operationalising safety voice as an observable 
behaviour, v) establishing the extent to which safety concerns need to be assessed to measure 
safety silence, and vi) illustrating how safety voice may be investigated in the field by analysing 
archival data. 
Second, I aim to contribute to research on safety management and social psychology. By 
evaluating how safety voice should be optimally conceptualised, I intend to highlight the extent 
to which the concept of safety voice has drawn from distinct safety literatures (Didla et al., 
2009; Guldenmund, 2000; Neal et al., 2000) and evaluate how safety voice may be understood 
as a separate behavioural phenomenon that is contingent upon situational characteristics such 
as risk (i.e., eliciting safety concerns) and the extent to which others listen (i.e., conceptualising 
an essential behaviour for the flow of safety-related information; Westrum, 2014). Thus, I aim 
to establish evidence that enables the proposition of a more nuanced and complete Threat 
Mitigation Model for the role of safety voice in the prevention of accidents (see Figure 1.1).  
Moreover, by investigating the role of risk in the behavioural nature of safety voice, I aim 
to clarify the extent to which safety voice can shed light on how common social behaviours 
can inhibit safety management (i.e., testing the limits of the contribution of common social 
behaviour to accidents; Perrow, 2011; van den Bos, van Lange, et al., 2011). That is, I establish 
the extent to which people i) are willing to remain silent upon facing unfavourable leadership 
when their own lives are actually at stake (Kaposi, 2017; Milgram, 1974), ii) follow social 
norms dependent on encountered risks (i.e., expanding insights into social norms; Asch, 1956), 
and iii) engage in behaviours reflective of information processing during emergency situations 
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that pose actual risk (P. Fischer et al., 2011; Latané & Darley, 1970). In addition, I contribute 
to the social psychological literatures on how people respond defensively to encountered 
threats (e.g., worldview defence in response to anxiety; Jonas et al., 2014) by highlighting that 
safety voice provides a specific type of defence against harm that involves sense-making for 
encountered hazards.  
By evaluating optimal methodologies, I contribute to the safety management and social 
psychology literatures by indicating how behavioural methodologies (i.e., laboratory 
experiments, analyses of archival data originating from the field) enable access to safety 
behaviours that are challenging to study (e.g., in natural environments, or without exposing 
participants to unethical levels of risks). I also contribute a novel experimental methodology 
that has the potential to be adapted in order to conduct obedience research in an ethical fashion 
(i.e., enabling new ways of investigating phenomena such as obedience)8.  
Finally, I aim to enable more effective safety management by i) highlighting to what extent 
interventions have been effectively designed for people to speak-up when they are concerned 
about safety (i.e., explaining mixed evidence on intervention succes; O’Donovan & McAuliffe, 
2020), and ii) evaluating the extent to which interventions need to address people’s safety 
concerns (i.e., indicating the importance of risk perception for reducing safety silence; Slovic, 
1987) and safety listening (i.e., evidencing the proposed importance of others' listening 
behaviours for effective safety voice; Barlow et al., 2019; Burris et al., 2012; A. Jones & Kelly, 
2014). 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that any undue pressure of authority figures should be carefully evaluated because 
any psychological harm to participants should prohibit the use of the experimental paradigm presented 
in this thesis (also see Chapter 2). 
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Mapping of research questions 
As outlined above, in this thesis, I aim to address three aims that I summarise as: evaluating 
how safety voice should be optimally conceptualised, assessed and intervened on. To address 
this, I ask: 1) What is the behavioural nature of safety voice? 2) What is the optimal way to 
investigate safety voice behaviour? And, 3) To what extent do interventions for promoting 
safety voice and reducing safety silence need to be tailored to the behavioural nature of safety 
voice? These higher-level questions inform the specific research questions outlined and 
developed within the four presented articles, with multiple research questions addressing the 
higher level aims of this thesis (for a mapping, please see Table 1.1).  
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Table 1.1. Overview and mapping of research questions. 













1) Which definitions, conceptualisations and 
theoretical backgrounds characterise safety 
voice? 
X   
2) What is the ecological nature of safety voice in 
terms of inhibiting (promoting) relationships 
between safety voice and antecedents, 
pragmatics, and outcomes across levels of 
analysis? 
X  X 
3) Which methodologies have been used for 
researching safety voice, how suitable are they, 
and what methodological challenges remain? 




1) To what degree can experimental methodologies 
address challenges for observing the 
behavioural nature of safety voice? 
X X  
2) To what degree can experimental methodologies 
address challenges for reducing the 
methodological reliance on memory and 
imagination? 
 X  
3) To what degree can experimental methodologies 
address challenges for advancing knowledge on 
the factors that predict safety voice? 




1) To what degree can safety silence be scaled 
based on the distinct themes that people voice? 
X X  
2) To what degree do interventions reduce safety 
silence? 
X  X 
3) To what degree does safety silence manifest 
differently over time? 




1a)  To what extent did flight crew engage in safety 
 voice across historic aviation accidents? 
X   
1b) To what extent has safety voice increased 
during aviation accidents since the 1980s? 
  X 
2a) To what extent does safety listening predict 
safety voice engagement for junior staff during 
aviation accidents? 
X   
2b) To what extent has safety listening improved 
 during aviation accidents since the 1980s? 
  X 
3) To what degree does power distance explain 
 safety voice and safety listening during historic 
 aviation accidents? 
X  X 
Abbreviation: Ch.: Chapter. 
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Thesis structure 
 This doctoral thesis is presented as a PhD-by-publication. Four articles are presented that 
address the three aims of this thesis developed above through fourteen studies that use 
experimental and archival methodologies (see Table 1.2; methods are developed within each 
article, and especially Chapter 4). A narrative to connect the articles is provided through 
additional chapters (i.e., introduction, approach, discussion) and article prefaces. The 
organisation of the thesis’ sections complies to guidelines outlined by LSE’s PhD academy. Its 
general structure is consistent with past theses using the PhD-by-publication format within the 
Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science (e.g., using article prefaces, a scoping 
review alongside a systematic review). The articles are structured to meet the author guidelines 
for the journal in which they are published (i.e., Safety Science for Article 1, Frontiers in 
Psychology for Article 2), or to which they have been submitted to (i.e., Safety Science for 
Article 3, Risk Analysis for Article 4). For the purpose of a consistent presentation of this 
thesis, the complete thesis (i.e., including the published articles) has been formatted according 
to APA style, 7th edition and I provided a chapter number to tables and figures (e.g., ‘Table 
2.1’ refers to Chapter 2, Table 1). I hold sole authorship for this thesis and chapters, and first 
authorship for the presented articles contained within it. Dr Tom Reader and Dr Alex Gillespie 
functioned as thesis supervisor and co-supervisor, respectively. Whilst challenging to quantify 
this, we agreed that as article co-authors they contributed approximately 20%. Author 
contributions are also specified in the preface to each article alongside the work conducted by 
research assistants.  
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In the next chapters, I present my approach to conducting the present thesis (i.e., philosophy 
of science, how an ethical approach is achieved; Chapter 2) and four articles prefaced with a 
discussion regarding the relationship between the articles and the thesis’ research questions. In 
the articles, I systematically review research on safety voice (Chapter 3), establish an 
experimental methodology to establish safety voice behaviours (Chapter 4), conceptualise and 
evaluate implications of the behavioural nature of safety voice and silence (Chapter 5) and 
establish the extent to which safety voice manifests during actual hazards and how this may be 
explained (Chapter 6). In the discussion and outlook (Chapter 7), I evaluate the contributions 
made to theory, methods and application, highlight limitations, and suggest new directions for 
research. 
Table 1.2. Overview of studies conducted as part of this thesis, in order of presentation. 
Study Date npartcipants nother Format Discussed in 
1 Pilot to explore paradigms Nov 
2016 
25  Laboratory Chapter 2 
2 Pilot to Walking the Plank 
#3 (laminate plank) 
Oct 
2017 
8  Laboratory Chapter 2 
3 Systematic review  Mar 
2017 
 48  Archival Chapter 3 (main study) 
4 Walking the plank #1 Apr 
2017 
129  Laboratory Chapter 4 (study 1) 
5 Walking the plank #2 Jun 
2017 
69  Laboratory Chapter 4 (study 2) 
6 Pilot to Walking the Plank #3  
(info on maximum load)  
Nov 
2017 
38  Laboratory Chapter 4 (footnote) 
7 Walking the plank #3 Jun 
2018 
75  Laboratory Chapter 4 (study 3) 
8 Pilot on risk perception #1 Jun 
2018 
88  Web-based Chapter 4 (footnote) 
9 Pilot on risk perception #2 Jun 
2018 
57  Web-based Chapter 4 (footnote) 
10 Pilot on risk perception #3 Jun 
2018 
37  Web-based Chapter 5 (footnote) 




237  Web-based Chapter 5 (pilot study) 
12 Sounds of silence study Jan 
2019 
404  Laboratory Chapter 5 (main study) 
13 Pilot by MSc students at 
LSE  
(closed/ open leader) 
May 
2017 
55  Laboratory Chapter 6 (preface) 




 172 Archival Chapter 6 (main study) 
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CHAPTER 2: 
APPROACH TO INVESTIGATING SAFETY VOICE 
Before presenting the studies that answer this thesis’ research questions, it is important to 
consider how I have approached the investigation of safety voice in terms of philosophy of 
science and ethics. This is because, whilst a wide range of approaches to investigating safety 
voice are conceivable, studies can be rooted in distinct and opposing assumptions about the 
nature of speaking-up in response to real hazards and have the potential to inflict harm.  
That is, first, because philosophy of science provides conflicting ontological (i.e., how the 
nature of the world is understood; Epstein, 2018) and epistemological positions (i.e., how valid 
knowledge about the world may be obtained; Steup & Neta, 2020), so research on safety voice 
may be rooted in distinct assumptions that shape how studies are designed. For instance, when 
the literature assumes that physical and social facts exist (Searle, 1995) and can only be known 
through experience (James, 1976/1910) it is more appropriate to investigate the behavioural 
nature of safety voice through empirical means than through thought experiments (i.e., these 
would not be deemed valid for providing empirical data). Conversely, if the literature assumes 
that the human mind is the only base of reality and the only way to know anything (i.e, idealism; 
Guyer & Horstmann, 2019) it is more appropriate to understand how individuals and groups 
think about their safety voice behaviour (e.g., through focus groups or interviews). 
Moreover, due to its interests in human subjects and accident avoidance, safety voice 
research has the potential to inflict harm. That is, the field aims to capture the extent to which 
people speak-up upon encountering hazardous situations, yet when participants are exposed to, 
or observed during real-life hazards participants may be unduly harmed. This makes 
investigating safety voice challenging (i.e., it restricts the available approaches to obtaining 
valid data), and because of this the safety voice literature has tended to rely on self-report 
Chapter 2: Approach to investigating safety voice 52 
methodologies that ask participants to reflect on their safety voice behaviour before or after 
hazardous situations have occurred (e.g., Hanson, 2017; see Chapters 3 and 4) or by hiding the 
true intent of safety voice experiments from participants (e.g., Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014). 
However, empirical philosophical positions may suggest that self-reports cannot be considered 
optimal for drawing conclusions on behaviour (e.g., due to empirical and ontological gaps 
between reports and behaviour, see Chapter 4) and it is not self-evident how ethical challenges 
(e.g., using deception procedures versus obtaining rigorous and valid data) should be optimally 
addressed. 
Thus, to evaluate how scholars may optimally approach the investigation of safety voice 
behaviour (therefore contributing to research question 2: What is the optimal way to investigate 
safety voice behaviour?), a need exists to understand how my philosophy of science provides 
assumptions for investigating safety voice and to evaluate how ethical challenges may be 
addressed by safety voice research. Without this, it is unclear how the experimental (i.e., 
laboratory- and web-based) and archival studies (i.e., a systematic review of historic aviation 
accidents) in this thesis should be designed. To address this, below I first consider the 
assumptions provided by my philosophy of science and its impact on designing the presented 
studies. Subsequently, I evaluate how safety voice research may address ethical challenges. For 
this, I review relevant ethical standards provided by professional bodies (e.g., the American 
Psychological Association, British Psychological Society; APA, 2017; BPS, 2018) and the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE, 2016a), identify how these standards 
may shape safety voice research and discuss how an ethical approach is achieved in this thesis. 
Thus, this chapter outlines the philosophical and ethical foundation for the design of the studies 
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in the next chapters9. For the purpose of conciseness, methodological challenges to 
investigating the behavioural nature of safety voice are not emphasised in this chapter. These 
are reviewed, established and addressed in Chapters 3-6 (e.g., Article 2 presents an 
experimental paradigm to address methodological challenges in investigating safety voice).  
Philosophy of science 
To reiterate, considering how my philosophy of science underpins research on safety voice 
is important because ontological (i.e., how I understand the nature of the physical and social 
world; Epstein, 2018) and epistemological positions (i.e., how valid knowledge about the world 
may be obtained; Steup & Neta, 2020) provide assumptions that drive theoretical and 
methodological choices. A full treatise on the philosophy of science in relationship to 
investigating safety voice, or safety management more broadly (e.g., see Haavik, 2014), is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis, but below I discuss how my philosophy of science 
impacts on the approach to investigating safety voice. 
In terms of ontology, I am persuaded by perspectives that accept the existence of physical 
and social reality (i.e., realist ontologies), yet I acknowledge the difficulty in establishing 
reality as independent from human experience (i.e., idealism; Guyer & Horstmann, 2019). For 
instance, whilst debated for its interpretation of contexts (B. Smith & Searle, 2003), I adopt 
Searle’s (1995) realist distinction between i) things that exist without needing interpretation 
such as the earth or laws of physics (i.e., ‘brute facts’), and ii) things that exist within human 
experience such as pain (i.e., ‘mental facts’). According to Searle, mental facts include a 
subcategory that involve things that people have agreed on to constitute a function in a context 
such as money, borders, or risk (i.e., ‘institutional facts’). Yet, adopting pragmatic principles, 
                                                 
9 For this, it is unavoidable that some comments look ahead to the next chapters, and I have aimed to 
balance the need to i) understand the choices made for designing the presented studies and ii) and 
maintaining the readability of this chapter for the reader who has not yet read the next chapters. 
Chapter 2: Approach to investigating safety voice 54 
I only consider these distinctions ontologically meaningful to the extent that brute and 
institutional facts can elicit outcomes (e.g., hitting a brick wall, avoiding risks). As William 
James put it: “Everything real must be experiencable somewhere, and every kind of thing 
experienced must be somewhere real.” (James, 1976/1910; p.125, spelling as original). This 
pragmatist position does not assume that experiences (though real in themselves) need to be 
valid or based on something true because experiences and activities provide meaningful 
realities for perceivers (James, 1976/1910) and the subjective perception of environments is 
therefore sufficient for people to alter their behaviour.  
Thus, I assume the existence of physical and social facts, but acknowledge that these are 
only ontologically meaningful through the consequences they can have. These consequences 
may be experienced differently because people are an integral component of their social, 
natural, and technical contexts (i.e., a holistic perspective): people dynamically shape and are 
affected by their environments (e.g., Erez & Gati, 2004). I therefore also accept that 
experiences and interpretations (e.g., the fatal outcomes of hazards and the understanding of 
these) can vary across contexts and do not need to be valid in order to elicit consequences. Yet, 
because ‘real’ resides at least in part in the experience of consequences (James, 1976/1910) I 
consider it problematic to deny the consequences of events in themselves (e.g., in terms of 
biological or social consequences such as hearts stopping, or people arranging funeral 
rituals)10. Thus, in summary, this means that for my ontological position I adopt principles 
from realism, pragmatism and holism, and assume that the world has a nature that is at least in 
                                                 
10 To illustrate: based on our context (e.g., available information, cultural values dictating the 
desirability of risk and responses to risk) we may construct a hazard as risky (e.g., flying an uncertified 
aircraft, omitting to wash hands prior to medical procedures) and therefore alter our behaviour or 
proceed and experience the outcomes (none, crashing, infecting a patient). In the case of boarding an 
aircraft, gravity (i.e., a brute fact) and our risk assessment (i.e., an institutional fact), lead to a range 
of possible experiences (e.g., flying the aircraft as usual, dread, evasive actions, injuries, etc.), with 
the nature of the physical and social world manifesting through these experiences. 
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part identifiable (i.e., realism) which enables ontological claims by providing ontologically 
meaningful experience of consequences (i.e., pragmatism), and that the world is constituted of 
dynamic systems (i.e., holism). 
In terms of epistemology, my assumption that reality manifests itself in the consequences it 
elicits means that I assume that knowledge can be advanced through empirical means. As Legg 
and Hookway summarise Peirce’s pragmatism: “we test theories by carrying out experiments 
in the expectation that if the hypothesis is not true, then the experiment will fail to have some 
predetermined sensible effect” (Legg & Hookway, 2019; no page number). Yet, I accept that a 
degree of epistemological uncertainty is inherent in scientific inquiry because people are 
fallible (Legg & Hookway, 2019) and the process of advancing and applying knowledge is 
social. That is, cognitive and social biases can inhibit the advancement of knowledge, and 
knowledge is frequently contested because the world is represented in different ways across 
groups and historical periods (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). Thus, and consistent with Haavik 
(2014), my epistemology is rooted in a relational social ontology: I assume that knowledge can 
be advanced through empirical means and acknowledge that science progresses through 
complex social processes of sensemaking in which scientists justify and contest knowledge 
(e.g., peer-reviewing). 
My ontological and epistemological assumptions have at least four implications for my 
approach to investigating safety voice in the next chapters. It means, first, that I treat 
characteristics of hazardous scenarios (e.g., physical laws, safety information, technical 
equipment, policies) and mental states (e.g., risk perceptions) as ontologically meaningful 
(though distinct types of facts) because they can elicit observable consequences (e.g., 
speaking-up, aviation accidents). Yet, second, it highlights that I consider behaviour and 
perceptions different types of facts and do not assume the accurate correspondence between 
perceptions and the world (e.g., behaviour, safety, safety listening). Because of this, I consider 
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self-reports meaningful (i.e., they elicit consequences) but suboptimal for establishing 
behaviour (i.e., an empirical gap exists between observable behaviour and mental facts). Thus, 
I explicitly test for the extent to which behaviour and perceptions overlap in the presented 
experiments (i.e., Chapters 4 and 5), and highlight the importance of assessing behaviour 
alongside people’s perceptions about the world (i.e., Chapters 4-6). Third, my assumptions 
indicate that I treat empirical evidence (e.g., data from behavioural observations, reports, 
transcripts from conversations) as building towards a better understanding of safety voice, 
whilst I do not assume that evidence necessarily indicates final and optimal knowledge. This 
explains why in the next chapters I systematically review empirical studies (i.e., instead of 
opinion pieces that are valuable but present no emprical evidence; Markiewiz, 2002; Spruce, 
2014), and obtain empirical data from experiments and an archival analysis (i.e., these obtain 
empirical data through methods that can be reproduced and refined). Finally, it means that I 
assume that the advancement of knowledge (e.g., raising safety concerns, building safety voice 
theory) is achieved through justification, contestation and refinement, which partly explains 
my choice to conceptualise safety listening in Chapter 6 (the other part involving its empirical 
and conceptual need), and to enable future research by making the study data (Chapters 3, 5 
and 6), protocols (Chapter 3-5), statistical code (Chapter 5) and publications available in open 
access (all articles, with the same intention for Articles 3 and 4 upon publication). 
An ethical approach to researching safety voice 
In addition to philosophy of science, ethical challenges shape the approach to investigating 
safety voice. Studies have demonstrated that safety voice provides desirables outcomes because 
it promotes patient safety indicators (e.g., appropriate procedures; Kolbe et al., 2015), is 
recalled by 74-78% of professionals (i.e., trainees and ‘attendings’) to prevent adverse events 
(Belyansky et al., 2011), and may have prevented mishaps across high-reliability industries 
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(see Chapter 1). However, whilst safety voice research has the virtuous aim of preventing harm, 
historic examples indicate that safety voice studies may ironically inflict harm. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, research on deindividuation (as discussed in: Zimbardo, 2011) and 
obedience to authority, undertaken by Milgram (1963, 1974) provided valuable insights into 
the factors that could lead people to act malevolently. Milgram’s research is particularly 
relevant for safety voice because of the conceptual familiarity between the conscious decisions 
to speak-up and disobedience when defined as an act of resistance (Kaposi, 2017). Milgram 
contributed a valuable conceptualisation of historical events (e.g., power relationships in Nazi 
Germany), yet sparked a debate on the ethics of conducting social psychological research. For 
instance, in terms of inflicted psychological harm (e.g., due to significant stress experienced) 
and the apparent lack of a right to withdraw (i.e., withdrawal was the dependent variable, and 
manipulations altered the perceived freedom to do so; Miller, 1986; Miller et al., 1995).  
The evaluation of whether this research crossed ethical boundaries depends, in part, on 
guidelines available at the time (APA, 1959) and the moral philosophical position taken 
(Miller, 1986; for a discussion on the ethics of harm avoidance, see: Bradley, 2012; Christie et 
al., 2008; Miller, 1986). For example, inflicting minimal harm to gain insights into how people 
speak-up within malevolent scenarios may be considered universally undesirable in a 
deontological view (e.g., because it crosses a general principle of non-maleficence; Sharpe, 
1997), acceptable in a utilitarian/consequentialist perspective (e.g., because the minimal harm 
weighs up against the benefit of applying new insights to prevent many accidents), or 
honourable within a virtue-ethics perspective (e.g., because the motive for increasing safety 
was appropriate for its context; Bolsin et al., 2005). Safety voice research appears to 
incorporate a utilitarian perspective in researching safety voice because concepts for safety 
voice have incorporated utilitarian principles (e.g., trade-offs between cost and benefits of 
speaking-up; Morrison, 2014; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014d), and the need for investigating 
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safety voice is typically justified through its contribution to harm-avoidance (e.g., see the 
introduction to this thesis), which implicitly appeals to the consequences of the behaviour (e.g., 
Christie et al., 2008). 
Yet, because of the range of perspectives on what is considered moral behaviour, and the 
implications of this for the approach to investigating safety voice, considering ethical standards 
for research design is key. Without this, participants’ well-being may not be safeguarded, the 
field and research institutes may suffer reputation damage, and study results may be invalid 
(e.g., due to the altered states of participants). Thus, I now turn to reviewing ethical standards. 
Review of ethical standards 
Ethical guidelines have been outlined by key international and national bodies (e.g., APA, 
2017; BPS, 2014, 2018), as well as the institution where this work was conducted (LSE, 2016a, 
2016b). For the field of social psychology, these guidelines provide principles that serve to 
guide conduct and research. For example, the BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct (BPS, 2018) 
outlines professional standards to guide decision-making (1.3, 1.6)11, and describes four ethical 
principles that constitute the “main domains of responsibility” (p.4) for psychologists: respect, 
competence, responsibility and integrity (2.1). An overlap in principles exists within and across 
ethics codes (Bell & Bryman, 2007), and when recent codes are mapped and synthesised, four 
principles provide important directions for investigating safety voice (see Table 2.1) that need 
to be maintained by scholars in designing and conducting research (including myself in the 
present thesis): respect for others, striving for excellence in research; responsibility, and 
minimising harm. 
First, the ethical guidelines suggest that it is important to respect others. The BPS considers 
respect for others the “philosophical foundation for many of the other ethical Principles” (BPS, 
                                                 
11 Numbers refer to sections of the ethics code. 
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2018, p.5). This respect entails an understanding and appreciation of human worth and the right 
to self-determination, irrespective of biases that may emerge, based on “cultural, individual, 
and role differences” (APA, 2017, p.4), and means that no person is to be in a manner that is 
“less [than] favourable” (LSE, 2016a, p.3), with the benefits of the field’s contributions equally 
accessible to all people (APA, 2017). Finally, respecting others’ right to self-determination 
means that scholars should obtain informed consent, allow participants to withdraw consent 
without penalty, enable the destruction of participant data upon request, and maintain 
anonymity (BPS, 2018). To illustrate, respectful conduct may involve equal treatment and the 
inclusion of different demographics, whereas disrespectful conduct may involve harassment 
and discrimination against study participants.  
Second, the ethical guidelines stress the importance of striving for excellence in research. 
Excellence in research means that safety voice scholars should strive to achieve high standards 
in their work, conduct themselves with integrity, and not conduct work “outside their areas of 
knowledge, skill, training and experience” (BPS, 2018, p.8). This includes integrity in 
accurately presenting research, complying with legislation (including not committing crimes), 
ensuring intellectual freedom and declared conflicts of interest, keeping commitments (APA, 
2017; LSE, 2016a), and producing high quality research output (BPS, 2018). Furthermore, 
excellence in research provides for the need to obtain valid data, and thus allows safety voice 
Table 2.1. Principles for ethical conduct and research by ethics code. 
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studies to use deception procedures when valid data could not be collected if participants knew 
the study’s intent beforehand (BPS, 2018). However, the ethics guidelines agree that deception 
should be used sparingly and only when participants are fully debriefed (i.e., explaining the 
study details after participation), distress from the deception is mitigated, and approval is 
obtained from ethics review boards (APA, 2017; BPS, 2018; LSE, 2009). To illustrate, 
excellence may involve the accurate reporting of a study into the influence of workload on 
safety voice whilst acknowledging that proposing a policy intervention to this effect includes 
considerations beyond one’s expertise (e.g., business finance), whereas poor excellence may 
involve the use of deception without debriefing participants. 
Third, the ethical guidelines highlight the importance of acting responsibly. Psychologists 
have professional autonomy due to their expertise (BPS, 2018), and this autonomy requires 
careful conduct around the management of entrusted data, application of knowledge and skills 
(BPS, 2018), management of conflicts of interest, serving the best interests of others (APA, 
2017), considering research contributions to society and the potential for problematic 
interpretations (BPS, 2014), and raising ethical concerns when these emerge (LSE, 2016b). To 
illustrate, responsible conduct would be to ensure data is stored in a protected environment, 
whereas irresponsible conduct would be to not anonymise junior staff members’ responses to 
a safety voice survey (i.e., to avoid identification and blame). 
Finally, the ethical guidelines emphasise the importance of safety voice research minimising 
harm. Whilst minimising harm overlaps with taking responsibility, and especially respect for 
others, it is stressed by all ethics codes (APA, 2017; BPS, 2014, 2018; LSE, 2016a, 2016b). 
This involves minimising the impact of any variables that may negatively affect participants 
(e.g., stress, invasion of privacy and infringement of personal values; BPS, 2014), safeguarding 
participant and researchers’ welfare (APA, 2017), and identifying and managing risks that 
exceed those encountered in daily life (BPS, 2018). Reflecting a utilitarian perspective, the 
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BPS (2018) considers risks that are minimal yet provide long-term benefits to be potentially 
appropriate, but this is for the consideration of research ethics committees. Unique amongst 
ethics codes, the LSE Ethics code stresses that minimising harm goes beyond minimising harm 
to humans and applies to the environment too (i.e., sustainability). 
Maintaining ethical standards in this thesis 
The four ethical principles identified within the ethical guidelines have important 
implications for the investigation of safety voice, and this has guided the research presented in 
this thesis. Because ethical challenges exist at every stage of research (i.e., from design to 
publication), conducting ethical research is an on-going process that has permeated all aspects 
of this thesis, and below I highlight how within the next chapters I have aimed to address the 
challenges posed by the four identified ethical principles: respect for others, excellence in 
research, responsibility and minimisation of harm. 
Respect for others 
The review of ethical guidelines indicates that, to ensure respect for others, safety voice 
researchers should treat participants, research assistants and the dissemination of data 
appropriately. To achieve this, and in addition to my personal commitment to respecting others, 
for the research presented in this thesis I have treated participants with dignity and in equal 
ways. For instance, respect for participants is achieved by recruiting across available 
demographics in participant pools (i.e., for the Behavioural Research Lab, Prolific Academic), 
without undue exclusions based on differences in culture, personality or roles (i.e., I only 
exclude participants if they have previously participated in any of the presented studies in this 
thesis). Furthermore, the ethical standards indicate that the investigation of safety voice should 
provide participants with the right to self-determination: they should be able to decide whether 
to take part and withdraw without being treated unfairly, and their data should be destroyed 
upon request. For the data collected in this thesis (excluding the use of publicly available 
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archival data), this is achieved by enabling participants to make an informed decision to partake 
(informed consent) and requesting explicit permission to include participant’s data after the 
full debriefing. Moreover, an additional statement is included in the debriefing information of 
the experimental studies: “You are completely free to withdraw your participation without any 
consequence, or loss of reward for your time. Please indicate this to us if this case. Your 
answers and video recording will then be destroyed”. Future safety voice research may 
incorporate this statement into a debriefing procedure to ensure respect for others. 
Additionally, the ethical standards indicate that research on safety voice should ensure 
respect for others by respecting the privacy of participants. This is achieved by collecting data 
in anonymous ways (i.e., names are never requested). In addition, I maintain existing levels of 
privacy when using archival data by not re-publishing any names of involved participants (i.e., 
names identified in accident investigation reports presented in Chapter 6). Finally, safety voice 
research should make the benefits of research equally accessible to all people, and the articles 
and data contained in the next chapters are therefore made publicly available (e.g., published, 
or submitted for publication as open access). An exception to this (i.e., public availability of 
the data for Article 2) is discussed below. 
Respect for research assistants may, arguably, be achieved by the investigation of safety 
voice by treating them as colleagues in a specialised field (e.g., accepting their unique views 
on researching safety-related behaviours), and by providing them with a degree of self-
determination in terms of the days they wanted to contribute (e.g., for collecting data). 
Accordingly, I communicated to research assistants that I perceived them as colleagues and 
provided them with flexible time-allocation. Of relevance to respecting research assistants, 
research that uses the Walking the plank paradigm (see Chapters 4 and 5) should address one 
particularly sensitive issue. Because the protocol involves a hazard whereby a research assistant 
walks across a plank with an alleged low maximum load, it is important to establish realism by 
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verifying that research assistants’ body weights exceed the maximum load. One’s body weight 
can be a sensitive issue, and this indicates that safety voice research needs to identify and 
provide ways to appropriately address sensitive issues (i.e., I verified individual’s weights but 
did not publish these). 
In addition, safety voice research should respect research assistants by providing appropriate 
employment contracts. This is important for providing them protection and security, yet 
unfortunately, and outside my own control, delays occurred in arranging employment contracts 
(i.e., up to two months). This provided strains on the schedule for the thesis, and those of the 
research assistants. I resolved this by refusing that work would commence early, and I only 
accepted one occasion where research assistants volunteered to keep track of hours and submit 
these at a later stage. Though research assistants were duly rewarded, this provided a 
suboptimal solution. I addressed this subsequently by scheduling additional time for arranging 
contracts, and future researchers are recommended to familiarise themselves upfront with the 
existing contract lead times in their institutions. 
Excellence in Research 
Secondly, the review of ethical standards indicates that the investigation of safety voice 
needs to demonstrate excellence in research, and a high standard of work is achieved in this 
thesis by ensuring rigorous protocols and methods, accuracy in presented data, intellectual 
freedom and compliance with (new) legislation. 
Rigorous protocols are developed in the next chapters through the iterative development of 
study protocols and measures. For instance, Article 2 presents three laboratory studies 
(supported by three pilot studies) that develop a novel experimental paradigm (labelled 
‘Walking the Plank’) and a manual is published alongside the article (see Appendix C) that 
ensures a consistent execution of the protocol. Furthermore, evidence is provided on the 
reliability (e.g., interrater, Cronbach’s Alpha) of measurement scales, application of coding 
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schemes and developed textual dictionaries (see Chapter 5) and poor variables are dropped 
from analyses or subsequent studies where appropriate (e.g., for the study presented in 
Chapter 6, one variable with poor reliability was dropped because it could not reliably establish 
the pragmatic nature of messages in terms of providing information, instructing, repairing 
misunderstanding, etc.). Furthermore, to ensure excellence in research, the investigation of 
safety voice should make analyses and data verifiable. Thus, for the presented studies, I 
i) enable the verification of raw data by others (e.g., supervisors, reviewers), ii) provide data as 
supplemental material (i.e., for Chapters 3, 5 and 6), or upon request (i.e., for Chapters 4), and 
iii) provide a Jupyter notebook outlining statistical procedures (i.e., for Chapter 5, see appendix 
E).  
The review of ethical standards indicates that research on safety voice should also maintain 
excellence in research by upholding intellectual freedom. I have therefore maintained my 
intellectual freedom in conducting research and writing up all sections of this thesis, and I can 
declare this thesis has not been unduly shaped by the institutions supporting it (i.e., London 
School of Economics and Political science, the Economics and Social science Research 
Council). Furthermore, the intellectual freedom of others is maintained through the provision 
of appropriate attribution (e.g., to publications, sources of the CVR data, etc.).  
Excellent safety voice research adheres to available legislation, and this posed a new 
challenge during the time-frame of this thesis (2016-2020) because of the introduction of the 
General Data Protection Regulation act (GDPR; EU: 2016/679). GDPR broadly aligns with 
existing practices for excellent research (Chassang, 2017), and stipulates when personal data 
can be used for research. For instance, after explicit consent is provided for the use and sharing 
of data, the right to withdraw is clear, or the reuse of data is equivalent to the original purpose 
for collecting the data. Compliance of study protocols and data usage with GDPR is therefore 
achieved by obtaining informed consent, destroying data upon request and the inclusion of two 
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explicit questions in the debriefing procedure regarding data sharing for research purposes and 
the permission to use video observations. GDPR came into force after the research for Chapter 
4 (Article 2) was conducted, and research excellence for this chapter is therefore achieved by 
limiting data availability to individual researchers upon request for data verification (as is 
required for publications; APA, 2017). 
Finally, excellent safety voice research requires that data is valid. This is challenging 
because informing participants about the true nature of studies can invalidate data, and 
deception is therefore required for the experimental studies. The permission for this procedure 
was obtained from the London School of Economics ethics review board (#000540), and the 
implications for minimising harm are discussed below. Because novel data on safety voice 
behaviour may necessitate deception, it is important that future researchers always engage with 
ethics review committees to decide how ethical standards should be balanced. 
Responsibility 
Third, research on safety voice should be conducted responsibly. In this thesis I achieve this 
by taking care in managing entrusted data, considering emerging ethical issues and highlighting 
study limitations and potentially problematic interpretations. For instance, collected data is 
stored on secure servers (i.e., with password protection, security certificates), and anonymised 
data is only shared freely when participants have consented. Furthermore, ethical approval was 
obtained from the research ethics committee at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science (#000540, #1051) before conducting the presented studies. Responsibility was taken 
by acting pro-actively upon emerging ethical concerns (e.g., applying the paradigm within an 
online environment, using different stimuli materials). In particular, the protocol for the 
laboratory-based Walking the Plank studies is designed iteratively to ensure that research 
assistants engage in data collection that is consistent, valid, and ethical. To illustrate, I took 
responsibility in developing this protocol further when it emerged that participants did not 
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appreciate being debriefed by the same research assistant, that provided a discouraging 
message (a study condition). Arguably, this was because they could not sufficiently discern the 
behaviour of the research assistant behaviour within the study versus outside of it. After two 
participants responded negatively, I evaluated and altered the protocol so that participants were 
debriefed by a research assistant they had not previously encountered. This successfully 
resolved this issue as demonstrated by participants no longer raising any issues.  
Lastly, in the next chapters I highlight study limitations and problematic interpretations of 
study results. For instance, in Chapter 6 I highlight that Article 4 should not be used to attribute 
blame as this requires an appreciation of systemic factors that could not be addressed within 
the study (also, it does not demonstrate respect for victims). 
Minimising harm 
Finally, safety voice studies need to minimise harm. In this thesis I achieve this by 
developing a protocol for the Walking the Plank paradigm that balances the imperative to 
minimise harm with the use of deception. 
To minimise harm, the Walking the Plank paradigm presents an apparent hazard. As 
discussed in Chapter 4 and 6, experiments cannot investigate safety voice through the 
introduction of actual hazards as this practice exposes participants to inappropriate risk. For 
example, during a brainstorm, I briefly considered the idea of investigating safety voice in a 
scenario where participants could speak-up about a researcher mindlessly crossing a busy road 
on campus but abandoned this because the extent of risk could not be controlled. Similarly, I 
discontinued a pilot study after only eight participants because it became clear that I could not 
guarantee minimal harm. That is, to better understand the limits of perceived risk on safety 
voice, in an early pilot of the Walking the Plank paradigm participants were told to test the idea 
of a bench by sitting down on a highly breakable (i.e., laminate) plank. Participants were not 
exposed to actual risk (i.e., as required for the ethics approval, I intervened before they sat 
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down), but seven of the eight participants moved to sit down with surprising speed (and I did 
not trust myself to always be prepared). To overcome the challenge posed by the need to 
minimise harm, safety voice studies may therefore better present apparent hazards that elicit 
the perception of risk. However, and crucially, for safety voice research, understanding the true 
nature of studies (e.g., that they are safe and intended to observe voice) would eliminate risk 
perceptions and reduce research excellence (i.e., valid behavioural data on safety voice and 
silence requires that participants perceive risk).  
This means that because risk perceptions are necessary for observing safety voice and 
silence in laboratory settings, I use deception procedures (see Chapter 4). The use of deception 
provides a challenge to psychological research because it reduces participants’ autonomy to 
decide whether to participate, and can cause minor psychological harms (e.g., feeling tricked). 
For the Walking the Plank studies, participants are recruited to a so-called ‘creativity study’ 
and the use of this deception received ethics approval because of the absence of actual risks, 
the long-term benefits of the research (e.g., design of safety interventions), the provision of a 
full debriefing and close monitoring for ethical concerns being raised. For instance, the protocol 
specified that research assistants should immediately follow-up with me when ethical concerns 
were raised. In two cases where this happened for an early pilot, this led to the protocol being 
changed so that the debriefing was conducted by another research assistant (as discussed 
above). As Corti (2015) highlighted, whether deception procedures are appropriate for 
experimental studies can, in part, be inferred from participants’ response to the deception. 
Accordingly, to ensure minimal harm is achieved, I included one question for the debriefing of 
the study presented in Chapter 5 (n = 404): ‘would you allow future participants to take part?’. 
Of the four participants (i.e., 1% of the respondents) that said they would not allow future 
participants to take part in the study, three indicated they had provided the wrong answer (e.g., 
“Oops. I think I pressed the wrong option. I would allow future participants to [take part], it’s 
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a really interesting study”) and the final participant suggested that the trade-off with gaining 
knowledge would justify the deception (i.e., “if it's towards research and understanding human 
behaviour and how it truly is then why not”). This indicates harm was successfully minimised 
and illustrates how future research may evidence this. 
Furthermore, minimal psychological harm for research assistants was achieved by providing 
safeguarding to participants coding the data for Chapter 6. This data involves the 
communication of people involved in fatal scenarios, providing the potential for undue stress 
by being deeply involved in the data. Indeed, when pilot coding the data, I felt it was a 
saddening experience and ensured frequent brakes and discussions with others. Thus, and on 
the suggestion of the research ethics committee (personal communication, 27 January 2020), 
research assistants’ wellbeing was safeguarded by discussing the impact of data coding at 
regular meetings, encouraging the discussion of their experience with others, and allowing 
completion of data coding at their own pace (i.e., to reduce time-pressure).  
Finally, I achieved the minimisation of harm by only providing paper-based study 
information (for participants to take home) upon request, obtaining a reusable mug for coffee 
breaks, and moving towards electronic data collection.  
Additional ethical challenges 
Investigating safety voice is complex due to its relationship to hazards and dependence on 
human participants, and the phenomenon can be investigated through various methods (e.g., 
simulations, surveys, participant observation, archival data) and in different environments. This 
means that, in addition to the challenges associated with maintaining the ethical standards in 
experimental and archival studies (as discussed above and in Chapters 3, 4 and 6), further 
challenges can be identified that are relevant for this thesis and should be addressed by future 
research on safety voice. These ethical challenges are associated with online data collection, 
in-situ observations, and obtaining data within organisational environments. Because these 
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challenges are relevant for the optimal approach to investigating safety voice (research question 
2), I discuss these below. Yet, I do not provide an exhaustive account because this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis and ethical challenges to safety management research have been 
discussed elsewhere (e.g., Whicher et al., 2015). 
Online studies: fair pay and exit options 
Because safety voice is difficult to observe in-situ, and simulations and laboratory 
experiments are resource intensive, online methods have been developed to enable resource 
efficient data collection (e.g., online surveys, vignettes). Yet, to adhere to the ethical guidelines, 
online methodologies should encourage ways for participants to make autonomous decisions, 
exert control over study withdrawal, and obtain fair reward. That is, in order to respect 
participants during online studies, scholars should provide autonomy when making the decision 
to participate (i.e., informed consent), provide the right to withdraw (i.e., providing autonomy 
and control) and should avoid asymmetrical power relations (e.g., through one-sided rejection 
options; Gleibs, 2014, 2017). 
These challenges are relevant to this thesis, as pilot studies collected data through 
Prolific.ac: an online platform for participant recruitment (Palan & Schitter, 2018). Palan and 
Schitter highlighted that Prolific.ac can address challenges in terms of providing autonomy, 
control and fairness. That is, ensuring autonomy, Prolific.ac requires that participants receive 
informed consent, and this was achieved by explaining that participants would evaluate a video 
from an experiment. Ensuring control, Prolific.ac provides participants with the option to 
withdraw consent for the study without affecting their acceptance score (i.e., a reputation score) 
by terminating the study, letting the study time-out, or appealing a rejected submission. 
Furthermore, the presented studies enabled participants to skip questions (i.e., providing 
additional control and autonomy) by prompting for, but not requiring answers. Finally, 
ensuring fairness, Prolific.ac requires a minimum reward per hour (i.e., £5) that participants 
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are made aware off when signing up to the platform (Palan & Schitter, 2018), and thus 
participants are fairly rewarded. The ethical challenges associated with online data collection 
are therefore addressed within the design of the online platform, and future researchers should 
carefully consider whether web-based data collection methods enable autonomy, control and 
fairness (e.g., for a discussion of ethics in online environments, see: Gleibs, 2017, 2014). 
In-situ observations: observing versus intervening 
Safety voice occurs spontaneously in response to encountered hazards. Yet, obtaining valid 
data on safety voice behaviour in-situ (i.e., real-time, as hazards emerge) is challenging. That 
is, researchers could be exposed to risks exceeding those of daily life when observing safety 
voice in-situ, because even highly trained observers with good subject-matter expertise may 
have a different situational awareness than the observed actors. Furthermore, to minimise harm, 
scholars cannot initiate unsafe actions or prolong hazardous situations. For example, when 
hazards emerge (e.g., low aircraft altitude; absence of handwashing), observers may notice that 
actors do not respond. This prompts a need to decide on an ethical dilemma for minimising 
harm that resembles the trolley dilemma in its choice of deontological versus consequentialist 
ethics (Bruers & Braeckman, 2014). Scholars could either i) intervene to mitigate harm, yet 
prohibit knowledge relevant for future safety voice interventions, or ii) observe the behaviour 
whilst allowing for potential harm. This is a catch-22 as both choices can prevent harm (i.e., 
immediate vs long-term), and providing an answer based on moral intuition is not 
straightforward due to the potential for cognitive biases (Bruers & Braeckman, 2014). Despite 
this, and arguably, intervening in this scenario may be desirable due to the uncertainty in terms 
of the long-term harm that could be averted. Non-intervention may be unethical because the 
long-term benefits of non-interventions are difficult to predict and can be substantially costlier 
than arranging alternative data-collection (e.g., physical harm is costlier than arranging 
alternative observation opportunities). The ethical guidelines suggest participants may be 
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exposed to risks that do not exceed those of daily life, and the benefits of understanding safety 
voice may be substantial (e.g., by avoiding future mishaps). Yet, whilst this argument on 
psychological uncertainty has flaws (e.g., uncertainty also exists for whether interventions 
avert harm; Bruers & Braeckman, 2014), if it is accepted, it means that safety voice cannot be 
readily observed by observers present in-situ as hazards would eventually require that 
observers intervene, thus invalidating data on safety silence (i.e., would someone have spoken-
up after the observers’ intervention?). In this thesis, I addressed this challenge by obtaining in-
situ data from historic situations (i.e., Cockpit Voice Recorder transcript in Chapter 6) and 
future research may address this ethical challenge by exploring how the moral philosophy 
underpinning related concepts (e.g., virtue-ethics and whistleblowing; Bolsin et al., 2005) may 
apply to designing safety voice studies. 
Organisational environments: anonymity, consent and equal benefit 
Whilst hazards occur across contexts, Chapter 3 highlights that safety voice research has 
mainly used data from organisational environments. Researching safety voice within these 
contexts needs to maintain the same ethical standards, and unique challenges exist in terms of 
ensuring anonymity, requesting consent and providing equal benefit to study participants.  
The study of safety voice in organisations requires that data is collected on whether 
employees speak-up, for example through employee self-reports or supervisor statements. The 
ethical guidelines suggest that to respect the dignity of others, study participants should be 
granted privacy in terms of the data they provide (e.g., BPS, 2018). This is important for 
investigating safety voice because participants demonstrate or disclose behaviour that may be 
considered undesirable (e.g., safety silence), and this can lead to unintended consequences. To 
minimise harm, and whilst favourable outcomes are also possible (e.g., promotion), researchers 
should therefore anonymise participants to ensure minimal harm (e.g., demotions, ostracism). 
Yet, achieving this may be challenging for organisational environments because even 
Chapter 2: Approach to investigating safety voice 72 
deidentified data may reveal individual employees (e.g., due to their unique role, or known 
views), and it is unclear to what degree the public role of seniors warrants privacy, or whether 
it is justifiable to reveal organisations included in datasets (Bell & Bryman, 2007). This 
underscores the importance of future research on safety voice carefully considering the 
potential consequences for employees of disclosing their information, and the ethical 
guidelines suggest scholars may mitigate this by providing leaders and organisations with the 
autonomy to take informed decisions on whether they want to be identified.  
In addition, future research should evaluate whether sufficient autonomy is provided when 
consent is obtained through gatekeepers (e.g., managers approving employee surveys). 
Gatekeepers often have the authority to make organisational decisions, yet it is unclear whether 
these can provide consent for individual employees, or if this leverages undue organisational 
pressure on individuals to participate (BPS, 2018). Accordingly, when consent is obtained 
through gatekeepers, future research should carefully consider whether it may be appropriate 
to provide additional information and autonomy to employees to ensure informed consent. 
Finally, it is important to consider whether organisational stakeholders (employees, 
management, patients, etc.) receive equal benefit from safety voice research. For instance, 
when safety voice interventions include control groups (Kines et al., 2010) participants may 
not receive equal benefits (e.g., protection from harm). Future safety voice interventions within 
organisational environments may therefore utilise stepped wedge trial designs (i.e., the phased 
introduction of interventions for all participants; e.g., C. A. Brown & Lilford, 2006). 
Conclusions on my approach in this thesis 
The investigation of safety voice aims to improve safety management by enabling people to 
speak-up about safety, and to achieve this research needs to obtain valid data and comply with 
ethical guidelines. In this chapter, I reviewed the implications of my philosophy of science and 
the ethical challenges in designing research on safety voice, and especially the studies in the 
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next chapters. By doing this, I revealed that the approach in this thesis is shaped by at least four 
assumptions that emerge from a mixture of realist, pragmatist and holistic philosophies, namely 
that i) characteristics of hazardous scenarios and mental states are meaningful through their 
observable consequences, ii) mental states do not necessarily correspond to the physical world 
or behaviour, iii) empirical evidence contributes towards a better understanding of safety voice, 
that is not final, and iv) research on safety voice is a product of on-going justification, 
contestation and refinement.  
Furthermore, I identified four principles for conducting ethical research (i.e., respect for 
others, excellence in research, responsibility, minimising harm), evaluated the present thesis in 
terms of these principles and emerging challenges, and identified additional challenges for 
future research on safety voice. The evaluation of ethics for safety voice research is important, 
as demonstrated by the ethical controversies in the 1960s and 70s, and the ethical guidelines 
demonstrate that the field of social psychology has learned important lessons that guide 
contemporary researchers (e.g., the right to withdraw without punishment). By reviewing the 
ethical standards, I was able to identify the challenges involved in investigating safety voice. 
Together, this chapter underscores that, despite its aim of contributing valid knowledge to the 
field of safety management, research on safety voice is shaped by philosophical assumptions 
and can inflict harm: scholars should continually monitor whether the process of contributing 
knowledge on safety voice achieves justifiable knowledge and ethical standards. The next 
chapters present studies that illustrate how the field of safety voice may achieve this.
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CHAPTER 3: 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE SAFETY VOICE LITERATURE 
Preface 
In the first article I conducted a systematic literature review to establish the gap in the safety 
management literature in terms of the need to advance safety voice concepts, assessments and 
interventions. The decision to systematically review research on safety voice was taken because 
upon taking stock of the literature it appeared that research on safety voice remained 
disintegrated, and it was unclear whether safety voice had a coherent conceptualisation and 
operationalisation. Studies adopted different labels (e.g., “voice”, “safety voice”, 
“speaking-up”, “nurse voice”; Krenz et al., 2020), definitions and operationalisations for the 
act of speaking-up about safety, and have drawn on distinct domains, including employee voice 
(e.g., Morrison, 2011) and safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000). Moreover, whilst studies had 
applied employee voice concepts to safety voice (e.g., Schwappach & Gehring, 2014d), it was 
proposed that the phenomenon is distinct (Tucker et al., 2008) and it was unclear to what extent 
this was appropriate. Thus, a need existed to draw together evidence from across safety 
management and voice research and evaluate the degree to which safety voice i) is conceptually 
related to the concept of employee voice (e.g., is safety voice a subtype or merely highly related 
to employee voice?), ii) occurs across levels of analysis, and iii) is optimally investigated. By 
doing this, a better understanding may be enabled of how the behavioural nature of safety voice 
is important for understanding accidents, and how gaps within the literature may be identified. 
In Article 1, I therefore aimed to understand the state of the literature and identify gaps that 
I address in the subsequent studies. The article builds towards answering the thesis research 
questions by clarifying how safety voice is defined, conceptualised and delineated across levels 
of analysis (therefore contributing to research question 1: What is the behavioural nature of 
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safety voice?), identifying methodical practices and remaining challenges (therefore 
contributing to research question 2: What is the optimal way to investigate safety voice 
behaviour?) and identifying and integrating evidence on the antecedents that have been 
established in relationship to safety voice (therefore contributing to research question 3: To 
what extent do interventions for promoting safety voice and reducing safety silence need to be 
tailored to the behavioural nature of safety voice?). 
Study description 
The article presents a systematic literature review in which I use an explicit search strategy 
and criteria for including or excluding studies (copies of these are provided in Appendix A). 
The protocol for the search strategy was developed iteratively (the versions of the search 
history are presented in Appendix A) to ensure coverage and a manageable dataset. To ensure 
coverage across theoretical domains, I decided to use two search engines (i.e., pubMED and 
EBSCO host) that enabled a search across diverse publication databases in social science, 
healthcare, legal science, history, and business. Initial exploratory searches revealed that results 
included irrelevant studies on consistent themes such as voice technology, the anatomy of the 
vocal cord, therapy for people hearing voices, and studies that included people from diverse 
languages (e.g., ‘English-speaking’). These terms were therefore used to build the exclusion 
criteria. Furthermore, this aided in reducing the unwieldy number of hits (i.e., 20,655). The 
first formal search was still limited to organisational environments: I decided to drop this search 
criterion as it did not enable an evaluation of the extent to which safety voice was investigated 
across social and organisational environments. The final search provided 3,031 peer-reviewed 
publications in English. By screening titles and abstracts and accessing full-text publications, 
these were narrowed down to 48 articles (with 50 studies). I extracted and synthesised data 
from these studies to understand the behavioural nature of safety voice, compared the concept 
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of safety voice with employee voice, and evaluated the extent to which safety voice has been 
investigated using varied methodologies. 
A secondary aim, though not explicitly described in the article, was to contribute towards 
open science. To achieve this, I pre-registered the search strategy on PROSPERO (Noort et al., 
2017), added open science to the assessment of publication quality, and provided the study data 
as supplementary material to the publication of the article in Safety Science (Noort et al., 
2019b). Thus, I provided clarity on the development of the protocol and an advance notice to 
the field. This proved useful to avoid unnecessary duplication in the scope of reviews in the 
wider literature: during the process of writing the systematic review I was contacted by Dr Aled 
Jones to discuss how he might avoid duplication in a new review (personal communication, 31 
May 2018).  
In the article’s discussion, I highlighted that the systematic literature contributed insights 
for conceptualising and operationalising safety voice. These include the insight that the concept 
of safety voice i) has unique scope in comparison to employee voice through its emphasis on 
harm prevention (i.e., underscoring its importance for the safety management literature), ii) is 
Figure 3.1. Threat Mitigation Model of safety voice.  
Note: this model highlights that the dysfunctional momentum of threats towards accidents 
(Barton & Sutcliff, 2009) can be mitigated through safety voice that has antecedents and 
outcomes across levels of analysis. 
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ecological in terms of occurring across levels of analysis, iii) is assumed to be intrinsically 
social, beneficial and organisational, and iv) relies on evidence from post-hoc and report-based 
methodologies (e.g., interviews, surveys) that are assumed to reflect the behaviour. I proposed 
an ecological framework that conceptualises the behavioural nature of safety voice as situated 
across levels of analysis, and this advances the conceptual model for safety voice (see Figure 
1.1) by indicating that the level of analysis can reveal distinct antecedents, voice and outcomes 
(see Figure 3.1). Finally, I identified new directions for the safety voice literature.  
The ecological nature of safety voice is important for safety management because it 
highlights that safety voice may be conceptualised in holistic terms (i.e., emphasising that 
behaviour is situated in context and history; Fay, 1996), may be mapped unto multilevel models 
(e.g., Reason, 1990; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) and provide insights into interpersonal 
communication about safety within sociotechnical systems (e.g., Appelbaum, 1997; Leveson, 
2002; Reason, 2000).  
Authorship 
I was responsible for designing and conceptualising the study, data collection, formal data 
analysis and interpretation, and manuscript preparation (80%). Dr Reader and Dr Gillespie 
contributed to refining the study design, interpreting results, and reviewing and editing the 
manuscript (20%). Anonymous reviewers provided invaluable challenges and suggestions for 
improving the manuscript, and Jackie van Dael contributed to the intercoder reliability analysis. 
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Article 1: 
Speaking-up to prevent harm – A systematic review of the safety 
voice literature 
 
Published under a Creative Commons licence (CC-BY 4.0) in Safety Science as:  
Noort, M. C., Reader, T. W., & Gillespie, A. (2019). Speaking-up to prevent harm: a 
systematic review of the safety voice literature. Safety science, 117, 375-387. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.04.039. 
Abstract 
Safety voice is the act of speaking-up about safety in order to prevent accidents and physical 
harm. It occurs across contexts (e.g., healthcare, aviation, construction, mountaineering, high-
risk sports) and understanding the phenomenon enables interventions. Despite recent interest, 
however, it remains unclear how safety voice i) differs conceptually from employee voice, ii) 
is delineated across levels of analysis, and iii) could be optimally investigated. Addressing this, 
we identified 48 articles, and integrated 256 safety voice antecedents, 7 pragmatics and 23 
outcomes into an ecological framework. Overlap was found with employee voice concepts and 
methodologies, especially for the behavioural nature of speaking-up. Nonetheless, safety voice 
appeared unique in terms of the content of the raised message (e.g., limited to safety), the 
context and person speaking-up, identified antecedents (e.g., hazard-specific antecedents), and 
methodological challenges (e.g., operationalisation of victimhood). Our proposed safety voice 
framework provides a novel approach to safety voice that is ecological and indicates 
interventions for mitigating physical harm. 
Keywords: Safety voice, Speaking-up, Employee Voice, Systematic review, Harm prevention 
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Article highlights: 
• Safety voice is the act of speaking-up about safety to prevent physical harm. 
• Conceptually related to employee voice, safety voice has unique scope due to its 
emphasis on physical harm. 
• It is ecological: predictors, pragmatics and outcomes are found across levels of analysis. 
• Important challenges for safety voice remain in developing methodologies and 
interventions. 
Introduction 
Safety voice is the act of speaking-up to prevent physical harm from hazardous situations 
(Bienefeld & Grote, 2012). Hazardous situations permeate organisations (e.g., dispensing 
medication, operating heavy goods equipment) and daily life (e.g., driving, high-risk sports; G. 
W. Fischer et al., 1991; Wilson, 1979), and raising safety concerns can identify and prevent 
potentially disastrous outcomes from these (e.g., medication error, crashes, drowning). Popular 
discourse frequently attributes the causes of mishaps to a lack of safety voice (BBC, 2015), and 
safety voice is repeatedly shown as an antecedent to avoiding harm (Turner et al., 2015b).  
The role of safety voice in accident prevention has led to considerable research interest, with 
observations, surveys, and interviews being used to investigate the antecedents, pragmatics, 
and consequences of raising safety concerns in various domains, and organisational 
environments in particular (Morrow et al., 2016; Okuyama et al., 2014). However, it remains 
unclear (i) how or why safety voice is conceptually distinct from phenomena such as employee 
voice, (ii) how levels of analysis (e.g., individual, team, organisation) at which safety voice 
operates are delineated, or (iii) what the optimal methodological approach to studying safety 
voice is. We conduct a systematic review to assess the uniqueness of the safety voice concept, 
integrate the safety voice literature into a conceptual ecological framework (i.e., a model 
outlining antecedents, pragmatics and outcomes across levels of analysis), and consider the 
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methodological approaches best suited to studying safety voice. Through exploring safety 
voice concepts and methodologies, we provide clarity on the conceptual nature of safety voice, 
its ecological nature and methodological challenges for research, and outline possible future 
directions.  
Safety voice: The need for an improved conceptualisation 
The concept of safety voice describes acts of communication aimed at preventing physical 
harm through communicating safety concerns to others. Various definitions of safety have been 
proposed. For example, Tucker and colleagues (2008) stated that safety voice: "(a) is 
communication motivated toward changing perceived unsafe working conditions that have 
implications for individual and organizational health, (b) can flow through formal and informal 
channels, and (c) can be directed toward numerous targets (e.g., supervisors/managers, 
coworkers, union officials, government officials)" (p. 320). Other characteristics of safety 
voice have been considered: for example, its constructive (Hu et al., 2015) and challenging 
nature (H. L. Johnson & Kimsey, 2012), or its occurrence in improving general safety (A. Jones 
et al., 2016) versus emergency situations (Schwappach & Gehring, 2014d).  
The interest in safety voice has generated considerable research, with two reviews 
addressing the antecedents and consequences of safety voice (Morrow et al., 2016; Okuyama 
et al., 2014). Conceptually, and in particular for healthcare workers, these reviews highlighted 
that (i) employees report a hesitancy for raising safety concerns, (ii) predictors are contextual 
(e.g., a scenario causing a motivation to speak-up, leadership, work relations) and individual 
(e.g., felt responsibility, a cost-benefit analyses of effectiveness and psychological safety), and 
(iii) raising safety concerns can avoid physical harm (e.g., through error correction). Yet, the 
safety voice concept remains disintegrated and nascent, with three outstanding issues.  
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Clarifying the conceptual relationship between safety voice and employee voice  
Research on safety voice draws from work in organisational behaviour on employee 
voice/silence, yet is distinguished through its focus on safety (Tucker, Chmiel, Turner, Sandy 
Hershcovis, et al., 2008). The concept of employee voice is used to study discretionary 
suggestions by employees that are intended to improve work-related issues (Morrison, 2014) 
such as smoother procedures, innovations or halt of organisational decline. The origins of 
employee voice are attributed to Hirschman (1970) who investigated how organisational 
stakeholders dissatisfied with organisational decline chose to exit a company, stay loyal or 
voice their concerns. Subsequent research conceptualised employee voice as the neglect of 
issues (Farrell, 1983) and a time-bound, observable, extra-role behaviour (Van Dyne & LePine, 
1998), and used questionnaire scales to measure it (LePine & Van Dyne, 1998). Thus, research 
attempted to identify the antecedents to employee voice, conceptualise its processes (Milliken 
et al., 2003) and identify sub-types of voice (Liang et al., 2012; Wu Liu et al., 2010).  
Employee voice and safety voice overlap conceptually because both refer to extra-role 
communicative acts to address perceived issues and change the status quo (Manapragada & 
Bruk-Lee, 2016; Morrison, 2014). Thus, it is important to integrate these conceptualisations, 
whilst addressing the ways in which safety voice is distinct (Wilkinson et al., 2019). 
First, the phenomenon of safety voice is broader in sampling (i.e., it goes beyond employees, 
for example to patients in hospitals, or passersby) and narrower in phenomenology (i.e., 
focusing on preventing harm). Unlike employee voice, raising safety concerns can be a legally 
required and protected activity (whistleblowing; Tucker, Chmiel, Turner, Sandy Hershcovis, 
et al., 2008). Yet, due to the social risks involved, engagement in safety voice can be highly 
challenging. For example, research in healthcare has long examined why clinicians are hesitant 
to report observing concerns about safety, and these have included cultures of blame (e.g., 
Waring, 2005), non-receptive colleagues (A. Jones et al., 2016), fear of negative repercussions 
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(Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016), and, unlike employee voice, aspects of the incident (e.g., 
speed of the incident, Schwappach & Gehring, 2014d). 
Second, the consequences of an absence of safety voice can be severe and highly proximal, 
with consequences for self (e.g., personal harm) and others (e.g., organisational accidents). For 
example, in a decision-making analysis of the Challenger space shuttle disaster (Moorhead et 
al., 1991), self-censorship of supplier staff members was deemed an important factor leading 
to the eventual seven fatalities (i.e., after pressure from NASA, an earlier held safety concern 
was suppressed in the final recommendation for launch). Similarly, analysing communication 
in healthcare, Wei Liu, et al. (2016) showed that raising safety concerns mitigated medication 
errors. Research on employee voice tends to focus on events with more individualised, and less 
severe, outcomes that carry a lesser moral obligation for raising issues. For example, a lack of 
employee voice can lead to unfavourable outcomes in terms of job satisfaction, turnover, 
citizenship behaviours or organisational performance (Bashshur & Oc, 2014).  
Third, safety voice research is grounded within a distinct set of literatures to employee voice. 
For example, the safety culture and climate literatures (e.g., Gauld & Horsburgh, 2014), and 
research on human error and systems theory (Aydon et al., 2016; Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009). 
These fields describe how characteristics of social systems (or lack thereof) enable safety, with 
speaking-up on safety frequently being incorporated into measures of safety culture and climate 
(Reader et al., 2015; Sexton et al., 2006) and safety citizenship (e.g., “I make suggestions to 
management to improve the safety of the work environment”; Reader et al., 2016, p.9). 
Furthermore, due to its social nature, safety voice has been framed and investigated through 
research on interdisciplinary collaboration (e.g., P. Liu & Ma, 2016), crew resource 
management (e.g., Lyndon, 2008) and shared decision-making (e.g., Frosch et al., 2012). This 
has helped identify group and institutional antecedents to safety voice (e.g., different 
experience levels; Wei Liu et al., 2016). 
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Fourth, within safety-critical environments, extra-role behaviours can be empirically 
distinguished on whether they are safety- or organisation-specific. Voicing safety concerns is 
considered a safety citizenship behaviour (i.e., extra-role behaviours for managing risks; Didla 
et al., 2009), and this wider concept is shown to be distinct from organisational citizenship 
behaviours (Reader et al., 2016). Direct empirical tests comparing safety and employee voice 
remain absent, and are beyond the scope of this article, yet this suggests that within safety 
critical contexts, the safety-related content of the communicated message may provide unique 
practical relevance beyond employee voice and a need to investigate the content of the message 
voiced (Morrison, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2019). 
Thus, in terms of conceptualising safety voice, a key observation emerges. Initially, safety 
voice appears to be a similar phenomenon to employee voice. It involves discretionary acts of 
communicating issues, to those with institutional power, in order to improve the status-quo. 
However, it also appears distinct, with relevance to those outside of an organisation (e.g., the 
public), different triggers to voice across levels of analysis (e.g., legal necessity, personality, 
observing hazards), unique consequences (e.g., personal harm, accidents), practical relevance 
within safety-critical organisations, and distinctive foundational literature. Therefore, it is not 
clear whether safety voice should be considered a subtype of employee voice phenomena, or a 
unique concept drawing on overlapping ideas and behaviours. This is important, but has not 
been directly addressed in reviews of the concept, with models of safety voice using models of 
employee voice to thematise research findings (Morrow et al., 2016). Yet, if safety voice is a 
sub-type of employee voice (Morrison, 2011), the need for a distinct literature is lessened with 
considerable scope for integration (Wilkinson et al., 2019), and the research findings (e.g., on 
voice antecedents) and methodologies for studying employee voice can be assumed to apply to 
safety voice. Alternatively, if safety voice is indeed an overlapping but highly distinct 
phenomenon, then the distinctive scope of this domain (e.g., outcomes), key research findings 
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(e.g., different relationships amongst safety voice antecedents, pragmatics and outcomes), and 
methodological challenges (e.g., how to observe safety voice) need to be better articulated and 
presented.  
Creating an ecological conceptualisation of safety voice  
Safety voice is an ecological phenomenon. It is found to vary according to individual factors 
(Bienefeld & Grote, 2012), group (e.g., safety-specific transformational leadership; Conchie et 
al., 2012), institutions (e.g., hierarchical effects) and external environments (e.g., national 
culture; Malloy et al., 2009). This means that the manifestation of safety voice will vary 
according to the specific characteristics of a situation (individual, group, institutional, external), 
and corresponds to a systems approach to safety and ecological models of behaviour that 
specify levels of analysis (Bronfenbrenner, 1977; Erez & Gati, 2004; Leveson, 2002). It 
suggests that distinguishing the levels at which safety voice is analysed is important for 
illuminating relationships among safety voice antecedents, pragmatics and outcomes, and 
enabling targeted interventions (Leveson, 2002).  
However, research has largely neglected conceptualising the ecological nature of safety 
voice, and as a consequence most scholars have not differentiated findings. Manapragada and 
Bruk-Lee (Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016) distinguished relationship-, job-, climate- and 
issue-based motives for safety voice and others distinguished (work) environment antecedents 
(e.g., Aydon et al., 2016; Lindberg et al., 2013), but differentiation into levels of analysis is 
scarce. In their review of the literature, Morrow and colleagues (2016) identified eleven 
qualitative studies and synthesised these into four themes (i.e., hierarchies and power 
dynamics; perceptions of unsafe/ineffective open communication; expectations and 
socialisation; managerial influence), but did not offer an integrated conceptual model for 
relationships amongst safety voice variables, or an account of the ecological nature of safety 
voice. Similarly, Okuyama et al. (2014)’s review of 27 articles describing safety voice in 
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healthcare identified the antecedents (e.g., motivation and clinical context, perceived safety of 
speaking-up), pragmatics (e.g., tactics involved in speaking-up), and outcomes (e.g., error 
correction) of safety voice. However, observations were not framed within a complete 
ecological conceptualisation; individual, team, and institutional factors were collapsed 
together, not delineated. For example, individual factors (e.g., ‘roles as professionals’) partly 
referred to social systems (i.e., organisations). 
Thus, there is a need to better conceptualise the ecological nature of safety voice, and to 
consider research findings within this framework. Through doing this, we enable stronger 
interventions that can target variables across levels of analysis and reveal gaps in research. One 
approach would be to apply a previously established ecological model operating at varying 
levels of analysis to the safety voice literature, for example the hierarchical model of 
organisational behaviour (e.g., individual, group, organisation, external context) proposed by 
Erez and Gati (2004). They proposed that levels interact in top-down (e.g., organisational 
hierarchy enabling an individual sense of power) and bottom-up ways (e.g., individuals’ 
personalities shaping teamwork), and due to this dynamic nature safety voice variables would 
interact and shape each other. 
Optimising methodologies for investigating safety voice  
Emulating the research tradition within fields such as safety culture and climate, safety voice 
studies have tended to utilise cross-sectional surveys (e.g., Barnett, 1992) and interviews (e.g., 
Aydon et al., 2016) to identify the organisational antecedents (e.g., the availability of time-
outs, workload) or characteristics of those who voice safety concerns (e.g., job type, age, 
gender; Gauld & Horsburgh, 2014; McLaughlin, Winograd, Chung, Van de Wiele, & Martin, 
2014; Nembhard, Yuan, Shabanova, & Cleary, 2015). These approaches have addressed the 
short-lived nature of the act of raising a safety concern (i.e., it is contained to the moment of 
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speaking-up and difficult to encounter spontaneously) through retrospective reports by 
individuals who voiced or their supervisors. 
Yet, the appropriateness of using surveys and interviews to investigate safety voice is 
uncertain. Methodologies have their strengths and weaknesses (e.g., surveys’ low resource 
demands versus lack of depth), and the field of safety may be subject to mono-methodological 
bias, with surveys not yielding behavioural data, or lacking causal understanding of its drivers 
and outcomes. Furthermore, biases may emerge due to the nature of safety voice. For example, 
if safety voice involves taking a social risk to avoid physical harm, anonymised surveys and 
interviews may be inflated because the moral obligation to appear as a voicer may be stronger 
than the social risk involved in providing data. 
Alternative methodologies have been used, for example interventions (e.g., Habyarimana & 
Jack, 2011) and observations (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012), and qualitative research has attempted 
to understand the pragmatics of safety voice (i.e., how one uses language to voice) and 
strategies to best communicate safety (Bickhoff et al., 2016; Wei Liu et al., 2016; Lyndon, 
2008). Yet, the suitability of these approaches remains unclear. Thus, there is a need to assess 
the variety of methods to identify optimal methodologies for investigating safety voice.  
The current study 
To establish the relevance of the concept of safety voice it is important to investigate 
whether safety voice is unique in terms of its concepts, ecological nature and methodological 
challenges. These issues can only be addressed through systematically reviewing and 
synthesising the safety voice literature. Previous analyses of this literature have not addressed 
these concerns, and have focused only on qualitative studies (Morrow et al., 2016), or 
healthcare professionals (Okuyama et al., 2014). The systematic review is conceptual in nature 
– empirical tests of the predictive validity of safety voice in comparison to employee voice are 
beyond our scope – and we address three issues. 
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First, we address the conceptualisation of safety voice, and its overlap with employee voice. 
We synthesise the concepts and data from the safety voice literature into a unified framework 
that provides conceptual clarity. We do this in order to illuminate the conceptual uniqueness of 
safety voice from employee voice and reflect on its congruency with Morrison’s (2011) model 
of employee voice, which is the only model that explicitly lists antecedents, voice and 
outcomes. Thus, we aim to identify the nature and usefulness of the safety voice concept, and 
ask: 1) what definitions, conceptualisations and theoretical backgrounds characterise safety 
voice?  
Second, we establish an ecological approach to conceptualising safety voice. To date, a lack 
of an ecological framework of safety voice has driven scholars towards limited coverage of the 
phenomenon, with observations being generalised or specific to narrow situations. Through 
reviewing the literature, the various individual, group, institutional and external variables that 
influence safety voice can be identified and synthesised, with an over-arching conceptual 
model being produced. We thus aim to evaluate the empirical evidence on safety voice to date, 
propose an ecological framework for future research on safety voice, and ask: 2) what is the 
ecological nature of safety voice in terms of inhibiting (promoting) relationships between safety 
voice and antecedents, pragmatics, and outcomes across levels of analysis? 
Third, we evaluate methodological approaches to investigating safety voice. Safety voice 
research faces unique challenges in researching a phenomenon for which harm can be 
immediate (i.e., imminent harm can be prevented) and proximal (i.e., it can affect victims’ 
bodies), the social desirability of speaking-up is diffuse (i.e., it is a risk and moral obligation), 
and its behavioural nature may obscure post-hoc methodologies (i.e., self-reports may be 
inaccurate). However, the effectiveness of different methodologies has not been reviewed and 
challenges to researching safety voice remain unaddressed. Accordingly, we ask: 3) which 
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methodologies have been used for researching safety voice, how suitable are they, and what 
methodological challenges remain? 
Methods 
Search strategy 
 This review followed PRISMA guidelines for systematic reviews (Liberati et al., 2009) and 
applications of these (Reader et al., 2014). The search strategy for this study was pre-registered 
on PROSPERO (Noort et al., 2017), and is presented in Fig. 3.1. The inclusion/exclusion 
criteria are outlined in Table 3.1.  
Identification. English peer-reviewed articles were identified through using the PubMED 
and EBSCOhost search engines. A preliminary search revealed that relevant articles included 
‘safety’ and a variation of ‘voice’, ‘speaking-up/out’ or ‘silence’, and articles on diverse 
subjects (e.g., prosocial, citizenship behaviours). However, safety voice is difficult to 
disentangle from scales containing items on safety voice (e.g., ‘I am willing to warn other 
coworkers about working unsafely’) and other behaviours (e.g., “I am willing to pick up work-
place litter that I did not cause myself”; Geller et al., 1996). Furthermore, including 
‘*communicat*’ provided an unwieldy number of hits (± 7 times more), and ‘organi?ation*’ 
specified an inappropriate a-priori contextual bound. Hence, to provide hits specifically related 
to safety voice (e.g., safety-related silence) the search term “(*safe* AND silenc*) OR (*safe* 
AND speak*) OR (*safe* AND voic*)” was used to search in titles and abstracts in the 
following databases: Anthropology plus, Business source complete, CINAHL Plus with full 
text, Communication and mass media complete, Criminal justice abstracts with full text, 
History of science, technology, medicine, International political science abstracts, MEDLINE, 
Peace research abstracts, PsycArticles, PsycINFO, SocINDEX with full text. 
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Irrelevant articles during the preliminary search related to physiological voice (e.g., pitch), 
voice technology (e.g., Voice over Internet Protocol), language skills (e.g., English-speaking), 
and wrong participants (e.g., children, mental health patients, intimate relationships). 
Therefore, in the final search hits were excluded based on the following search term: 
“Technolog* OR VoIP OR Computer? OR PC OR Pitch OR Intonation OR Anatomy OR vocal 
OR Child* OR “Mental health” OR Contraception OR HIV OR molecular OR therapy OR 
airway OR syndrome OR “Language skill?” OR "-speaking"”. A detailed search history is 
published online (see supplementary material)12. 
                                                 
12 Please also see Appendix A for the review protocol (i.e., search strategy, inclusion criteria, data 
extraction, search development). 
Table 3.1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Domain Include Exclude 
Publication • Peer-reviewed articles • Duplicates 




• On-going, unpublished trials 
• Errata (unless referring to extracted information) 
• Conference proceedings (e.g., keynotes, panel 
discussions) 
Language • English • All other languages 
Subject • Raising safety concerns to 
another person (behaviour) 
• Voice technology (e.g., VoIP) 
• Language skills 
• Physiological voice 
• Technology-mediated communication 
• Medical diseases 
• Primarily about ethics 
• Primarily about law 
• Intimate relationships 
• Drugs or therapies (not raising concerns) 
Method • Empirical, primary study 
• Quantitative 
• Qualitative 
• No original data 
• People speak-up when prompted (e.g., focus group) 
• Authors advocate for a group 
• Calls to speak-up about an issue 
Participants • Behavioural 
• From/to all staff 
roles/hierarchies 
• Non-adult participants 
• Mental health patients 
• Unions or organisations advocating an issue 
Predictors • All predictors • No predictors discussed 
Outcomes • All outcomes • N/A 
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Screening and Eligibility. After the removal of duplicates, the title and abstracts of identified 
articles were screened based on the inclusion criteria (see Table 3.1). Finally, full-text articles 
were retrieved and checked for their eligibility. Inter-coder reliability was established through 
double coding 15% of the 3031 hits by a research assistant trained on applying the inclusion 
criteria. Gwet’s AC1 was calculated as it is a robust measure for datasets with a high prevalence 
of one category (e.g., excluded articles; Wongpakaran et al., 2013). Very good agreement was 
found, indicating a reliable application of the inclusion criteria, AC1 = .92 (95CI: .89-.95), p < 
.001. 
Data extraction and analysis13 
Descriptive data 
Data extraction. (i) author(s), (ii) year of publication, (iii) journal, (iv) country, (v) industry 
or context, (vi) number of studies in a publication, (vii) amount of safety voice. Quality 
indicators (Cochrane, open science, inter-coder reliability): (i) comparability of study groups, 
(ii) appropriateness of randomisation, (iii) whether randomisation was performed blindly, (iv) 
sample representativeness (i.e., response rate > 40%), v) appropriateness of exclusions, (vi) 
compliance with ethical standards, (vii) appropriateness of treatment of missing data, 
(viii) achievement of inter-coder reliability, and (ix) open science achievements14. Cochrane 
quality indicators are developed for randomised control trials (Higgins et al., 2011). Hence it 
was recorded when quality indicators were not applicable.  
Data analysis. Trends on publication history and outlets, country, industry distribution, and 
quality indicators. Calculations for the amount of safety voice (weighted by study size, limited 
                                                 
13 Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.04.039.  
14 We employed a broad definition of open science where open science was coded when follow-up 
research was supported (e.g., through providing materials, data or inviting opposing views). Whether 
publications were open access was not recorded because this is often achieved through paying a fee. 
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to pre-intervention amounts, aggregated across sub-groups) reported in articles. Likert scale 
scores were converted to percentages (e.g., 4.5 on 5-point Likert scale indicating safety voice 
is calculated as (4.5-1)/(5-1) = 87.5%). 
Concept of safety voice 
Data extraction. (i) Definition of safety voice, (ii) theoretical background. Theoretical 
backgrounds (i.e., theories or models) were deducted from the argument and cited literature if 
none was explicitly stated. 
Data analysis. Trends on the theoretical background of studies, and synthesis of definitions 
of safety voice through coding and thematically grouping key concepts of extracted definitions 
(e.g., ‘speaking-up about safety’ was coded as: ‘safety-related issues’ and ‘speaking-up’).  
The ecological nature of safety voice 
Data extraction. (i) Individual-level antecedents, (ii) group-level antecedents, (iii) 
institutional-level antecedents, (iv) hazard-specific antecedents, (v) other antecedents, (vi) 
safety voice pragmatics, (vii) safety voice outcomes, (viii) direction of relationship (i.e., 
promoting/inhibiting), (ix) voice variable statistics. Variables were only used for the synthesis 
when a significant relationship (e.g., thematic, correlational, regression) was suggested in the 
study’s results section. 
Data analysis. Qualitative synthesis of the evidence on safety voice through coding and 
thematically grouping antecedents, pragmatics and outcomes into first and second order themes 
(e.g., ‘fear of retaliation’ and ‘sense of safety’ were coded as ‘fear for consequences’ and the 
higher order theme ‘perceived cost of voice’), and according to level of analysis. After bottom-
up synthesis, we adopted labels from Morrison’s model of employee voice (Morrison, 2011) 
when the constructs overlapped. All grouped variables were recoded to reflect the same 
relationship to safety voice (i.e., promoting/inhibiting).  
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An ecological framework is proposed through i) providing a consistent terminology for 
similar but differently named antecedents and outcomes (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006; Reader et 
al., 2014), ii) thematically integrating related antecedents for the individual, group, 
institutional, external and hazard-specific levels, iii) thematically integrating related outcomes, 
and iv) identifying promoting or inhibiting relationships to safety voice. 
Methodological data 
Data extraction. (i) Operationalisations, (ii) quantitative/qualitative methods, (iii) 
methodology, (iv) unit of analysis, (v) independence of dataset, (vi) manipulations, (vii) 
interventions, (viii) high-level participant information, (ix) number of participants, (x) number 
of outliers deleted. 
Data analysis. Trends on the use of methods and operationalisations through coding and 




A total of 48 articles met the inclusion criteria (see Table 3.1), including five articles 
identified through hand-search. The articles included 50 studies, with one article including 
three studies (Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016). The extent that people raised safety concerns 
was provided by 24 studies (mweighted = 44%; SD = 4%), and an effect size could be extracted 
(or calculated) from 15 quantitative studies. However, 62 effect sizes were dispersed over 42 
distinct variables (i.e., many variables had only up to two effect sizes). Therefore, at this stage 
of the literature, the planned meta-analysis would not provide additional information beyond 
repeating authors cited. The amount of safety voice was not associated with the number of 
extracted variables, or context of research (i.e., healthcare or USA versus other contexts). 
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Description of the safety voice literature 
Interest in safety voice emerged recently (i.e., 45 of the 48 articles were published in the last 
decade), and publication outlets were diverse. Publications were spread over 37 journals, and 
the outlet containing most publications, AORN Journal, had only three publications.  
Study contexts were heavily biased towards the United States (i.e., 50% of the studies). 
Three studies had an international sample (Anicich et al., 2015; Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; 
Malloy et al., 2009). Similarly, indicating the need for a context-agnostic framework, an 
industry-bias exists towards research in healthcare (n = 41). Further research was conducted in 
transport (Habyarimana & Jack, 2011; Tucker, Chmiel, Turner, Sandy Hershcovis, et al., 
2008), aviation (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012), wildland firefighting (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009), 
secondary education (Turner et al., 2015b), oil and gas (Conchie et al., 2012) or across 
industries (n = 2; Barnett, 1992; Manapragada and Bruk-lee, 2016 (Study 1)). Furthermore, 
despite inclusive inclusion criteria for contexts, no studies were found outside of institutions 
with, arguably, mountaineering groups (Anicich et al., 2015) being the least institutional in 
nature. These biases are important: as a proportion of extracted variables (i.e., antecedents, 
pragmatics, outcomes), USA-based studies have identified fewer group-based antecedents (i.e., 
23% vs 31% for other countries), and healthcare-based studies identify more organisational 
antecedents (24% vs 8% for other industries) but less individual antecedents (32% vs 42%). 
This suggests context is important for researching and contextualising safety voice, and the 
literature might address whether unique antecedents exists across contexts (e.g., daily life).  
In terms of publication quality (i.e., Cochrane, open science, inter-coder reliability), studies 
varied in applicable quality indicators (M = 5.86; SD = 1.41) of which they met 45% 
(SD = 20%). Most studies reported obtaining ethical approval or following industry-standard 
procedures (n = 32; e.g., obtaining informed consent). However, eighteen studies did not report 
sufficient information to determine ethical standards. The weakest quality of the safety voice 
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literature is its treatment of missing data. That is, most studies did not report procedures 
(n = 24) or used list-wise deletion rather than data imputation (n = 4). Finally, only fifteen 
studies promoted open science: thirteen studies provided study materials and/or data (i.e., 
online, printed, or through the author), one had an invited commentary (Barzallo Salazar et al., 
2014) and another a large online appendix on the study methodology (Anicich et al., 2015). Six 
open-science articles (38% of all articles in this period) were published before the recent 
growth in open science (around the year 2013 when the Centre for Open Science was founded); 
nine (28%) after 2013. This indicates a need to publish higher quality articles in terms of 
clarifying ethics, improving the treatment of missing data, and promoting open science. 
Descriptive information regarding the studies is presented in Table 3.2. 
The concept of safety voice 
Definitions 
Thirty-two studies provided a definition of safety voice, and 110 concepts were identified 
across the definitions (M = 3.4; SD = 1.6). Some definitions were shorter (Manapragada & 
Bruk-Lee, 2016) than others (e.g., the definition stated above by Tucker et al., 2008). 
Definitions of safety voice emphasised communication (n = 30), unsafe situations (n = 36), 
discretion (n = 2), improvement-focus (n = 12), actors (e.g., from lower ranked staff; addressed 
to superiors; n = 11), and that it originates with a perception of a situation (n = 4). Five concepts 
were very generic (i.e., that safety voice is a motivation, willingness or ability), seven referred 
to variable aspects of delivering safety voice (e.g., assertiveness, persistence), and five other 
concepts put a stringent theoretical bound on the context of safety voice (e.g., work-related 
issues; Nembhard, Yuan, et al., 2015). Synthesising these concepts, safety voice may thus be 
defined as: explicit communication that is (1) discretionary, (2) aimed at improving a perceived 
unsafe situation, and (3) addressed to others of equal or senior status. 
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Theoretical backgrounds 
Forty-eight studies referred to a total of 79 theoretical paradigms (M = 1.58; SD = .91). 
Most prevalent were references to safety (n = 17; e.g., patient safety, safety culture, high 
reliability organisations), voice (n = 16; e.g., employee voice, speaking-up decisions, patient 
complaints), and working in teams (n = 17; e.g., leadership, organisational culture, CRM, 
workplace ostracism). The remaining paradigms referred to (i) diverse theoretical or pragmatic 
models (n = 15; e.g., social exchange theory, social influence, social defence theory, moral 
courage, national cultural values, black swan theory), (ii) patients (n = 5; e.g., patient 
advocacy), (iii) broad areas of interest (n = 6; e.g., attitudes, communication, quality 
improvement), or (iv) methodology-informed paradigms (n = 2; e.g., narrative standpoint, life-
world phenomenology). This highlights that the literature on safety voice is theoretically 
disintegrated, and that it requires (i) a unified theoretical paradigm, and (ii) a clarification of 
overlaps and contrasts between different theoretical accounts.  
The ecological nature of safety voice 
The 50 studies described 256 antecedents to safety voice. These were delineated into levels 
of analysis as individual (n = 94; m = 1.84, SD = 2.18), group (n = 78, m = 1.56, SD = 1.86), 
institution (n = 64, m = 1.28, SD = 1.59), or external context (n = 3, m = .06, SD = .31). 
Seventeen antecedents (m = .34, SD = .63) were hazard-specific. This highlights that an 
ecological safety voice framework needs to incorporate properties of hazards to account for 
whether people voice their safety concerns. Less research investigated the pragmatics of the 
safety voice act (i.e., 3 studies, n = 7, m = .14, SD = .64) or outcomes (i.e., 15 studies, n = 23, 
m = .45, SD = .91). To provide a consistent terminology, the 256 antecedents, 7 pragmatics 
and 23 outcomes were collapsed based on resemblance within their level of analysis. This left 
65 first-order antecedents (e.g., impact of harm, likelihood of harm) and 31 second-order 
antecedents (e.g., risk). Four types of safety voice outcomes were identified (i.e., negative 
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experiences, reduced physical harm, action-driven communication, organisational 
performance). Through summarising findings, this demonstrates that safety voice has been 
mostly conceptualised in terms of antecedents (predominantly individual), and in particular 
that the field has researched the phenomenon as an ecological phenomenon. All antecedents, 
pragmatics and outcomes of safety voice across levels of analysis, and a conceptual comparison 
against Morrison’s (2011) model for employee voice, are presented in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.2. Descriptive information of articles included in the review. 
Authors Journal Study Country Setting Methods Out Prag 
Antecedents 
Haz Ind Gr Org Ext 
Anicich, et al. 
(2015) 
PNAS 1 27 
countries 
Mountaineering Vignettes  1 0 0 0 1 0 0 




1 Canada Healthcare 
(education) 
Experiment  0 0 0 2 1 1 0 
Aydon, et al. 
(2016) 
Journal of Clinical 
Nursing 
1 Australia Healthcare (neonatal 
care) 
Interviews 0 0 0 2 5 4 0 
Barnett (1992) Journal of Business 
Ethics 




Human Relations 1 USA Wildland 
Firefighting 
Interviews 2 0 0 2 4 0 0 
Barzallo 
Salazar, et al. 
(2014) 
Journal of the American 
College of Surgeons 
1 USA Healthcare 
(education) 
Experiment 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Bickhoff, et al. 
(2016) 
Nurse education today 1 Australia Healthcare 
(education) 




and Applied Human 
Factors 
1 Europe Aviation (air crew) Observation, 
survey 
0 0 1 4 3 2 0 
Blanco et al. 
(2009) 
AORN Journal 1 USA Healthcare (surgery) Survey 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Conchie, et al. 
(2012) 
Journal of Occupational 
Health Psychology 
1 UK Oil & Gas Survey 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 
Davis, et al. 
(2013) 
Journal of Evaluation in 
Clinical Practice 
1 UK Healthcare (surgery) Focus groups 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 




1 Canada Healthcare Survey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Frosch, et al. 
(2012) 
Health Affairs 1 USA Healthcare (primary 
care) 









Healthcare Survey 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 
Gkorezis, et al. 
(2016) 
Journal of advanced 
nursing 
1 Cyprus Healthcare (nursing) Survey 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 
Gurung, et al. 
(2017) 
BMC health services 
research 
1 Nepal Healthcare Interviews 0 0 1 2 2 4 0 
Habyarimana 
& Jack (2011) 
Journal of Public 
Economics 
1 Kenia Transport (long-
distance road 
transportation) 
Intervention  2 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Hanson (2017) Journal of infusion 
nursing 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hemingway, et 
al (2015) 
AORN Journal 1 USA Healthcare Survey 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 









0 0 0 1 0 0 0 




1 USA Healthcare Interviews 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 
Howard, et al. 
(2013) 
Journal of patient safety 1 Australia Healthcare (acute 
care) 
Interviews 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Hu, et al. 
(2015) 
Journal of the American 
College of Surgeons 
1 USA Healthcare (surgery, 
anaesthesiology, 
nursing) 
Observation 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Jackson, et al. 
(2010) 
Journal of Advanced 
Nursing 
1 Australia Healthcare (nursing) Interviews 5 0 0 3 0 2 0 
Jacobsson, et 
al. (2012) 




1 Sweden Healthcare (trauma) Observations 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
H. L. Johnson 
& Kimsey 
(2012) 








K. R. Johnson, 
et al. (2006) 
Archives of 
dermatology 
1 USA Healthcare (cross-
sectional) 
Survey 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
A. Jones, et al. 
(2016) 











Journal of graduate 
medical education 
1 USA Healthcare 
(anaesthesia) 
Intervention 1 0 0 9 1 0 0 
Lindberg, et al. 
(2013) 
International journal of 
qualitative studies on 
health and well-being 
1 Sweden Healthcare (elderly 
care nurses) 
Interviews 0 0 1 2 8 5 0 
Liu, et al. 
(2016)  
Journal of clinical 
nursing 




0 4 0 0 3 1 0 
Lyndon (2008) Journal of Obstetric, 
Gynecologic, and 
Neonatal Nursing 




2 2 1 4 3 4 0 
Malloy et al. 
(2009) 




Healthcare (nursing) Focus groups 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Malvey, et al. 
(2013) 
Journal of Healthcare 
Management 






Accident Analysis and 
Prevention 




0 0 1 1 2 2 0 
2 USA Healthcare (Nursing) Survey 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 
3 USA Healthcare (Nursing) Survey 1 0 1 3 1 3 0 
Manias (2015) Health Expectations 1 Australia Healthcare (surgery, 
medical teaching) 
Interviews 1 0 1 5 3 0 0 
Maxfield, et al. 
(2013) 
American Journal of 
Obstetrics & 
Gynaecology 
1 USA Healthcare (labour-
and-delivery) 









1 USA Healthcare (primary 
care) 











1 USA Healthcare (nursing 
education) 
Interviews 0 0 2 3 1 1 0 
Phelps & Reed 
(2016) 
Canadian Journal of 
Infection Control 












BMC Health Services 
Research 
1 Switzerland Healthcare 
(Oncology) 




BMJ Open 1 Switzerland Healthcare 
(oncology) 
Interviews 0 0 1 0 4 1 0 
Seiden, et al. 
(2006) 
Quality & Safety in 
Health Care 
1 USA Healthcare 
(education) 
Case study 1 0 0 1 4 1 0 
Tucker et al. 
(2008) 
Journal of Occupational 
Health Psychology 
1 UK Transport (bus 
drivers) 
Survey 0 0 0 5 1 1 0 
Turner, et al. 
(2015b) 
Journal of Safety 
Research 
1 Canada Education (high 
schools) 
Survey 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Abbreviations: Out.: Outcome; Prag.: Pragmatics; Haz.: Hazard; Ind.: Individual; Gr.: Group; Org.: Organisational: Ext.: External context 
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Methodological challenges 
In terms of datasets, 39 studies had an independent dataset. Nine studies were part of a larger 
project, and two included reinvestigated data (Schwappach & Gehring, 2014b, 2014c). A total 
of at least 52,948 participants took part across the studies (M = 1177; SD = 3490; 
median = 135). The exact number of participants could not be determined for four studies 
(Hanson, 2017; Henkin et al., 2016; Phelps & Reed, 2016; Seiden et al., 2006), and twelve 
studies removed data (e.g., attrition, partial data).  
Studies were qualitative (n = 23), quantitative (n = 22), or mixed-method (n = 5). 
Methodologies included surveys (n = 17), interviews (n = 12), focus groups (n = 4), field or lab 
experiments (n = 2), vignette studies (n = 2), video observations (n = 2), case studies (n = 1), 
and combinations of these (n = 8). Quasi-experimental methods for studying safety voice were 
limited (n = 1; Delisle et al., 2016), and few studies manipulated safety voice (n = 5, i.e., 2 
through leader behaviours, 2 vignettes, 1 intervention timing) or tested safety voice 
interventions (n = 7, i.e., 4 training programs, 3 changes to the environment). 
Safety voice variables (i.e., antecedents, pragmatics, outcomes) across levels of analysis 
were identified through quantitative (n = 67) and qualitative methods (n = 183), but qualitative 
studies identified relatively more group-based antecedents (32% vs 22% of all identified 
variables) and fewer outcomes (7% vs 15%). 
To elicit data on safety voice, 32 studies used a single operationalisation of safety voice and 
eighteen studies used two (e.g., latent themes and scales). Most studies relied on safety voice 
as identified through latent themes (n = 28) or scales (i.e., targeted at individuals, n = 16, 
groups, n = 3, or institutions, n = 2).  
Situational realism was approached through episode-recall (n = 11), vignettes (n = 2), or 
through in-situ observations (n = 5; e.g., observation or text analysis of transcribed 
conversations). Finally, only seventeen studies explicitly operationalised the victim in safety 
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voice (whether self or other). Post-hoc reports were a dominant method to elicit data from 
voicing individuals (n = 40) or their seniors (n = 4). The use of external sources (e.g., 
databases, behavioural observation, insurance claims) was rare (n = 6). 
Together, this indicates that 38 safety voice studies (76%) base findings on associations (i.e., 
correlations or themes). Research using broad-ranging methodologies has identified numerous 
variables and it seems appropriate to engage in a new phase of experimental research that can 
support the development and assessment of interventions in-situ. Furthermore, a need exists 
for improving safety voice operationalisations through (i) relying less on post-hoc reports that 
might bias results, (ii) disentangling victimhood from voice, and (iii) increasing the realism of 
safety voice scenarios.
 
Table 3.3. The Safety Voice framework. 





7  7 Demographics* Older age 5 1 6 Norms Unfavourable 
norms 
 5 5 Structures* Larger size 1  1 National 
culture 




2  2  Female 
gender 
4  4 Access Legitimated in 
concerns 
4  4  Segregated 
organisation 




1  1 
Speed High speed  2 2  Higher SES 1  1  Ostracism 1 2 3  Group 
membership 




1  1 
Awareness Hazard 
noticed 
2  2  Longer 
tenure and 
experience 
3  3  Territorial 
colleagues 




1  1 Perceived 




2 11 13 Situational 
presence 
Bystanders  2 2  Enabling 
structures/ 
resources 




 1 1 Need to 
protect 
reputation 
 7 7 Self 1  1  Lack of open 
communication 
channels 
 3 3      
Controllability Within 
control 
 1 1 Trusting 
others 




12  12 Culture* Unfavourable 
culture 








5  5 Invited or 
encouraged 
9  9  Support 5  5      
     Personality* Openness 
to 
experience 





7  7 Information Legal advice 
against voice 
 1 1      
      Conscien-
tiousness 
1  1 Fragile 
relationships* 
 8 8  Availability of 
information 
3  3      
      Extraversion 1  1 Safety voice 
affects others 
 2 2 Work 
configuration 
High workload 1 14 15      






3  3  Classroom-
reality 
mismatch 
 1 1      
     Motivation* To protect 
others 
3  3     Busy work 
environment 
1 2 3      
      Willingness 
to voice 
3  3 Group hierarchy  7 7           
      Felt 
Responsibil-
ity 
7  7 Difficulties due 
to authority 
 3 3           
     Position and 
status 
(power)* 






 3 3           




9 1 10 Others are 
fallible 
4  4           
 
      Intuition to 
speak-up 
1  1 Shared 
understanding* 
2  2           




6  6 Opportunities Learning 
opportunities 
1  1           
      Self-
confidence 




1  1           




 5 5                
     Identification With the 
organisation 
1  1                
2. Safety voice pragmatics 




  1                
      Work the 
hierarchy 
  1                
      Politeness   1                
      Increment 
urgency 
  1                
      Frame as 
support 
  1                
      Mirror 
receiver's 
language 












 3  3 Performance*  3 1 4      
    Sense of 
failure* 
 1 1               
+ Promoting/promoted by Safety Voice; - Inhibiting/inhibited by Safety Voice; * Overlaps with Morrison's (2011) model for Employee Voice. 
Note: where appropriate, extracted antecedents were recoded to provide a uniform polarity (e.g., all age antecedents were recoded towards indicating high age). A smaller font is used to enable all columns to be fitted onto one 
page. 
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Discussion 
 This study systematically reviewed the safety voice literature, which consisted of 48 
articles, most of which have been undertaken in healthcare and the US. In comparison to the 
safety voice model of Okuyama and colleagues (2014) our framework provides a more 
comprehensive overview (i.e., 65 versus 19 antecedents; 6 versus 3 pragmatics; 4 versus 2 
outcomes) across clearly delineated levels of analysis. Three questions were addressed, and we 
revealed the state of the safety voice concept (i.e., grounded in diverse theories, definitions and 
conceptualisations), its ecological nature (i.e., spread across hazard, individual, group, 
institutional and external levels of analysis) and methodological challenges (i.e., high rate of 
research using report-based methods and contexts of the USA, healthcare). We revealed for the 
first-time the safety voice outcomes, pragmatics and antecedents that inhibit (or promote) 
safety voice at Erez and Gati’s (2004) levels of analysis for the individual, group, institutional 
and external context. 
These findings have challenges and implications for safety voice, and we expanded upon 
these in the following sections.  
The conceptual uniqueness of safety voice  
Our systematic review revealed that safety voice had important conceptual overlaps with 
employee voice, yet also unique aspects that only warrant partial conceptual integration.  
Behaviourally, safety voice appeared similar to employee voice. That is, safety voice 
concepts and definitions, like employee voice, described a verbal behaviour in which people 
communicate a concern to others (e.g., colleagues) to change a perceived situation, with a 
similar propensity (i.e., discrete, constructive, proactive), and grounded in communication and 
teamwork concepts (Morrison, 2011). Furthermore, whilst future work may uncover this, we 
did not identify studies describing unique variables for social risk, moral obligation or 
proximity of outcomes. This suggests that safety voice and employee voice may be difficult to 
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distinguish in practice. For example, within safety-critical environments, concerns regarding 
the lack of protective equipment during a procedure can involve a safety issue (e.g., the new 
procedure can cause harm), a work-related issue (e.g., leadership does not comply with its 
responsibility to provide protective equipment), or bullying (e.g., being forced to work under 
lower standards than colleagues). This overlap highlights the potential for integrating 
behavioural concepts on speaking-up (Wilkinson et al., 2019), and a need for research to 
investigate the extent of empirical overlap in practice. We did not present evidence for this, 
and we anticipate future empirical investigations will prove fruitful. 
However, safety voice appeared unique in terms of the content of the raised message, the 
context and person speaking-up, and identified antecedents. That is, because safety voice 
involves raising a safety concern in response to a perceived hazard it appears closer to 
prohibitive (i.e., concerns about practices that may harm organisations) than promotive 
employee voice (Liang et al., 2012). This is important because it suggests safety voice’s scope 
may be limited to prohibitive messages (i.e., preventing harmful outcomes), and the safety 
content may provide a unique type of message and voice behaviour (Morrison, 2011). The issue 
of risk perception appears important for distinguishing safety voice: the need for safety voice 
hinges on the perception of a safety problem, and the recognition that it requires addressing. 
We agree with Morrison and colleagues (Morrison, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2019) that voice 
research (in the broadest sense) should emphasise the content of the communicated messages, 
whilst continually evaluating potential for integration across voice types.  
Furthermore, safety voice extends beyond organisational environments. Safety concerns are 
raised by other persons than employees (e.g., patients, family members, friends, bystanders; 
Hu et al., 2015), and beyond organisational contexts (e.g., in public, during sports activities; 
Anicich et al., 2015). Part of the unique value of safety voice thus resides in the broader context 
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of hazardous situations and future research should explore hazardous scenarios outside of 
organisational environments.  
Finally, in comparison to Morrison’s model for employee voice (Morrison, 2011), unique 
antecedents exist for employee voice (e.g., job attitudes, learning, decision-making, group 
harmony) and safety voice (i.e., safety knowledge, norms, shared safety knowledge, 
information, work configuration, national culture, outside interest, regulation), with hazard-
related antecedents revealing the unique scope of safety voice (see Table 3.3). Arguably, this 
reveals a difference in the fields’ aims and scopes, and future research may identify further 
overlaps in antecedents. 
Assumptions in researching safety voice 
At least three distinctive assumptions appear to shape the safety voice literature in terms of 
theory and methods. These relate to the social nature of processes involved in safety voice, the 
cost and benefits of safety voice outcomes and the research context.  
First, meaning is attributed to absences, and this implies that safety voice is a process of 
social construction. That is, silence (i.e., the absence of voice), and in particular safety (i.e., the 
absence of physical harm), are considered to constitute relevant concepts with real 
implications. This is important because things that have not occurred are difficult to assess, and 
manage, without invoking factors that precede, replace or follow from the absence, and it is 
difficult to understand safety voice without taking into account how process of social 
construction can create opposing views. For example, a lack of safety voice may only be 
meaningful because beliefs on the nature of physical harm, the desirability of outcomes, and 
absent behaviours are socially constructed (Lupton, 1999; Turner & Gray, 2009). Yet, what is 
considered to be safe or desirable may be ambiguous, contested, and altered over time through 
sense-making processes, and this suggests that future research needs to address the act of 
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raising safety concerns as inherently meaningful, social and embedded in a sociocultural 
context (Weick, 1995, 2010). 
Second, like employee voice (Bashshur & Oc, 2014), safety voice is treated as producing 
mainly favourable outcomes. However, physical harm may carry a larger cost than unresolved 
work issues, and this may imply that people would rationally consider it optimal to raise more 
safety than work issues. This review highlighted that research investigating the complete safety 
voice process (antecedents, voice pragmatics, output) are scarce, and when outcomes were 
included these focussed predominantly on prevented physical harm (e.g., preventing wrong site 
surgery; Blanco et al., 2009). Yet, safety voice outcomes may also be unfavourable (e.g., 
negative experiences), mixed or ambiguous and the ‘expected utility calculus’ (Milliken et al., 
2003) predicts this would reduce the likelihood of people speaking-up. This distinguishes 
safety voice from employee voice, because this would imply that if each safety voice instance 
has a cost (e.g., negative responses from others) and each prevented safety incident a 
significantly larger benefit (e.g., physical harm), then, dependent on the ambiguity of the 
expected utility of the outcomes, individuals would rationally produce a large number of false 
alerts for each correct alert in the case of safety voice. Approaches from signal detection theory 
(Nesse, 2005) and game theory (e.g., J. S. Brown et al., 1999) have been applied to defensive 
responses such as fear, and utilising these approaches might prove useful to uncover costs and 
benefits of safety voice outcomes and potential optimum levels of safety voice. 
Finally, based on the lack of research outside of organisational and clinical contexts, the 
literature seems to have assumed that safety voice is exclusively an organisational 
phenomenon. This finding highlights and important gap in safety voice research to date: safety 
risks are not confined to work contexts (Wilson, 1979) and people are concerned about risks 
that extend well beyond them (e.g., natural hazards, fires; G. W. Fischer et al., 1991). Research 
using experience sampling methods has highlighted that only 29% of people’s concerns about 
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physical risks are related to work activities (Hogarth et al., 2007), and concerns relate more 
often to personal transportation and food safety. Underscoring this, between 1979 and 2014 a 
total of 288,211 deaths were attributed to non-work related accidents (e.g., motor accidents, 
drowning, falls, poisoning) in the UK (ONS, 2016). The safety voice literature’s emphasis on 
institutions may have emerged from (i) organisations’ desire to manage and control safety and 
(ii) researchers’ desire to use a combination of relevant and accessible data. However, to fully 
understand the processes involved in voicing safety concerns, the literature needs to expand 
beyond organisational contexts.  
An ecological framework for safety voice  
We set out to uncover the inhibiting and promoting relationships between antecedents, 
safety voice, and its outcomes across levels of analysis (Bronfenbrenner, 1977; Erez & Gati, 
2004; Leveson, 2002). To this end, we proposed an ecological framework for safety voice 
antecedent and outcomes (see Table 3.3) that makes three contributions. 
First, the framework highlights the ecological nature of safety voice for antecedents, 
pragmatics and outcomes. Safety voice can be delineated at Erez and Gati’s (2004) individual, 
group, institution and external context levels of analysis, and some variables manifest 
differently across these levels. For example, power differentials are manifested as individual 
‘power’, group ‘hierarchy and leaders’ actions’, and institutional ‘hierarchical structures’. 
Furthermore, we found that several antecedents related specifically to characteristics of 
hazards. This is important for safety voice as an ecological phenomenon, because it implies 
that in addition to outcomes, the unsafe event dynamically shapes and is shaped (i.e., a feedback 
loop) by the social context of individuals, groups, institutions and external environment. The 
framework therefore enables a systems approach to safety voice (Leveson, 2002), that is not 
prescriptive but describes the nature of relationships amongst antecedents, voice pragmatics 
and outcomes across levels of analysis as dynamic and emergent (White, 1995).  
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Second, the framework suggests novel directions for research. The framework 
simultaneously reveals gaps and abundances in knowledge. Arguably, certain domains would 
not require additional evidence (e.g., workload, receptiveness of others, physical harm, fear for 
consequences), whereas others would (e.g., unfavourable outcomes, the external context, 
unconscious processes, characteristics of the hazard). In particular, the literature has put a 
significant emphasis on antecedents, but a gap remains in terms of a clearer operationalisation 
of victimhood (i.e., who suffers the physical harm), safety responsibilities (i.e., people who are 
tasked with managing the safety issue may not speak-up), beliefs on hazard characteristics, 
safety voice pragmatics, and unfavourable outcomes. 
Finally, the framework enables improved safety management. It facilitates causal factor 
analysis for accident investigation (through enabling the identification of causes for silence), 
and, in particular, the application of evidence-based interventions by ensuring interventions 
cover the available empirical evidence and identifying suitable loci for novel interventions. For 
example, based on evidence across levels of analysis, interventions may target the removal of 
trade-offs, creating (shared) safety knowledge, or providing favourable work configurations 
and regulation. 
Methodological issues in researching safety voice  
Safety voice research is characterised by broad-ranging methods (i.e., quantitative and 
qualitative), a reliance on post-hoc reports and a need for causal conclusions. These challenges 
are similar to those outlined by Morrison (2011), yet four methodological challenges require 
special attention to further the safety voice literature.  
First, the field tends to assume that people can report on the antecedents and outcomes of 
safety voice, and has treated post-hoc reports as reliable data. Post-hoc reports are valuable as 
they are relatively resource efficient and can enable large sample sizes (e.g., through surveys). 
However, Podsakoff and Organ (1986) pointed out common method variance, motives for 
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consistency and social desirability, and a range of perceptual biases (e.g., confirmation bias, 
illusory correlations) can bias post-hoc reports. Furthermore, self-reports may be biased 
through motivations to mitigate social risks (e.g., negative consequences), and supervisor-
reports may be inflated through a desire to appear as an effective leader. Also, such findings 
are often correlational, and the causality of relationships between safety voice and its 
antecedents and outcomes requires explicit testing.  
Second, related to this, data on safety voice occurring in-situ is scarce, and few studies have 
observed the complete safety voice phenomenon (i.e., antecedents, pragmatics, outcomes). 
Collecting data in dangerous scenarios (e.g., through exposing or prolonging participants to 
danger) or operationalising victimhood is ethically challenging (Lee-Treweek & Linkogle, 
2000), and the short-lived nature of safety voice means it is difficult to encounter 
spontaneously. Report-based methodologies (e.g., statements provided in surveys, interviews, 
etc.) enable the circumvention of this, yet are limited as they do not observe safety voice 
behaviours (e.g., reports of behaviour are not the behaviour), rely on memory and imagination 
(e.g., poor memory and social desirability can introduce bias), and cannot establish causal 
relationships with other antecedent and outcomes (e.g., due to common method bias). Our 
review revealed limited methodological breadth, and the limitations of report-based 
methodologies indicates new methodologies are needed to investigate safety voice, for example 
experience sampling methodologies, text analysis of transcribed conversations on safety, or 
designing safety voice scenarios for simulations or laboratory settings. This may also address 
(i) the empirical relationship between safety voice and silence, which Morrison (2011) 
suggested is outstanding for employee voice, and (ii) the challenge of manipulating risk 
perceptions without crossing ethical boundaries. Thus, to address this, we investigated the 
challenges for investigating safety voice, and presented a novel safety voice experiment for use 
in laboratory settings (Noort et al., 2019a).  
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Third, it remains unclear whether safety voice processes are particular to their industrial or 
national contexts, and no data on measurement equivalence exists for safety voice in terms of 
its relevance, construct, and relationship with antecedents and outcomes (Reader et al., 2015). 
Thus, there is a need to compare results across contexts.  
Finally, a need exists to clarify ethical procedures, treatment of missing data, and promote 
open science. This may be achieved through providing more information during the publication 
process, and authors need to address whether data can be shared on open platforms.  
Limitations 
Several limitations of this systematic review need to be stated. First, additional articles may 
have been published during the process of writing this article (March 2017 onwards) and the 
date of publication. A mere product of the academic publication cycle, authors of future safety 
voice reviews should take this into account. Second, systematic reviews are limited to their 
search strategy. For this article, the search strategy was limited to include articles when ‘*safe*’ 
and not ‘technolog* were mentioned in the title or abstract. This means that the search strategy 
may have missed employee voice studies that covered safety but did not mention this in the 
title or abstract, or voiced concerns through technological means. The initial searches did not 
reveal any articles in this regard, and we aimed to mitigate this through a hand search. Third, 
the strength of the safety voice framework is only as strong as the quality of the evidence that 
underpins it. The quality of articles and associated risk of bias has been addressed in this 
review, yet the framework may be biased to the extent that the field’s assumptions and methods 
are systematically biased. We addressed above how the field can address this with future 
research. Finally, this systematic review had a conceptual scope and a need remains for direct 
empirical comparisons of safety and employee voice to establish their relative predictive 
validity. This is especially relevant for organisational environments where reducing harm is the 
main organisational goal (e.g., for air traffic control, healthcare): studies on employee and 
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safety voice may render identical (or highly correlated) findings where the concepts’ scopes 
overlap (i.e., reducing harm through speaking-up in safety-critical organisations).  
Conclusions 
Despite some conceptual and methodological overlap between safety voice and employee 
voice, we conclude that it is a related but distinct phenomenon due to its unique focus on safety 
and risk perception, the wider range of stakeholders involved, and the distinct methodologies, 
antecedents, and outcomes of safety voice. Understanding safety voice as an ecological 
phenomenon, whereby it can be influenced by hazard, individual, group, organisational, and 
contextual factors, can help researchers to improve understanding on why people do or do not 
engage in safety voice, and can support practitioners in developing interventions to enable 
speaking-up within specific safety-critical situations. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR INVESTIGATING 
SAFETY VOICE 
Preface 
In the previous chapter I revealed that the safety voice literature relies on evidence from 
post-hoc and report-based methodologies (e.g., interviews, surveys, focus-groups) that are 
assumed to reliably reflect the acts of raising and withholding safety concerns. Scholars have 
acknowledged the implications of this assumption for the interpretation of findings (e.g., 
Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c). However, this means that we have not directly studied safety 
voice behaviour but people’s perspectives on safety voice behaviour. Because of this empirical 
gap, it remains unclear how people actually engage in safety voice and safety silence, or how 
interventions alter the behaviour. Yet, whilst the broader methodological literature has 
identified applicable methodological and ethical challenges (e.g., Gleibs, 2014; Mitchell, 2012; 
Nestel et al., 2017; also see Chapter 2), it remains unclear how these apply to assessing safety 
voice behaviour (and safety-related behaviours more generally), and in order to better 
understand how safety silence contributes to accidents, a need exists for methods that can 
directly access safety voice alongside the extent to which people are concerned.  
In Article 2, I present three studies to develop, evaluate and make accessible an experimental 
paradigm for investigating safety voice behaviour (termed ‘Walking the Plank’). The article 
aimed to build an experimental paradigm for investigating safety voice, but it also creates a 
template for the design of new experimental paradigms in the safety management literature 
(e.g., for targeting other safety-related behaviours in healthcare or flight simulations, also see 
Chapter 7). This is important because, whilst simulation studies have been published in medical 
journals (Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Kolbe, Weiss, et al., 2013) and journals interested in 
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organisational behaviour (Weiss et al., 2017, 2018), the top safety management journals with 
a generic contextual scope (e.g., Safety Science, Accident Analysis and Prevention, Risk 
Analysis, Human Factors) tend to publish relatively few laboratory studies15. Article 2 
therefore aims to highlight how experiments may establish insights into safety management by 
addressing key methodological and ethical issues for observing safety-related behaviours (e.g., 
assessing risk perception, providing ethical protocols, addressing the association between 
reported and observed behaviour).  
In terms of the mapping to the thesis research questions, these studies were originally 
intended to investigate how interventions are optimally tailored to the nature of safety voice 
(research question 3). However, because the paradigm was not yet stable it functioned more 
optimally to evaluate challenges to investigating safety voice behaviour (therefore contributing 
to research question 2: What is the optimal way to investigate safety voice behaviour?). In 
addition, I evaluate which aspects of safety voice need to be established by experiments 
(therefore contributing to research question 1: What is the behavioural nature of safety voice?) 
and how studies can establish causal conclusions on safety voice (therefore contributing to 
research question 3: To what extent do interventions for promoting safety voice and reducing 
safety silence need to be tailored to the behavioural nature of safety voice?). 
To avoid being misread, I should explicitly note that I do not debate that post-hoc or report-
based methods have distinct value. Studies using these types of methods have contributed 
important insights into the factors that shape safety voice (Morrow et al., 2016), and I have 
personally used report-based methods to great satisfaction in safety management studies, and 
beyond, because they enable in-depth insights into people’s worldviews (e.g., interviews; 
                                                 
15 A crude analysis indicates that the term ‘laboratory experiment’ only provides thirty hits on Google 
Scholar across publications in these four journals in 2019, of which ten only cited laboratory 
experiments. Most laboratory studies were published in Human Factors (n = 16). 
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Franks et al., 2017) and cost-effective data collection from large samples (e.g., surveys; Noort 
et al., 2016; Reader et al., 2015). Yet, methods have inherent limitations (e.g., archival studies 
may capture trends that have since changed, Gergen, 1973; experiments have debated external 
validity; Gigerenzer, 1984) and it remains unclear how these apply to observing safety voice 
behaviour. In addition to experiments, other methods can enable direct access to safety voice 
behaviour and the conclusions from this chapter (e.g., the need to establish safety concerns to 
establish safety silence), arguably, apply to the investigation of safety voice behaviour through 
simulations (e.g., Raemer et al., 2016) and archival studies that capture field-based data (see 
Chapter 6). 
Study description 
Across three studies, I evaluate how the proposed ‘Walking the Plank’ paradigm can address 
challenges to investigating safety voice behaviour. I review safety voice methods and identify 
nine methodological shortfalls in the literature that limit behavioural conclusions on safety 
voice (see Table 4.1). These relate to the literature establishing scant data on the behavioural 
nature of safety voice (e.g., because reports of safety voice are not safety voice behaviour), 
relying on recalled and hypothesised behaviour (e.g., providing potentially biased data) and 
providing limited insights into the relationships of safety voice with other variables (e.g., in 
terms of causality). 
The three studies evaluate how these challenges can be addressed by laboratory 
experiments. Lessons were drawn on the concept (i.e., the behaviour is contingent upon risk 
perception, it manifests as a varied and continuous variable) and operationalisation of safety 
voice (i.e., the behaviour is observable, but operationalising safety silence is challenging). This 
indicated that in order to establish safety silence, behavioural investigations need to assess the 
extent to which individuals are concerned upon encountering threats, and that safety voice can 
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be conceptualised as a two-dimensional behaviour with the extent to which hazards elicit 
concerns providing an important step in the prevention of harm (see Figure 4.1). Most 
importantly, by establishing and evaluating the Walking the Plank paradigm, I contribute a new 
way to investigate safety voice. This is evidenced by the successful adoption of the 
experimental paradigm by five MSc students for their thesis research, to date16.  
Ethics approval for the studies and supporting pilot studies was obtained from the Research 
Ethics Committee at the London School of Economics (see appendix B). To support future 
research in applying and tailoring the paradigm, I provided a protocol manual and illustrative 
video as online supplementary materials to the publication (Noort et al., 2019a)17. Copies of 
the protocol manual and paper-based study materials are provided in Appendix C and 
                                                 
16 This involved: Eleanor McSweeney, Grace Rahal, Kate Sitniewski and Lucy Zhong (on disinhibition, 
gender, closed leadership), and Alyssa Pandolfo (on social norms). 
17 The online supplementary materials can be found at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/ 
fpsyg.2019.00668/full#supplementary-material. 
Figure 4.1. Threat Mitigation Model of safety voice and safety concerns.  
Note: this model highlights that the dysfunctional momentum of threats towards accidents 
(Barton & Sutcliff, 2009) can be mitigated through safety voice when individuals are 
concerned. This emphasises that safety voice can be understood as (un)concerned voice and 
silence (also see Table 4.7), with antecedents reducing the extent that threats elicit concerns 
and voice. 
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Appendix D, respectively. Readers are strongly encouraged to familiarise themselves with the 
illustrative video. 
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Article 2:  
Walking the plank – An experimental paradigm to investigate 
safety voice 
 
Published under a Creative Commons License (CC-BY 4.0) in Frontiers in Psychology – 
Organizational Psychology section as:  
Noort, M. C., Reader, T. W., & Gillespie, A. (2019). Walking the plank: an experimental 
paradigm to investigate safety voice. Frontiers in psychology, 10, 668. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00668. 
Abstract 
The investigation of people raising or withholding safety concerns, termed safety voice, has 
relied on report-based methodologies, with few experiments. Generalisable findings have been 
limited because: the behavioural nature of safety voice is rarely operationalised; the reliance 
on memory and imagination has well-established biases; and determining causality requires 
experimentation. Across three studies, we introduce, evaluate and make available the first 
experimental paradigm for studying safety voice: the ‘Walking the plank’ paradigm. This 
paradigm presents participants with an apparent hazard (walking across a weak wooden plank) 
to elicit safety voice behaviours, and it addresses the methodological shortfalls of report-based 
methodologies. Study 1 (n = 129) demonstrated that the paradigm can elicit observable safety 
voice behaviours in a safe, controlled and randomised laboratory environment. Study 2 (n = 69) 
indicated it is possible to elicit safety silence for a single hazard when safety concerns are 
assessed and alternative ways to address the hazard are absent. Study 3 (n = 75) revealed that 
manipulating risk perceptions results in changes to safety voice behaviours. We propose a 
distinction between two independent dimensions (concerned-unconcerned and voice-silence) 
which yields a 2x2 safety voice typology. Demonstrating the need for experimental 
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investigations of safety voice, the results found a consistent mismatch between self-reported 
and observed safety voice. The discussion examines insights on conceptualising and 
operationalising safety voice behaviours in relationship to safety concerns, and suggests new 
areas for research: replicating empirical studies, understanding the behavioural nature of safety 
voice, clarifying the personal relevance of physical harm, and integrating safety voice with 
other harm-prevention behaviours. Our article adds to the conceptual strength of the safety 
voice literature and provides a methodology and typology for experimentally examining people 
raising safety concerns. 
Keywords: Safety Voice; Safety Silence; Safety Concerns; Experimental methodologies; 
Behavioural Observations 
Introduction 
The term safety voice describes the behaviour of raising, or withholding, safety concerns to 
prevent physical harm from hazardous situations (e.g., Tucker, Chmiel, Turner, Sandy 
Hershcovis, et al., 2008). Across organisational (e.g., healthcare, energy), family (e.g., 
transport, DIY), and leisure contexts (e.g., high risk sports), promoting the act of raising of 
safety concerns can reduce people’s exposure to hazards (e.g., medicine dispensation, 
dangerous driving, high-altitude climbing without proper gear) and prevent physical harm 
(Anicich et al., 2015; Manias, 2015). The absence of speaking-up, also termed safety silence, 
(Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014), has been implicated in catastrophes such as the 1983 Challenger 
disaster (Moorhead et al., 1991) and 2010 Deepwater horizon oil spill (Reader & O’Connor, 
2014), and is estimated to be involved in 25% of aviation accidents (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; 
Tarnow, 1999).  
Due to the difficulty of observing safety voice in safety-critical situations, academic safety 
voice publications tend to present data obtained through report-based data (e.g., surveys, focus 
groups, interviews, vignettes; Noort et al., 2019b) in which individuals or their seniors report 
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on behavioural responses to previously held or imagined safety concerns. Yet, it remains 
unclear whether data from reports is reflective, explanatory, and predictive of safety voice 
behaviours. Alternative approaches are required to study the conditions and ways through 
which people raise or withhold safety concerns, and to address this, we propose and test the 
first experimental paradigm for investigating safety voice. Through investigating the 
occurrence of safety voice behaviours in a laboratory setting, and the challenges in assessing 
these, we aim to establish a methodology for i) observing the behavioural nature of safety voice; 
ii) reducing the methodological reliance on memory and imagination; and iii) advancing 
knowledge on the factors that predict safety voice.  
Safety voice: the need for an experimental approach 
The term ‘safety voice’ is used as a broad label to, confusingly, encompass a behaviour and 
its counterpart: safety voice (i.e., raising safety concerns) and safety silence (Manapragada & 
Bruk-Lee, 2016; Morrow et al., 2016; Okuyama et al., 2014; Van Dyne et al., 2003). ‘Safety 
voice’ often relates to raising safety concerns, which is the act of speaking-up about safety 
issues, through informal or formal communication channels, to a variety of targets (e.g., 
management, co-workers, the public), with the intention to mitigate harm from a situation 
perceived to be dangerous (Tucker et al., 2008). Through doing this, people communicate 
safety issues with the aim of creating a shared perception of the risk and, ultimately, avoiding 
the danger (Okuyama et al., 2014). Safety silence, the ‘non-voicing’ type of safety voice, is 
defined as the active withholding of safety concerns (e.g., Okuyama et al., 2014), and is thus 
different from the simple absence of speaking-up: this can follow from not having safety 
concerns (i.e., ‘unconcerned silence’).  
The concept of safety voice emerged from the literature on employee voice and silence 
(Morrison, 2011, 2014; Van Dyne et al., 2003), and appears similar. Yet, voice behaviours (in 
the broadest sense) can be distinguished based on message content (e.g., Liang et al., 2012; 
Chapter 4: Methodological challenges for investigating safety voice 122 
Morrison, 2011), and the safety voice literature is characterised by a narrower concern (i.e., 
limited to prohibiting harm from safety issues), broader application (i.e., beyond organisational 
environments), more severe outcomes (e.g., fatalities), and has established different 
antecedents across levels of analysis (e.g., expected impact of harm, safety knowledge, 
workload, national culture; Noort et al., 2019b). The message content of safety voice relates to 
the avoidance of harm based on perceived risks, and arguably types of harm may be 
distinguished: the prevention of physical (e.g., injuries, accidents), psychological (e.g., 
bullying, harassment), social (e.g., ostracism, unpleasant interactions) or ethical harm (e.g., 
loss of autonomy; Marshall, 1996). These issues are important to safety voice researchers and 
practitioners as they can contribute to unsafe outcomes (e.g., bullying can create a poor safety 
culture), yet physical harm may be easiest to operationalise (i.e., it is closer to a hazard, less 
ambiguous, easiest to manipulate), and other types of harm may occur beyond (potential) 
hazards.  
Researching safety voice for academic or practice-based purposes is complex due to the 
elusive and sensitive nature of the phenomenon. Safety voice is a spontaneous response to 
hazards occurring in natural environments (e.g., wobbly stepladders, incorrect aircraft air 
pressure settings), and systematic behavioural observations can provide valuable insights into 
the dynamic social and physical context in which people raise safety concerns (Mulhall, 2003; 
Reiss, 1971; Rydenfält et al., 2015; van Schagen & Sagberg, 2012), real-time patterns of 
behaviour (e.g., attention; Lappi et al., 2017; Waller & Kaplan, 2016), demographic variations 
(Pérez-Tejera et al., 2018) or how people feel and act when they speak-up without having to 
rely on post-hoc reports (e.g., Mastrofski et al., 1998; Murphy & Dingwall, 2007), and may 
reveal stronger effects (Brodin et al., 2016). Yet, within natural environments, it is difficult to 
i) observe short-lived and spontaneous behaviours that may not occur frequently (Mastrofski 
et al., 2010) in a resource efficient way (i.e., many resources are needed to capture brief 
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moments of speaking-up/remaining silent; Reiss, 1971), ii) record behaviours in a standardised 
way (e.g., across unsafe situations), iii) assess the riskiness of a situation and whether people 
are withholding a safety concern (or did not understand the gravity of the situation), or iv) 
ensure participants are not changing their natural behaviour (Nichols & Maner, 2008). A 
notable exception to these limitations of naturalistic observations are cockpit voice recordings, 
but to-date they have received limited empirical study in terms of safety voice (cf. U. Fischer 
& Orasanu, 2000). 
To overcome the challenges of observing safety voice, practice-based investigations (e.g., 
inquiries, accident investigations; Francis, 2013, 2015; Rogers, 1986) and the vast majority of 
academic investigations into safety voice (i.e., a systematic review indicated 76% of academic 
publications; Noort et al., 2019b) utilise methodologies that obtain data from participant reports 
on whether they or their supervisees raised or withheld safety concerns. For example, through 
participants providing statements during inquiries (e.g., Francis, 2015), stating their imagined 
response to a vignette scenario (Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c), recalling scenarios in which 
they held a safety concern and communicated this to others (e.g., Schwappach & Gehring, 
2014d), or completing survey scales that elicit agreement with statements about imagined or 
generic scenarios (Delisle et al., 2016; Gkorezis et al., 2016). Applications of these 
methodologies for academic and non-academic purposes have enabled the identification of lay 
rationales for safety voice, contributing factors to major incidents, cross-sectional comparisons 
(e.g., across organisational departments), and testing of interventions to alter lay perceptions 
of the likelihood, with practitioners supplementing academic conclusions through providing 
better access to people involved in incidents, subject-matter expertise and faster publication of 
lessons learned (when conclusions are published).  
  
Chapter 4: Methodological challenges for investigating safety voice 124 
Table 4.1. Methodological shortfalls, needs, and experimental solutions for the investigation of 
safety voice. 
Shortfall Need  Experimental solution 
Behavioural nature of safety voice 
1. Reports provide no 
behavioural data 
Reproduce safety voice 
behaviours  
Create a situation to elicit 
speaking-up and silence 
2. Few methods have 
operationalised safety voice as 
emerging from a clear hazard 
and safety concern 
Operationalise a hazard that 
elicits a single safety concerns 
and behavioural response 
Present a single hazard and 
ascertain safety concerns 
3. Participants cannot be 
exposed to real hazards and 
cannot be aware their 
decisions on safety voice are 
observed  
Minimise potential harm to 
participants while they believe 
risk is real 
Manipulate the perception of 
risk, not real risk, using 
deception procedures 
The reliance on memory and imagination 
4. Reports provide inaccurate 
data on safety voice 
Operationalise measures that 
directly observe safety voice 
behaviours 
Record behaviours through 
observation (in-
person/recording) 
5. Floor and ceiling effects can 
bias estimates of behaviour 
Provide measures that enable 
sufficient variance and observe 
speaking-up and silence 
Calibrate safety concerns to 
elicit speaking-up and safety 
silence  
The relationship with other variables 
6. Reports provide limited 
insights into causal 
relationship between safety 
voice and antecedents and 
outcomes 
Provide methodologies that can 
establish and replicate causal 
relationships 
  
Build a protocol that can 
manipulate variables of 
interest 
7. Reports on safety voice may 
be subject to structural 
confounds introduced through 
sampling 
Minimise the influence of 
unintended contextual 
confounds  
Sample participants using 
random procedures  
8. A third outcome variable is 
created if alternative 
mitigations are possible 
Establish a method that limits 
alternative hazard mitigations to 
speaking-up and silence 
Minimise alternative 
mitigations of the hazard 
9. Relationships may not be 
reliable over time  
Protocols need to enable direct 
replication and falsification  
Provide a clearly specified 
study protocol 
 
 However, there are limitations in the use of report-based methodologies to investigate 
safety voice. Reports have limited applicability for addressing situational factors (e.g., personal 
relevance of risk, group dynamics, previous history of raising safety concerns) and mechanisms  
(e.g., decision-making on risk) that can shape safety voice, and perhaps paradoxically, request 
people to speak-up about whether they remained silent. Reports on safety voice are always at 
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least one-step removed from the actual behaviour of raising or withholding safety concerns, 
are over-reliant on imagining or recalling behaviours, and cannot provide predictive insight 
into how safety voice relates to antecedents and outcomes. Accordingly, the validity of the 
research remains uncertain, and alternative methodologies focussing on actual behaviour are 
required to validate findings, and evidence interventions. The use of experiments in related 
domains (e.g., bystander intervention; P. Fischer et al., 2011) suggest these methods can 
provide a way to overcome the unique challenges of studying safety voice in hazardous 
situations. We thus propose that the shortfalls of safety voice methods (summarised in Table 
4.1) can be overcome through the development of an experimental methodology that: i) 
captures the behavioural nature of safety voice; ii) avoids the reliance on memory and 
imagination; and iii) explores the relationship to other variables as potential causes. 
The behavioural nature of safety voice 
Research on safety voice has emerged due to recognition that, in high-risk situations, raising 
concerns is critical to avoiding accidents. Case study investigations have revealed acts of 
raising and withholding of safety concerns as critical determinants of harm in dangerous 
situations (e.g., Cocklin, 2004; Moorhead et al., 1991), and the phenomenon is highly 
behavioural. It typically involves an individual (e.g., an employee, patient, concerned 
stakeholder) having a concern about a safety issue, and then raising it with another party (e.g., 
supervisor, doctor, colleagues) in order to prevent harm, or holding back from raising the 
concern altogether (silence). Yet, and despite the recognised importance of raising safety 
concerns for avoiding accidents (and silence in allowing accidents; Francis, 2013; Moorhead 
et al., 1991; Reader & O’Connor, 2014; Tarnow, 1999), investigations into this phenomenon 
have frequently assumed that reports correspond to real-world behaviour, and are subject to the 
same mechanisms that drive safety voice (Del Boca & Noll, 2000).  
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This is problematic because of: i) the often-observed gaps between reports and actual 
behaviour (e.g., Sheeran, 2002); ii) the lack of behavioural data upon which to base findings 
and interventions (Weathington et al., 2010); and iii) the low fidelity of actions and context 
(i.e., operationalisations do not correspond to the behaviour and risky environment; Stoffregen 
et al., 2003). Accordingly, it remains unclear to what extent safety voice behaviours differ from 
report-based data and should be observed directly, in a standardised way (i.e., reports may not 
acquire behavioural data; Shortfall 1), or conceptualised, operationalised and measured as 
emerging from clear hazards that cause safety concerns (i.e., safety concerns have not been 
measured alongside safety voice behaviours; Shortfall 2). Establishing this is important for 
generating accurate baseline data on safety voice (e.g., the average rates of people that are 
concerned about a hazard and speak-up or remain silent), clarifying the relationship between 
presented hazards and the extend that these cause concerns, and for generalising and predicting 
safety voice behaviours.  
However, to date, 76% of the safety voice literature (Noort et al., 2019b) has focussed on 
willingness to raise safety concerns in general (e.g., agreement to generic questionnaire items), 
post-intervention changes in safety voice, or the extent of safety voice in response to presented 
hazards without measuring safety concerns (yet for a safety concern item, see: Schwappach & 
Gehring, 2014c). For example, high-fidelity training simulations (Hanson, 2017) have 
specified safety voice as a trainable behaviour, whilst only measuring changes in safety voice 
in pre- and post-training questionnaires, and studies that have exposed participants to 
(perceived) hazards such as a senior person engaging in unsafe acts (e.g., Aubin & King, 2015; 
Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014) or medical emergencies (Reime et al., 2016) have assumed that 
such hazards should trigger safety concerns (yet do not measure this). Furthermore, where 
observational data on safety voice has been obtained, measurements have included safety voice 
into higher level codes (Hughes et al., 2014; Reime et al., 2016), focussed on a tendency to 
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speak-up or remain silent without measuring safety concerns (Kolbe et al., 2012, 2014), 
assumed knowledge about hazards or their presentation elicited safety concerns (Barzallo 
Salazar et al., 2014), or presented multiple hazards at once (Hodges, 2018). To our knowledge, 
no studies have investigated the relationship between observed levels of safety voice and 
reported safety voice, or to measured safety concerns.18  
This is important, because safety voice is a highly contextualized behaviour: it is assumed 
to occur in response to the perception of safety being threatened within a particular context 
(e.g., cockpit, operating theatre, production line) that can be highly ambiguous (e.g., 
contrasting information, multiple hazards) and complex (e.g., March & Olsen, 1975). Without 
collecting data on perceptions of risk within a given context one cannot i) compare across 
hazardous situations (e.g., threats to patient and aviation safety; Tamuz & Thomas, 2006) and 
ii) make assumptions about why someone may have remained silent (i.e., unconcerned silence 
versus withholding of safety concerns due to fear of reprisals), or iv) ascertain whether voice 
occurred due to concern or precaution (i.e., unconcerned voice). Whilst self-report studies can 
provide insight on general tendencies for safety voice, insights on how safety concerns elicit 
safety voice behaviours remain minimal (cf. Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c), and behavioural 
studies have not measured the risk perceptions of the participants being observed.  
To study similar phenomena in other fields, experimenters have designed standardised 
situations for eliciting participant behaviour: for example bystander interventions (for a meta-
analysis see: P. Fischer et al., 2011) or defiance/resistance to authority (Kaposi, 2017; Milgram, 
1963; Miller et al., 1995). Within the field of voice more generally, experiments have been 
                                                 
18 High-fidelity simulations have contributed important insights on the behavioural nature of safety 
voice, and the effects of training and debriefing (Friedman et al., 2015; Pian-Smith et al., 2009; Weiss 
et al., 2014, 2018), and indicated that leaders respond less favourably to explicit ways of speaking-up 
(Krenz et al., 2019) or can delay the onset of nursing speaking-up (Krenz et al., 2020). However, and 
despite the valuable insights drawn from this work, these studies did not present data on whether 
scenarios elicited safety concerns (i.e., thus limiting conclusions on safety silence). 
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used to investigate employee voice for volunteering non-safety related information (Morrison 
et al., 2015). What is common to these studies is that they create a high-fidelity illusion of an 
emerging problem that requires a behavioural response (e.g., helping a person falling victim to 
verbal abuse in a bystander scenario; P. Fischer et al., 2006) without endangering participants. 
Their benefit is that they allow for a behavioural phenomenon to be investigated in a highly 
controlled environment, with observations then being contextualised to specific scenarios.  
To investigate safety voice, a similar approach would be beneficial, with participants 
engaging in standardised situations that create a safety concern that can be addressed through 
speaking-up. This is challenging because participants cannot be exposed to genuine physical 
harm and, to avoid observer effects and study naturalised behaviour (Nichols & Maner, 2008), 
participants should not be aware that their decisions on safety voice are being observed 
(Shortfall 3). These issues can only be addressed through designing scenarios that manipulate 
perceived levels of safety (i.e., hazards that elicit a concern, and a need to intervene), not actual 
risks, while measuring safety concerns and ensuring participant remain naïve to study goals 
through deception procedures (Weathington et al., 2010). In particular, designing plausible 
cover stories is important: in the absence of these invalid data may emerge because participants 
i) deduce the hazard is fabricated; or ii) believe (correctly) that researchers would need to 
comply with ethical standards that would prevent the scenario. 
In summary, an experimental paradigm is required to investigate safety voice in a controlled, 
standardised, and generalisable way. A key property of any such paradigm is that it elicits 
observable safety voice behaviours (i.e., both raising and withholding concerns) through 
manipulating perceived risk and ascertaining safety concerns (i.e., as opposed to exposure to 
real physical harm), with deception procedures ensuring that participants are naïve to study 
intentions, and thus their behaviour is natural.  
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The reliance on memory and imagination 
Insight on safety voice has largely been generated through recalled or imagined (in)action 
during hazardous instances. Whilst practice-based inquiries have investigated actual incidents 
(Francis, 2013; Rogers, 1986), typically, it is assumed that participants are accurate in 
remembering and generalising past behaviours (e.g., Schwappach & Gehring, 2014d), or can 
imagine how they would respond in a safety-related situation (Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c). 
These data are then used to explain the factors that influence safety voice (e.g., Nembhard, 
Labao, et al., 2015), to describe its occurrence (Tucker et al., 2008), and predict future 
outcomes (Blanco et al., 2009). Yet, the validity of this approach is not self-evident, and 
correlations often low (Reiss, 1971), with participants in report-based studies having been long-
shown as unable, or unwilling, to provide accurate data (Bartlett, 1932; Podsakoff & Organ, 
1986). Memories are influenced by a limited ability to recall situations: behaviour can be 
activated by causes outside of conscious awareness at the time of the behaviour such as scents, 
posters or semantic primes (Aarts et al., 2008; Custers & Aarts, 2010). Furthermore, distances 
in time, space, or person (e.g., CEOs reporting whether staff in remote locations raised safety 
concerns for a system introduced the previous year) can further erode data accuracy, and 
recalling and imagining behaviours is subject to subject-matter expertise and cognitive biases 
(e.g., availability heuristic; Schwarz et al., 1991). That is, participants may lack knowledge on 
what constitutes speaking-up, or be unwilling to accurately report safety silence: reports are 
constructed based on individual attitudes and perceived social norms regarding safety voice 
(Bartlett, 1932); individuals may experience dissonance between their ideal self-image as able 
to speak-up and admitting to safety silence (Baumeister, 1982); and social desirability biases 
half of survey and interview findings (van de Mortel, 2008). For example, desires to appear a 
good and ethical employee (or effective manager), may bias participants towards reporting 
speaking-up over safety silence, especially when harmful outcomes occurred in serious or 
obvious safety situations.  
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Moreover, recalling and imagining safety voice provides limited scope for exploring the 
dynamic context in which it occurs. Safety voice surveys, interviews, and vignettes typically 
aim to increase realism through recall of previously experienced hazardous scenarios or the 
presentation of scenarios validated by subject matter experts. However, these scenarios remain 
limited because i) the hazard environments they present will usually differ in some way from 
reality (i.e., which hinders recall; Lars & Wolf, 2009); ii) the dynamic of a situation is not 
present (e.g., task pressures on the participant); and iii) there are no immediate consequences 
for participants, or safety, at the time of data collection. This means, as shown in other research 
paradigms (Blass, 1999; Milgram, 1974), a gap may exist between reports and behaviour, and 
addressing this is important for establishing the triggers of safety voice (e.g. hazard perception), 
and the contextual factors (e.g. interactions between people and situations) that determine 
voice: or, indeed, silence.  
The above factors potentially erode the accuracy of safety voice data collected through 
report-based methods (Shortfall 4), which undermines the validity of conclusions assumed 
from data (Bagozzi et al., 1991), and more specifically, how safety voice is assumed to be 
operationalized in risky situations. Addressing this is important for establishing the triggers of 
safety voice, and the contextual factors (e.g., interactions between people and situations) that 
determine the behaviour. An experimental paradigm focussed on eliciting safety voice can 
address this limitation through facilitating observations of safety voice (e.g., at the time of data 
collection, or through video), ensuring these are reliably assessed (e.g., using inter-coder 
reliability for the extent to which an individual raised safety concerns), with participant post-
hoc reports being matched to behavioural data. To achieve this, and undertake meaningful 
statistical analyses, safety voice experiments need to elicit both safety voice acts (i.e., raising 
a concern) and silence. Floor (i.e., near-complete silence) and ceiling effects (i.e., near-
complete voice) can bias estimates of the behaviour (Shortfall 5), with information about 
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change (e.g., through interventions) being lost at the extreme ends of the scale through data 
censoring (i.e., relevant data falling beyond the scale end-point; Cox & Oakes, 1984). Though 
statistical procedures are available (McBee, 2010), a successful experimental paradigm should 
produce sufficient statistical variance and a moderate degree of speaking-up and silence (i.e., 
a 50-50 split). Thus, an experimental approach enables direct observations of safety voice 
behaviours, and provides scope for statistical analyses that can evidence higher construct 
validity.  
The relationship with other variables 
Data collection using report-based methodologies typically collect data on safety voice and 
other variables simultaneously (e.g., in the same survey), and using populations that are not 
randomised. This limits interpretation of the factors that determine or follow safety voice and 
silence behaviours.  
Investigations using reports provide limited insights into causal relationship between safety 
voice and antecedents and outcomes (Shortfall 6). Yet, to build interventions, safety voice 
measures need to establish and replicate causal relationships. Antecedents and outcomes have 
been linked with safety voice and silence, and evidence suggests that interventions can 
successfully alter reported levels of safety voice. For example, safety silence increases with 
perceived social risks (e.g., ramifications of speaking-up; Bickhoff et al., 2016), differences in 
safety knowledge (e.g., Schwappach & Gehring, 2014b), hierarchical power relations (e.g., 
Seiden et al., 2006), and, conversely, training on why and how to speak-up reduces silence 
(Delisle et al., 2016; Hanson, 2017; H. L. Johnson & Kimsey, 2012; Kulig & Blanchard, 2016). 
Yet, such observations tend to be correlational rather than causal in nature. Additionally, 
controlled manipulations of safety voice antecedents through vignettes (Anicich et al., 2015; 
Aubin & King, 2015; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c) or interventions (Habyarimana & Jack, 
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2011; Hanson, 2017) are scarce and tend to rely on indirect data rather than behavioural 
observations.  
Furthermore, reports on safety voice may be subject to structural confounds (i.e., variables 
that are not of interest but covary with independent variables and provide alternative 
explanations of results; Goodwin, 2008) that may emerge from contextual variables that are 
introduced through sampling (Shortfall 7; e.g., junior doctors needing longer to accrue subject-
matter expertise in part of the included research contexts). To establish valid conclusions, 
measures need to minimise the influence of confounds and minimise alternative explanations 
of relationships between antecedents and safety voice and silence. Yet, report-based 
methodologies have sampled within similar populations (e.g., oncology departments, medical 
students; Delisle et al., 2016; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014a), and across different populations 
(Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016), and both sampling practices can be problematic because 
unmeasured and uncontrolled characteristics of contexts (e.g., workload; Nembhard, Labao, et 
al., 2015) can provide alternative explanations of patterns in safety voice. Addressing this is 
important, and a need exists to minimise the influence of unwanted contextual confounds 
through applying random sampling procedures.  
Hence, a need remains to establish methodologies that can address the relationships between 
safety voice and other variables. The optimal way to achieve this is through safety voice 
experiments. These can manipulate antecedents (i.e., enabling causal conclusions), randomise 
participants (i.e., randomising confounds across the groups to eliminate structural influences), 
and limit participants’ influence on hazard mitigation to a choice on whether to speak-up. 
Critical to an experimental paradigm is that participants should not be able to mitigate physical 
harm through other means than speaking-up: a third outcome variable is created when 
alternative mitigations are possible (Shortfall 8). This means that, when participants have a 
safety concern, safety silence can be determined through absence of safety voice. The field 
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experiment by Barzallo Salazar and colleagues (2014) showed how surgeon communication 
style predicts medical students’ tendency to speak-up, yet the field experiment did not assesses 
safety concerns and thus cannot distinguish concerned and unconcerned silence, and because 
relationships between psychological variables may not be reliable over time (Shortfall 9; 
Gergen, 1973) a need remains for available experimental protocols that enable the direct 
replication and falsification of findings (Earp & Trafimow, 2015) in laboratory settings.  
The current article  
We propose the first experimental paradigm for investigating safety voice in laboratory 
environments, and establish and evaluate it across three studies in order ensure the protocol 
meets the nine requirements reported in Table 4.1 that address the shortfalls of current safety 
voice methodologies. Through doing this, we aim to advance safety voice research by i) 
enabling a behavioural approach, ii) moving away from a reliance on recall and imagination, 
and iii) supporting the investigation of causal relationships between safety voice and other 
variables, which can be used as a basis for intervention.  
Below, we describe the ‘Walking the plank’ paradigm that we have developed for 
investigating safety voice. We then report on the three studies used to refine and iterate the 
paradigm, alongside the observations about safety voice yielded from these studies.  
The ‘Walking the plank’ paradigm 
Our proposed paradigm for assessing safety voice, the ‘Walking the plank paradigm’ 
introduces a decision-point for participants in which they are faced with a hazard (a plank with 
the potential to break when walked on), and need to decide to either raise their safety concern 
(and experience any consequences of safety voice) or remain silent and let the situation run its 
course (with potential harmful implications for victims of the hazard). The paradigm’s title is 
a reference to the naval practice of coercing victims to walk off a plank, plunging into the open 
sea and certain doom. The parallel is in the fact that perpetrators felt abdicated of responsibility 
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because the victim ostensibly killed themselves (i.e., for onlookers, it was an act of safety 
silence rather than murder). Our Walking the plank paradigm is generic, and its realistic 
perceived consequences and randomisation of participants provide for a confound-free 
assessment of safety voice that enables generalisable conclusions. Before settling on a viable 
scenario, we considered and abandoned four hazardous scenarios for the experimental 
investigation of safety voice: crossing a busy road (i.e., the real risk was considerable), faking 
a terrorist threat (i.e., too politically sensitive; likely to upset participants), interacting with 
loose electric wiring (i.e., the hazard could be mitigated by the participant through alternative 
means than safety voice such as unplugging the equipment), and ordering participants to 
provide approval for future hazardous experiments (i.e., difficult to ascertain risk perceptions; 
no immediate consequences at time of data collection). 
The final scenario involved a person walking across a plank with a perceived low weight 
limit in the context of an alleged creativity task (the cover story). We chose this hazard because 
we could manipulate the perception that the plank might break (by having a bendy plank and 
stating a weight limit) while using a plank that was actually safe. Furthermore, it enables 
experimental control of variables of interest (e.g., self or other walking on the plank), safety 
knowledge (i.e., provided information regarding the maximum load of the plank), a plausible 
cover story (i.e., participation in a creativity task to evaluate and test creative uses of a wooden 
materials), evaluative mindsets (i.e., participants evaluated aspects of the task), standardisation 
of the hazard (i.e., consistent materials and research assistants), testing of risk perceptions and 
safety concerns (i.e., perceived maximum load of the plank and the person sitting/walking on 
it), a straightforward and resource efficient replication by others, and a systematic observation 
of the linguistic nature of safety voice (this is beyond the scope of the current article). In this 
article we show that this paradigm meets our nine criteria. 
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To test the scenario, we iterated it across three studies. Our goal was for the paradigm to 
meet the nine requirements (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2) of an effective safety voice experiment. 
Demonstrating and reporting on this process is important for i) enabling the effective 
application of the Walking the plank paradigm (e.g., it highlights potential challenges for future 
research), ii) supporting open science (i.e., protocol histories enable more direct replication; it 
acknowledges safety voice experiments are challenging and that the final version emerged from 
addressing this) and iii) supporting future research on safety voice (i.e., it illustrates how 
amendments to the paradigm can be made and evaluated). 
Through the course of three studies (their characteristics are summarised in Table 4.2), we 
illustrate that the Walking the plank paradigm meets the requirements for safety voice and 
silence experiments. In brief, in study 1 we demonstrate that the paradigm can elicit safety 
voice behaviours in a safe, controlled and randomised laboratory environment. In study 2 we 
refine the protocol and demonstrate it is possible to elicit safety silence. In study 3 we further 
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Table 4.2. Protocol characteristics of study 1, 2 and 3. 
Protocol characteristic Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Hazard 
Hazard Sitting Sitting Walking  
Plank material Pinewood Plywood Plywood 
Stated maximum load of plank 45kg 42kg 30kg 
Presence of broken plank  Yes Yes No 
Implicit risk condition included Yes No No 








Juggling, Bench,  




Footbridge, Piece of 
art 









Reported safety concerns in wrap-up 
questionnaire 
No Yes Yes 
Safety voice 
Direct observation of safety voice 
behaviours 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observation of safety silence 
behaviours 
No Yes Yes 
Reported safety voice in wrap-up 
questionnaire 
No Yes Yes 
Research Assistant (RA) actions 
RA avoids hazard upon safety voice  Not manipulated Yes Yes 
RA perceived to be naïve to maximum 
load 
Not manipulated Yes Condition  
(yes/no: ns) 
RA indicates to respond negatively to 
speaking-up 
Neutral Condition  
(yes/no: ns) 
Neutral 
Perspective taking with RA Not manipulated Not manipulated Condition 
(be objective/ 
imagine self as 
other: ns) 
Questionnaires 
Wrap-up questionnaire Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic questionnaire (submitted 
before study) 
Yes Yes Yes 




The aim of study 1 was to establish the protocol for the Walking the plank paradigm 
(initially ‘sitting on the plank’), and provide a first evaluation. Within the guise of a creativity 
task, participants experienced a perceived hazard designed to elicit safety voice behaviours 
(i.e., being asked to sit on a plank with a risk of breaking under heavy load). The goals of study 
1 were to i) test whether the paradigm could sufficiently elicit safety voice behaviours in 
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response to potential physical harm from breaking the plank; ii) present a perceived, not actual 
hazard; iii) observe safety voice directly; iv) apply participant randomisation and deception 
procedures; and v) introduce the experimental manipulation of variables (i.e., minimising harm, 
hazard presentation, hazard awareness, deception, victim identity) for determining safety voice.  
Method 
Protocol 
A 2(safety: unsafe-control) * 2(victim: participant-research assistant) design was employed. 
Participants were invited to a study about ‘creativity’ and allocated to study conditions using 
double blind and random procedures. The study consisted of three stages. First, participants 
completed a 5-minute ‘creativity task’ in which they had to design creative uses of a pinewood 
plank (L: 120cm, W: 20cm, H:1.8cm) and four blocks of wood. The instruction read: “In this 
room you find a plank and four pieces of wood. In the box below, write down how you could 
use a plank and four pieces of wood. Try to be creative and think of as many solutions as you 
can. You have five minutes.” Second, in an interaction with a research assistant, the 
participants were instructed to undertake and rate the feasibility and creativity of each idea, but 
were informed that they would test the previous participant’s ideas (a standard set: 
seesaw, shelving, door, juggling, chair/bench, slide) which included a hazardous idea (i.e., 
‘chair/bench’). Upon re-entering the room, the research assistant stated: “The next stage 
involves testing these ideas for two things: feasibility and creativity. However, your ideas will 
be tested by the next participant, and now the ideas of the previous participant are tested”. 
Finally, participants completed an electronic questionnaire (including manipulation checks for 
hazard awareness and naivety to study hypotheses, and unpresented exploratory variables), 
after which they received a full debrief.  
To present the hazard, and elicit a behavioural response, the instruction for the creativity 
task included a note on the maximum load of the plank (i.e., ‘Please note: the plank can carry 
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a maximum load of 45kg/99lbs/7.1 stone)’; unsafe condition), or no additional note (control 
condition). Furthermore, a broken version of the plank in the room reinforced this 
information. In reality, the plank was able to hold at least 125kg. When testing the previous 
participant’s creative ideas, the participant was prompted by the research assistant to place the 
plank across two chairs (their location marked discretely on the floor) with a gap for a third 
chair between them. The research assistant then made clear their intention to test the feasibility 
of the bench through sitting on it (e.g., “Okay, let me test this”) or requested the participant to 
sit (e.g., “Could you please demonstrate?”). The emphasis of the protocol was to observe any 
subsequent speaking-up or silence behaviour. The protocol concluded with the participant 
completing a questionnaire. 
Ethical approval was obtained for all studies from LSE’s research ethics committee 
(#000540), and informed consent was required from participants before commencing. To 
comply with data regulations, anonymous data storage to enable future research was included 
as a separate question. 
Participants 
129 participants (Nfemales = 85, Nstudents = 98) were recruited from a pool including students 
and the general public. Participants were spread in age (M(sd) = 26.57(7.56)) and weight 
(M(sd) = 64.81kg(14.41)). On a 5-point Likert scale (with 1 = low), participants indicated they had 
no expertise on timber (M(sd) = 1.67(1.03)), or whistleblowing legislation (M(sd) = 1.48(.83)), and 
safety voice did not correlate with demographic variables (i.e., student status, gender, age, 
social economic status, class, education, expertise on timber/whistleblowing, nationality, 
language). One participant was dropped from analyses because the protocol was not followed. 
Measures 
Manipulation checks. Perceived risk was calculated from two items in the 
questionnaire that followed the scenario (i.e., kilograms of participants’ own weight minus the 
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estimated plank’s maximum load). This measure addressed that the plank’s maximum load 
would not pose a safety issue without a person sitting on it. One participant’s estimation of the 
maximum load of the plank (i.e., 292kg) was removed based on a Cook’s test identifying the 
response as an outlier (i.e., for the effect of the safety condition on risk perception; Cook = .50). 
The questionnaire asked whether participants noticed anything odd during the study. 
Safety voice. A direct observational measure of safety voice was used. Safety voice 
(1) was coded if the participant questioned whether testing the bench was a good idea and/or 
alternative action might be more appropriate (e.g., “Did the instruction not state a maximum of 
45kg?”; “This would be feasible for a child, not for adults”), before the chair/bench was tested. 
Otherwise the participant’s behaviour was recorded as ‘no voice’ (0). Through discussing 
examples, research assistants were trained to recognise whether statements intended to prevent 
a situation in which someone sat on the plank and might break it. The first author made a final 
decision through watching video recordings when research assistants were unsure on how to 
code participants statements. 
Prohibitive employee voice. Three items from Liang and colleagues (2012) were 
adapted to the laboratory environment to explore overlap with safety voice (on 5-point Likert 
scale, with 5 indicating strong agreement): ‘I pointed out problems when they appeared, even 
if that would hamper relationships with others’; ‘I advised others against undesirable 
behaviours that might hamper the task’; ‘I highlighted problems that might cause serious 
issues’. 
Results 
Manipulation check. The paradigm’s safety manipulation created a perception that sitting 
on the plank would break it (i.e., weight difference between person sitting and plank’s 
maximum load ≥ 0kg). The perceived maximum load of the plank was 13.96kg lower in the 
unsafe condition (M(se) = 48.84kg(2.97)), F(1,127) = 4.39, p = .04, η2 = .03, observed 
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power = .55. The perceived risk for the unsafe condition (M(se) = 19.60kg(3.26)) was non-zero, 
t(59) = 6.00, p < .001, higher than the control condition (M(se) = -1.32kg(5.97)), F(1,127) = 7.72, 
p = .006, η2 = .06, observed power = .79, and led 81% of participants in the unsafe condition 
(95CI: 71-91%) to think the plank would break, t(61) = 15.94, p < .001. Illustrating successful 
deception, no participant guessed the true nature of the study. 
 Safety Voice. The safety manipulation successfully elicited safety voice. Whilst some 
participants raised safety concerns in the control condition (i.e., 20% spoke-up; 95CI: 10-29%), 
t(66) = 3.99, p < .001, participants were 2.76 times more likely to raise safety concerns against 
sitting on the bench when information regarding an unsafe maximum load was provided, 
Wald(1) = 6.12, p = .01. Yet, and despite the success of the manipulation to create risk 
perceptions for 81% of participants in the unsafe condition, a considerable proportion of 
participants in the unsafe condition did not raise a concern (60%; 95CI: 48-73%), and this held 
when participants without a perceived risk were accounted for: 58% (95CI: 44-72%) remained 
silent about their perceived risk (see Table 4.3). Furthermore, in the unsafe condition, 33% 
(95CI: 2-65%) of participants raised a safety concern despite not perceiving a risk, t(11) = 2.35, 
p = .04, and perceiving risk was not related to safety voice, χ2(1) = .30, p = .58. However, 
whilst the safety manipulation caused differences in safety voice, no influence was found on 
prohibitive employee voice, F(1,127)s < 1.29, ps > .26, and no correlation existed with 
observed safety voice, rs > |-.10|, ps > .25. This suggests that hazards differentiate safety voice 
but the relationship between risk perception and safety voice is not straightforward. A need 
Table 4.3. Safety voice behaviours for Study 1 (unsafe condition). 
 Perceived risk Perceived no risk Total 
 N %(SE) n %(SE) n %(SE) 
Voice  21 42(7.1) 4 33(14.2) 25 40(6.2) 
Silence 29 58(7.1) 8 67(14.2) 37 60(6.2) 
Total 50 81(5.1) 12 19(5.1) 62 100(-) 
Percentages total 100% within a column, except for the total of 
perceiving (no) risk. 
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thus exists for improved safety concern measures. Finally, the identity of the victim (i.e., 
participant vs research assistant) did not influence safety voice, ns19. 
Discussion 
Study 1 demonstrated that the paradigm enables i) the reproduction of safety voice 
behaviours in response to a hazard (speaking-up only); ii) the presentation of a perceived, not 
actual, hazard; iii) the direct observations of safety voice; iv) participant randomisation to 
minimise alternative explanations; and v) experimental control over study variables (i.e., 
minimising harm, hazard presentation, hazard awareness, deception, victim identity). 
Furthermore, it suggested that the relationship between risk perceptions and safety voice is not 
straightforward, and participants can remain silent when perceiving a risk, or speak-up when 
not perceiving a risk. 
However, study 1 did not fully illustrate five requirements for safety voice experiments. 
First, participants raised safety concerns when demonstrating the seesaw and slide ideas, thus 
presenting multiple hazards and potentially producing unmeasured spillover effects. Second, it 
was not clear whether the perception of risk made people concerned about the hazard: it is not 
self-evident that safety concerns emerge from participants’ body weight, or that the application 
of this weight to a plank with a low capacity always leads to concerns, and in order to 
demonstrate safety silence (i.e., the withholding of safety concerns) experiments need to 
establish optimal measures to establish safety concerns. This is important, because, third, whilst 
safety voice behaviours were observed, these emerged for people with and without perceptions 
of the plank potentially breaking, and in the absence of clear safety concern measures it is 
unclear whether a lack of voice meant safety concerns were withheld (i.e., participants might 
                                                 
19 An online pilot study (n = 88), that asked participants to rate a video of the scenario, suggested that 
participants perceived the hazard equally unsafe dependent on whether they or someone else would 
be the victim, F(88,1) = .03, p =.86, η2 = .00. 
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not have been concerned about harm despite a perceived likelihood of the plank breaking). 
Fourth, the proportion of safety voice acts was low and could be improved to prevent floor 
effects. Finally, when participants were victim, they occasionally mitigated the hazard by 
keeping weight on their feet and thus not fully sitting on the plank (creating a third outcome 
variable).  
Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to address the issues raised in study 1 through amending the risk perception 
measures to enable the observation of safety silence (i.e., calculated based on the person sitting 
on the bench and triangulated with an item on having a safety concern); eradicating safety voice 
for multiple hazards; improving the manipulability of the perceived physical risk to elicit 
stronger responses (i.e., lowering the weight limit; using a bendy plank; creating sufficient 
variance in safety voice and silence); and minimising alternative ways to mitigate physical 
harm following from breaking the plank20.  
Methods 
Protocol refinements 
The protocol in study 1 was followed, albeit with five adjustments. First, the observation of 
safety silence was enabled through an altered risk perception measure and self-report safety 
voice questionnaire item to obtain additional data and ascertain whether the scenario led to 
subjective safety concerns. Second, to increase the perceived risk of physical harm, the 
maximum load was lowered slightly to 42kg (93lbs, 6.6 stone) and the pinewood plank was 
replaced by a more bendy plywood plank of the same proportions (still capable to withstand at 
least 125kg in reality). Third, to eliminate other perceived hazards from the protocol, three 
                                                 
20 The manipulation of one experimental variable was explored (i.e., high and low expectations of 
negative consequences of voice), but this is not discussed here because the condition was randomised 
and produced no significant main-effect. 
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ideas (i.e., seesaw, door, slide) were replaced with two new ideas (i.e., mirror, piece of art). 
Fourth, to ensure that the hazard could not be mitigated through not fully sitting on the plank, 
the research assistant sat on the plank. Finally, based on a pilot study, only the unsafe scenario 
was included21. 
Participants 
Sixty-nine participants were recruited (Nfemales = 50; Nstudents = 62; Age M(sd) = 25.52(.61)). 
Participants had no expertise on timber (M(sd) = 1.54(.11)), or whistleblowing legislation 
(M(sd) = 1.62(.12)), and demographic variables were not associated with safety voice measures.  
Measures 
Manipulation check. Perceived risk was based on the estimated weight of the research 
assistant (i.e., estimated weight of the research assistant’s above the plank’s maximum load). 
Furthermore, a dichotomous item asked whether participants were concerned regarding the 
demonstration of the bench (answered as: yes/no). One participant’s estimation of the 
maximum load of the plank (i.e., 200kg) was removed based on a Cook’s test identifying the 
response as an outlier (i.e., Cook = .09). 
Safety voice. Safety voice acts were observed as a dichotomous variable, described in 
study 1. Furthermore, participants’ self-reported safety voice was measured as a dichotomous 
variable (i.e., did you raise a safety concern regarding the demonstration of the bench idea: 
yes/no). Safety silence was operationalised as participants who said they held a safety concern 
but were not observed to raise it. 
                                                 
21 A lab-based pilot study (n = 38) demonstrated that the mere presentation of the message regarding 
the maximum load of the plank was sufficient to reproduce safety voice behaviours, OR = 17.00, 
Wald(1) = 6.38, p = .01. 
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Results 
Manipulation check. The safety manipulation created a perception that sitting on the 
plank could break it (i.e., excess weight ≥ 0kg): the perceived maximum load of the plank 
(M(se) = 60.28kg(3.20)) was not statistically higher than the weight of the research assistant 
sitting on the plank (M(se) = 57.69kg(1.26)), t(67) = -.87, p = .39, 55% of participants (95CI: 
43-67%) perceived that the plank could break, t(66) = 9.02, p < .001, and 42% (95CI: 30-54%) 
reported feeling concerned, t(68) = 7.02, p < .001. The new safety concern measure had a 
stronger relationship to safety voice than perceived risk: whether participants perceived a 
physical risk was not related to observed safety voice behaviours, OR = 1.64, Wald(1) = .79, 
p = .37, yet whether participants reported having a safety concern about the act of sitting on 
the plank related to safety voice, χ2(1) = 4.14, p = .04, and these people were 3.16 times more 
likely to be observed to raise a safety concern, Wald(1) = 3.81, p = .05. Furthermore, safety 
concerns were predicted by the perceived risk, OR = 3.61, Wald(1) = 5.87, p = .02, indicating 
an indirect relationship between perceived risk and safety voice behaviours through safety 
concerns. 
Safety voice. Replicating study 1, safety voice behaviours were directly observed, but 
71% (95CI: 59-82%) of participants did not raise a concern about the research assistant testing 
the bench, t(67) = 5.28, p < .001. Yet, strikingly, and demonstrating concerned silence, this 
held when participants without safety concerns were not included in the analysis: 57% of 
participants did not raise their safety concern (95CI: 38-76%), t(27) = 4.50, p < .001. 
Furthermore, and suggesting the existence of two additional types of safety voice behaviours 
(i.e., unconcerned voice and silence), 20% (95CI: 7-33%) of participants raised a safety 
concern despite being unconcerned, t(39) = 3.12, p = .003 (see Table 4.4). 
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Self-reported safety voice. Supporting the need for direct behavioural observations of safety 
voice behaviours, participants provided poor report of their behaviours. Reported safety voice 
related to observed safety voice (r = .47, χ2(1) = 14.94, ps < .001), but it only explained a small 
proportion of the variance (R2 = .22), and 23% of participants (95CI: 13-34%) misreported their 
behaviour, t(67) = 14.76, p < .001, with participants 4.5 times more likely to misreport that 
they raised a concern, Wald(1) = 6.25, p = .01.  
Discussion 
Study 2 successfully addressed the requirements to observe safety silence, ascertain safety 
concerns for a single hazard, and minimise alternative hazard mitigations. Furthermore, study 
2 showed it is important to include safety concern measures in safety voice experiments, 
indicated that safety voice consists of four behaviours (i.e., concerned voice and silence; 
unconcerned voice and silence), demonstrated a gap between observed and reported safety 
voice, and indicated that participants tend to misreport in favour of speaking-up. 
However, study 2 was limited in terms of eliciting safety concerns from the majority of 
participants, with even fewer participants (as a proportion of concerned participant) raising 
their concern. The reasons for this are unclear, yet consistent with the wider safety voice 
literature, may reflect either an unwillingness to voice safety concerns, or a perception that the 
situation does not merit action (unconcerned silence). In particular, only 42% of participants 
were concerned about the act of sitting on the plank (and of these 57% withheld their concern). 
This indicates that for the majority of participants the task was not particularly risky, and for 
those who did perceive it as risky, it may not have been perceived as sufficiently dangerous to 
Table 4.4. Safety voice behaviours for study 2. 
 Concerned Unconcerned Total 
 n %(SE) n %(SE) n %(SE) 
Voice  12 43(9.5) 8 20(6.4) 20 29(5.5) 
Silence 16 57(9.5) 32 80(6.4) 48 71(5.5) 
Total 28 42(6.0) 40 58(6.0) 68 100(-) 
Percentages total 100% within a column, except for the 
total of (un)concerned. (Missing: 1) 
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warrant intervention. Thus, to increase engagement in safety voice behaviours, and prevent a 
floor effect, we decided to further increase participants concern.  
Study 3 
Study 3 refined the paradigm so that it would meet the final requirements for a safety voice 
paradigm: to increase the number of participants with safety concerns and produce an equal 
amount of safety voice and silence acts. It replicated the four safety voice behaviours identified 
in study 2, and refined the protocol through further reducing the stated maximum load of the 




To improve the number of concerned participants, study 3 refined the paradigm’s protocol 
through replacing the previous participant’s idea for creating a bench by a footbridge. Instead 
of sitting on the plank when it is placed across two chairs, the research assistant made clear 
he/she would be testing the idea by walking over it (and did so in the absence of safety voice)23. 
The final protocol is presented in an online manual as supplemental material (providing 
detailed pictures, scripts)24.  
Participants 
Seventy-five participants were recruited (Nfemales = 49; Nstudents = 69; Age M(sd) = 23.09(3.87), 
missing demographic data: 1 person). In reply to dichotomous questions (i.e., are you an expert 
                                                 
22 The manipulation of two experimental variables was explored (i.e., perceived hazard awareness of 
the research assistant; perspective-taking), but these are not discussed here because the conditions 
were randomised and produced no significant main-effect. 
23 An online pilot study (n = 57), that asked participants to rate a video of the scenario, revealed that the 
act of walking the plank was considered unsafe and likely to lead to undesirable and preventable 
physical harm by 76% of participants, t(56) = 7.28, p < .001.  
24 This manual is also presented in Appendix C. 
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on wood/whistleblowing), no participants reported to be whistleblowing experts and only 1 
participant reported to be a wood expert. Demographic variables were not associated with 
safety voice measures.  
Measures 
Study 3 adopted the manipulations checks (i.e., perceived risk, self-reported safety concern) 
and safety voice measures (i.e., observed acts, self-reported) described in study 2. Ten 
additional exploratory items (on a 5-point Likert scale, with 5 indicating strong agreement) 
were included: “I felt I might be seen as a trouble-maker when I spoke up" (Wei et al., 2015); 
"I felt obligated to raise any concerns I had" (Liang et al., 2012); "Right now, I worry about 
making mistakes" (Carver & White, 1994); “I felt I might offend the RA by questioning the 
way things were done"; "I felt the RA might bring out the worst in me"; "I felt uncomfortable 
to speak up about concerns I had"; "I had a concern about something that I thought the RA was 
not aware of"; "I had more information than the RA"; "I withheld my opinions"; "I don't feel 
very sorry for any problems the research assistant might have" (reverse-coded). 
Results 
Manipulation check. Altering the safety manipulation to walking the plank improved 
concerns that the plank would break it (i.e., weight difference ≥ 0kg): the perceived maximum 
load of the plank (M(se) = 38.89kg(2.93)) was significantly lower than the perceived weight of 
the research assistant walking the plank (M(se) = 56.76kg(1.48)), t(73) = 6.08, p < .001, 82% of 
participants (95CI: 74-91%) perceived the plank could break, t(73) = 18.51, p < .001, and 68% 
(95CI: 57-79%) reported feeling concerned, t(73) = 12.54, p < .001. This proportion of 
concerned participants was significantly higher than for Study 2 (i.e., 42% concerned 
participants), t(74) = 4.80, p < .001. 
Safety voice. The protocol for Study 3 elicited speaking-up for 44% (95CI: 33-56%) 
of participants, t(74) = 7.63, p < .001, and, demonstrating safety silence, this held when 
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unconcerned participants were excluded, t(50) = 7.21, p < .001: participants with safety 
concerns were split between those who raised (i.e., 51%) or withheld (i.e., 49%) their safety 
concerns, and, providing sufficient variation in safety voice and silence, this split was not 
different from a 50-50% split, t(50) = .14, p = .89, and this was true for concerned and 
unconcerned participants, χ2(1) = 3.15, p = .08. Furthermore, and providing further support for 
the existence of (un)concerned voice and silence, 29% of participants (95CI: 10-49%) raised a 
safety concern despite being unconcerned, t(39) = 3.08, p = .01 (see Table 4.5). 
A MANOVA (using Pillai’s trace) suggested that participants who displayed either 
concerned voice, concerned silence, unconcerned voice or unconcerned silence responded 
differently to ten exploratory questionnaire items, V = .86, F(30,192) = 2.56, p < .001, η2 = .29, 
observed power = .91, and separate ANOVAs confirmed this, Fs(3,71) ≥ 3.41, ps ≤ .02, η2s ≥ 
.13, observed power ≥ .75. Post-hoc analyses suggested that people who raised their concerns 
were less fearful, more caring and thought they had more information compared to those who 
withheld their concerns: they were less likely to fear being seen as a trouble-maker, MD = -.79, 
p = .01, offend the RA, MD = -.79, p = .05, or making mistakes, MD = -.86, p = .01, state to 
withhold their opinions, MD = -.92, p = .01, feel sorry for any problem the research assistant 
had, MD = -.77, p = .02, or obligated to raise concerns, MD = -.81, p = .02, and think they had 
more information than the RA, MD = -.81, p = .03. Furthermore, and suggesting a lack of 
safety concerns might be due to feeling less responsible for the research assistant, in 
comparison to those who raised their concerns, those who spoke-up despite being unconcerned 
felt less obligated to raise concerns, MD = -1.48, p = .004, and less sorry for the research 
Table 4.5. Safety voice behaviours for Study 3. 
 Concerned Unconcerned Total 
 n %(SE) n %(SE) n %(SE) 
Voice  26 51(7.1) 7 29(9.5) 33 44(5.8) 
Silence 25 49(7.1) 17 71(9.5) 42 66(5.8) 
Total 51 68(5.4) 24 32(5.4) 75 100(-) 
Percentages total 100% within a column, except for the 
total of (un)concerned. 
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assistant’s problems, MD = -1.16, p = .02, and a marginally significant trend suggested they 
might have less concerns that they think the research assistant was not aware of, MD = -.1.24, 
p =.06. Providing further evidence that concerned participants who remained silent were 
fearful, they were more likely than those who raised concerns despite being unconcerned to 
state they withheld their opinions, MD = .1.27, p =.03, and feel uncomfortable to speak-up, 
MD = .1.15, p =.04. Finally, and suggesting that making people concerned can improve 
speaking-up when people display unconcerned silence, those who displayed unconcerned 
silence were more likely than those displaying unconcerned voice to feel obligated to raise 
concerns, MD = -.1.24, p =.04, and less likely than those who raised concerns to perceive a 
concern that they felt the research assistant was not aware of, MD = -.1.03, p =.02. 
Self-reported safety voice. Replicating Study 2, and supporting the need for direct 
behavioural observations of safety voice, participants provided poor self-reports of their safety 
voice behaviours. Self-reported safety voice for Study 3 related stronger to observed safety 
voice than for Study 2, r = .64, χ2(1) = 30.39, ps < .001. However, a considerable portion of 
the variance remained unexplained (R2 = .41), and 19% of participants (95CI: 10-28%) 
misreported their behaviour, t(74) = -4.12, p < .001, but participants’ tendency to misreport 
safety voice acts over safety silence was only a marginal trend, OR = 2.78, Wald(1) = 2.48, 
p = .092 (bootstrap sample = 1000). 
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Discussion 
Study 3 successfully addressed the remaining challenges to the paradigm (i.e., creating 
sufficient safety concerns; producing equal safety voice and silence) through altering the 
presented hazard from sitting on the plank to walking over it. This amendment increased the 
number of concerned participants and thus creates ample scope to test interventions for safety 
voice because the resulting proportion of safety voice (i.e., 50%) could be improved and 
reduced through the manipulation of safety voice antecedents. Progress of the development of 
the Walking the plank paradigm across the 3 studies is summarised in Table 4.6.  
Furthermore, Study 3 revealed that the four types of safety voice behaviours (i.e., concerned 
voice, concerned silence, unconcerned voice, unconcerned silence) were associated with 
different levels of fear, felt obligation and care for the research assistant. 
Table 4.6. The illustration of requirements for safety voice experiments across study 1, 2 and 3. 
Requirement Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Behavioural nature of safety voice 
1. Created a situation to elicit 
speaking-up and silence 
No: unclear whether 
silence was concerned 
silence 
Yes Yes 
2. Presented a single hazard 
and ascertained safety 
concerns 
No: poor measure; more 
than one hazard 
No: safety concerns 
could be increased 
Yes 
3. Manipulated the perception 
of risk, not real risk, using 
deception procedures 
No: concerns unclear Yes Yes 
The reliance on memory and imagination 
4. Recorded behaviours 
through observation 
Yes Yes Yes 
5. Calibrated safety concerns 
to elicit speaking-up and safety 
silence 
No: more voice needed No: still more voice 
needed 
Yes 
The relationship with other variables 
6. Built a protocol that can 
manipulate variables of 
interest 
Yes Yes Yes 
7. Sampled participants using 
random procedures  
Yes Yes Yes 
8. Minimised alternative 
mitigations of the hazard 
No: some participants did 
not fully sit 
Yes Yes 
9. Provided a clearly specified 
study protocol 
Yes Yes Yes 
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General discussion 
Our results establish a novel experimental paradigm for safety voice. Through an iterative 
process, three studies addressed nine requirements for a valid safety voice experiment (see 
Table 4.1). The final protocol can facilitate behavioural investigations of safety voice, 
overcome the reliance on memory and imagination inherent in report methodologies, and allow 
for the study of relationships between safety voice and other variables. It is also the first 
generalisable experimental paradigm for safety voice, enables the investigation of 
(un)concerned voice and silence, can be used to investigate the effect of safety voice 
interventions, and through focussing on behaviour, can improve the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of safety voice.  
Conceptualising and operationalising safety voice 
Through the process of developing the ‘Walking the plank’ paradigm, insights were drawn 
on conceptualising and operationalising safety voice, the relationship between having and 
raising safety concerns, the important role of safety silence, and existence of unconcerned voice 
and silence. 
First, studies of safety voice would benefit from operationalising the phenomenon as 
observable behaviours in response to safety concerns rather than reportable acts. In our studies, 
it was notable that the presentation of the hazardous footbridge elicited observable safety voice 
behaviours, and that these often differed from reported safety voice (i.e., about 1 in 5 
participants misreported their behaviour, and participants tended to favour misreporting safety 
voice over silence). This finding reinforces the problems we raised with report methodologies 
at the outset, and has implications for conclusions from practice-based and academic 
investigations. Whilst practice-based investigations occur in response to real hazards that 
elicited safety concerns, these frequently rely on reports of incidents occurred in the past (e.g., 
interviews, focus groups; Francis, 2013). Furthermore, existing academic studies using 
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behavioural observations (Aubin & King, 2015; Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Hu et al., 2015; 
Hughes et al., 2014; Kolbe et al., 2012, 2014; Reime, Johnsgaard, Kvam, Aarflot, Breivik, 
Engeberg, Brattebø, et al., 2016; Sundqvist & Carlsson, 2014) have not addressed the extent 
that safety concerns lead to speaking-up (e.g., they assumed that an unsafe procedure causes 
concerns). Other scholars have merely discussed the behaviourial nature (Hofmann et al., 2003; 
C. Jones & Durbridge, 2016), sampled experiences close to the behaviour (Kines et al., 2010) 
or provided high fidelity simulation training on the behaviour (Hanson, 2017) without 
measuring it through behavioural observations. Accordingly, more measures of safety voice 
should operationalise (or triangulate with) direct observations of behaviours. We showed these 
behaviours emerged in response to a hazard (i.e., a hazard should be presented, also see below) 
to prevent physical harm (i.e., safety voice occurs before the hazardous scenario has finished: 
voice after the scenario may aim to clarify a mismatch between safety information and the 
results of the scenario). 
Second, safety voice is thus rooted in hazard perception: it primarily occurs in response to 
being presented with a hazardous situation. Yet, the relationship between safety voice and 
hazards is not straightforward, with hazards emerging through interactions between behaviour 
and physical contexts, and safety voice occurring when hazard perceptions trigger a safety 
concern. That is, crucially, whilst the plank of wood became unsafe when the context of its 
utilisation changed (e.g., from being held up as a mirror, to being used as a low-weight carrying 
footbridge), our data illustrated that perceiving this as risky only related to safety voice because 
the risk of breaking concerned participants. Furthermore, we illustrated that i) an objectively 
safe plank could be perceived as unsafe before someone walked the footbridge, ii) not everyone 
held a safety concern despite safety information regarding the plank’s maximum load and 
perceptions that walking the plank would break it, and iii) some participants spoke-up about 
safety without reporting feeling concerned. This indicates that safety concerns are based in risk 
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perceptions that are future orientated (i.e., consequences have not yet occurred), uncertain (i.e., 
there is no direct evidence available to participants regarding consequences of hazards), and 
subjective (i.e., desirability of physical harm is a personal preference). Thus, safety voice 
behaviours are not just indicative of the willingness of a participant to raise a safety concern, 
but reflect more nuanced and subjective judgements rooted in the uncertainty of perceiving 
hazards, the interplays between actions and objects, and attribution of desirability. 
Third, we learned that safety voice behaviours could be codable as a dichotomous variable 
(i.e., safety voice was observed: yes/no) but were expressed in different utterances which might 
be better captured in future as a more continuous variable. For example, people raised their 
safety concern through stating the facts (e.g., ‘there was a 30kg weight limit’), exclaiming 
concern (e.g., “No, don’t do that!”), asking for additional information (e.g. “wait, how heavy 
are you?”), polite statement (e.g., ‘this should be safe for a kid’), and some participants 
persisted or physically blocked the research assistant from engaging with the plank. Coding 
these behaviours in a binary manner enabled statistical analyses (e.g., logistic regressions) and 
conclusions on the extent that participants raised their safety concerns, yet this variety 
underscores the need expressed by others to understand voice concepts as conversational acts 
that can be expressed in different ways (Bashshur & Oc, 2014; A. Jones & Kelly, 2014; Kulig 
& Blanchard, 2016; Lyndon, 2008; Manning, 2006). Binary approaches may oversimply 
otherwise meaningful utterance as silence (A. Jones & Kelly, 2014), or obscure moderators 
and drivers of outcomes (Bashshur & Oc, 2014), and crew resource trainings may benefit from 
understanding the breadth of conversational techniques employed to raise concerns. The 
Walking the plank paradigm provides a new methodology for exploring this, and particularly 
enables data collection on variation in utterances to standardised and controlled hazards. 
Fourth, we learned that operationalising safety silence behaviours is deeply challenging. 
Developing strong safety concern measures is important for assessing whether participants 
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withhold concerns, but ascertaining safety concerns is more difficult than observing safety 
voice behaviours because concerns are intrinsically subjective (as per the above), and cannot 
be observed directly. Crucially, and echoing the literature on employee voice (Morrison, 2014), 
for investigating safety voice it is important to ascertain whether participants were concerned. 
We addressed this through triangulating risk perception and safety concern measures, and 
alternative operationalisations of safety concerns may be developed for the assessment of 
safety silence during or before the exposure to the hazard (e.g., physiological measures).  
Fifth, through obtaining data on safety concerns we indicated voice and silence for people who 
were concerned and unconcerned, and the existence of these four types of safety voice merits 
investigation and conceptualisation. Unconcerned voice may be explained as verbalised sense-
making on safety, caution, or a misrepresentation of being concerned, and unconcerned silence 
may be a misrepresentation or an unawareness of the hazard. In particular, our results suggested 
that i) people who withheld their concerns worried more (e.g., about being seen as trouble-
maker), cared less about the research assistant, and felt less obligated to raise concerns; ii) those 
who spoke-up despite perceiving no safety issues felt less responsible for the research assistant; 
and iii) those who were silent and unconcerned simply did not perceive an issue, but would 
have felt responsible for raising it. Thus, our paradigm enables the development of safety voice 
into a two-dimensional typology for (un)concerned voice and silence that is rooted in social 
interaction and sense-making (see Table 4.7), and this may resemble signal detection 
typologies (i.e., hit, miss, false positive, false negative; Nesse, 2005). 
Table 4.7. Safety voice typology. 
 Safety Concern No Safety Concern 
Voice  Concerned Voice Unconcerned Voice 
Silence Concerned Silence Unconcerned Silence 
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New directions for the investigation of safety voice 
The literature of safety voice has established a considerable body of findings, and the 
‘Walking the plank’ paradigm enables four potential research questions. 
Can safety voice antecedents be replicated?  
The paradigm can be used to replicate empirical findings within an experiment setting. We 
illustrated that safety voice behaviours can be elicited and directly observed, and that self-
reports of safety voice were imperfect and biased towards speaking-up. This might raise doubts 
on report-based evidence regarding the relationship between antecedents and safety voice, and 
interventions based on these conclusions. For example, self-report and correlation studies 
indicate that expectations of negative consequences of speaking-up (e.g., Bickhoff et al., 2016) 
and power hierarchies (e.g., Seiden et al., 2006) can lead to withholding safety concerns. 
However, whilst power hierarchies have been experimentally manipulated (Anicich et al., 
2015; Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c), simulated (Aubin & King, 
2015; Reime, Johnsgaard, Kvam, Aarflot, Breivik, Engeberg, Brattebø, et al., 2016), trained on 
(Hanson, 2017), or discussed as part of single-cases (Liao et al., 2014), to date causality remains 
unclear because no studies have simultaneously i) manipulated power hierarchies (e.g., through 
creating a control condition) and ii) obtained behavioural data on safety voice (treating reports 
of the behaviour as empirically different from the behaviour itself). Using the ‘Walking the 
plank’ paradigm, research can establish whether current findings are upheld in an experimental 
setting, and establish the causal relationship between safety voice and other variables.  
What characterises safety voice behaviours? 
We demonstrated safety voice as a behavioural phenomenon, and this opens up new 
questions for how the behaviour can be characterised. Our experimental paradigm enables the 
identification of the nature of safety voice behaviours, and especially opens up the investigation 
of question regarding sense-making, decision-making, physiological mechanisms and 
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linguistic expressions. In particular, although the literature has conceptualised safety voice (i.e., 
raising concerns held) and silence (i.e., withholding concerns held), we provided the first 
demonstration and initial conceptualisation of the act of raising safety concerns (and staying 
silent) when individuals are unconcerned. Through refining the conceptualisation of 
(un)concerned voice and silence, and testing its predictive power in relationship to safety voice 
antecedents or outcomes would provide clarity on the nature of safety voice behaviours, and 
enable targeted interventions. 
In addition, we showed that safety voice appears distinct from employee voice. Speaking-up 
to change expected outcomes (as the verbal behaviour labelled ‘voice’) is at the core of 
employee and safety voice, and scope for integration may exist under conceptual overlap 
(Wilkinson et al., 2019). However, conceptually employee voice includes a broader set of 
behaviours (i.e., promotive and prohibitive; Liang et al., 2012) than safety voice (i.e., 
preventing harm is prohibitive in nature), and we found no empirical support that safety voice 
is a sub-type of employee voice. This may be because, in hazardous situations, safety voice 
emphasises the prevention of harm based on an assessment of perceived risks that can be 
ambiguous (e.g., because they are yet to occur, have not been noticed, it is not clear who is 
responsible, or people are discouraged to raise concerns). This may prompt sensemaking on 
potential harms (with or without the interlocuter) and felt responsibilities for harm-prevention, 
and a clearer responsibility and need for sensemaking may lie in warning others than 
challenging their task-related choices. This underscores the need to consider the content of the 
raised message through speaking-up (see also: Morrison, 2011), and this extends to the breadth 
of harmful issues that are raised through safety voice. Devising studies that manipulate the 
content of safety voice (i.e., judgements on risk, attributions of desirability, types of harm) 
provides a way to understand voice behaviours.  
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Third, the direct observation of safety voice behaviours enables the assessment of the 
decision-making processes regarding whether to raise concerns or not. Decisions to raise safety 
concerns may be automatic or deliberative, and the optimal way to make decisions for 
speaking-up about safety remains unexplored. Evidence suggests that people are more inclined 
to engage in pro-social behaviours under time-pressure (Rand et al., 2014) or in a state of pro-
social disinhibition (van den Bos, Muller, et al., 2011; van den Bos et al., 2009; van den Bos, 
van Lange, et al., 2011), and intuitive decisions are frequently implicated (Rand & Epstein, 
2014) and effective (Kahneman & Klein, 2009) in preventing harm based on recognising 
patterns in the situation (e.g., fire fighters recognising that smoke patterns indicate a potentially 
lethal backdraft). Through manipulating the time-pressure, the paradigm may therefore unearth 
decision-making mechanisms for safety voice. 
A fourth area for conceptualising safety voice behaviours is the association of safety voice 
with physiological measures. Because the proposed paradigm enables the observation of safety 
voice in-situ, these behaviours can be simultaneously assessed with physiological mechanisms: 
safety beliefs emerge from embodied experiences (Somerville, 2006) and consequences of 
silence might manifest physiologically. Scholars may therefore explore the generalisation of 
safety concerns from physiological mechanisms. Our paradigm lends itself for the inclusion of 
physiological measures (e.g., skin conductance, heart rate, inhalation, gross movement, vocal 
amplitude, vocal pitch) and this enables the conceptualisation of the physiological mechanisms 
underpinning safety voice (e.g., arousal) that can be triangulated to safety concerns measures. 
Finally, researchers may utilise the safety voice paradigm to examine the linguistic nature 
of safety voice. We, in line with others in the literature (e.g., Okuyama et al., 2014), treated 
safety voice as a binary variable. Yet the manner (e.g., mirroring conversation partners’ 
language, using polite expressions, providing support and explanations, prompts and 
suggestions; Liu, Gerdtz, & Manias, 2016) and intensity (e.g., U. Fischer & Orasanu, 2000) in 
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which people raise safety concerns varies. The ‘Walking the plank’ paradigm provides direct 
access to safety voice as speaking-up through the systematic observation of conversational 
processes in response to an observed risk, and novel insights may be drawn through 
conversation (Kendrick, 2017) or speech analysis (e.g., pitch; Kawahara & Morise, 2011; van 
Heuven & Boersma, 2001). We intend to test and present the linguistic nature of safety voice 
in future research.  
Does personal relevance of harm shape safety voice? 
We illustrated that safety voice can be observed in laboratory environments, and this enables 
the investigation of how the personal implication of physical harm shapes safety voice. The 
behaviour can emerge from individuals who are directly impacted by the consequences of a 
hazard (e.g., the person walking the plank) or observe others putting themselves in danger, and 
this may alter results. Different predictions exist for why people prevent harm to others versus 
oneself (Crockett et al., 2014), and these emerge from i) a stronger aversion to one’s own pain 
(i.e., economic exchange hypothesis), ii) an aversion to conflicting harm (i.e., guilt-aversion 
hypothesis), and iii) an equal evaluation of harm to self and others (i.e., empathy perspective). 
For example, Batson and colleagues found that perceiving someone as needing help increases 
empathic concern and helping (Batson et al., 2007), and our results suggested that victimhood 
does not influence safety voice. This opens up questions regarding the relationship between 
victimhood and safety voice, and whether it is explained by processes such as empathy and 
perspective taking. The ‘Walking the plank’ paradigm enables the investigation of these 
questions. 
Can concepts for safety voice and harm-prevention behaviours be integrated?  
Safety voice appears conceptually related to obedience to authority and the bystander effect, 
and the experimental paradigm may be used to investigate conceptual and operational overlap. 
Milgram’s behavioural study of obedience (Milgram, 1963) has been reconceptualised as 
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operationalising an act of defiance (Miller et al., 1995) or resistance (Kaposi, 2017) that closely 
resembles safety voice (i.e., people repeatedly speak-up to resist a harmful order from an 
authority figure), and resistance may represent a special type of safety voice. Similarly, 
research on bystander interventions of people in need of assistance (Bennett et al., 2014; Darley 
& Latane, 1968; P. Fischer et al., 2011) operationalised harm-prevention behaviours and these 
have included non-verbal (e.g., walking to another room to intervene in sexual harrasment; P. 
Fischer et al., 2006) and verbal actions (van den Bos et al., 2009). However, the extent of 
overlap between these harm-prevention behaviours (e.g., raising a concern to a senior figure; 
Milgram, 1963) and triggers (e.g., the necessity of noticing and evaluating situations as 
dangerous; Latane & Darley, 1968) remains unaddressed. Evaluating overlap and integrating 
conceptualisations would provide an interesting research agenda, especially because, to our 
awareness, we are the first to indicate that unconcerned participants can step up to prevent 
harm, and the notion of ‘unconcerned voice’ would provide a novel take on long-established 
paradigms (e.g., disobedient participants might have objected about electric shocks on 
principle, not due to safety concerns). 
Limitations 
Three limitations of the experimental paradigm must be stated. That is, first, the paradigm 
cannot establish whether safety voice prevents physical harm: the paradigm presents a 
controlled hazard (i.e., the safety of its actual outcome is assured), and assumes that if the 
hazard were real physical harm would have been prevented. This is an important limitation that 
emerges from an ethical paradox: safety voice research aims to design safety interventions, but 
experiments cannot put participants in harm’s way (e.g., actually breaking the plank, violence 
to participants, etc.). We illustrated how this can be addressed through manipulating risk 
perceptions that lead to safety concerns.  
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Second, the responses to the wrap-up questionnaire scales may be interpreted differently by 
those who raised a concern or remained silent, and may be understood as rationalising their 
behaviour (P. Fischer et al., 2006). For example, through obtaining safety concerns post-hoc, 
results may be interpreted as self-perception (Bem, 1967): people that remained silent were 
less likely to say they were concerned. This challenge is common for experiments that use a 
cover story to introduce a hazard, and we agree with Fischer and colleagues (2006) that the 
presentation of the questionnaire after the behaviour is the optimal procedure to collect 
additional data “without risking the credibility of [the] experimental design. Asking about these 
variables right after the danger manipulation and before measuring the dependent variable 
would have caused suspicion and unmasked our cover story” (p.272). This underscores the 
need for direct observations of safety voice, and the development of direct measures of its 
antecedents (e.g., physiological measures of safety concerns). 
Third, the external validity of experiments is debated (Gigerenzer, 1984; Jiménez-Buedo & 
Miller, 2010) and because conclusions may not generalise (e.g., to the Intensive Care Unit, or 
mountaineering) the paradigm may thus not provide insights for unique environments. Yet, 
safety voice behaviours are highly contextual (i.e., they are shaped by antecedents and hazards), 
and, to enable conclusions on safety voice mechanisms, this calls for strict control over 
contextual variables through standardised assessments. That is, conclusions with high internal 
validity are near-impossible to draw in fast-paced environments with inconsistent presentation 
of antecedents and hazards, and mechanisms can only be established using highly standardised 
measures or scenarios presented across participants. Providing high internal validity, the 
proposed paradigm can isolate speaking-up in a standardised scenario and generalise with more 
certainty to contexts that have (manageable) characteristics tested through the paradigm, and 
external validity can be established through benchmark findings against other contexts.  
Chapter 4: Methodological challenges for investigating safety voice 161 
Conclusion 
Safety voice behaviours can be observed in laboratory experiments (and safety silence 
through assessing safety concerns). This is important because current safety voice 
methodologies have shortfalls, and experimental paradigms, despite their own limitations, are 
needed to address the behavioural nature of safety voice, reliance on memory and imagination, 
and relationship between safety voice and other variables. We presented the first experimental 
paradigm for investigating safety voice (the Walking the plank paradigm) that can address the 
requirements for safety voice experiments, and we illustrated how these can be evaluated. 
Through investigating safety voice experimentally, insight was provided on the importance of 
considering risk perception when interpreting behaviour, leading to a new two-dimensional 
typology for analysing safety voice behaviours. Our presentation of the paradigm adds to the 
debate on the need for appropriate methodologies for investigating harm prevention 
behaviours. The literature on safety voice has generated considerable insight into why people 
raise safety concerns, and the development of experimental methodologies advances the field: 
fostering the development of behavioural conceptualisations, new directions for research, and 
stronger interventions for the prevention of physical harm. People speaking-up about safety 
has saved countless lives, and experimentally examining the causes and nature of this 
behaviour has the potential to increase the prevalence and effectiveness for people to create 
safety through speaking-up.
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CHAPTER 5: 
A PRECISE BEHAVIOURAL CONCEPTUALISATION OF SAFETY 
VOICE AND SAFETY SILENCE 
Preface 
In the previous chapter I presented an experimental methodology for studying safety voice. 
This enables the investigation of gaps in the safety management and safety voice literatures, 
and it enabled a more nuanced and complete conceptualisation of safety voice as rooted in the 
extent to which people respond to hazardous situations (e.g., perceived risk, safety concerns). 
Consistent with systems perspectives on safety management (Leveson, 2002; Reason, 2000), I 
presented the first evidence that the act of safety voice is ecologically related to variables across 
levels of analysis (Chapter 3) and contingent upon the perception of risk (Chapter 4). This 
allowed the conceptualisation of safety voice as a two-dimensional behaviour based on the 
extent to which individuals engage in voice or silence and are unconcerned or concerned (see 
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.7). However, in order to understand the extent to which safety voice 
enables better safety management through the flow of safety-related information (Westrum, 
2014), this concept requires further development and evaluation in terms of the extent to which 
people raise safety-related knowledge and motivations in speech (Christian et al., 2009). 
In particular, a need exists to establish how the behavioural nature of safety voice may be 
scaled on a continuum (i.e., as a matter of degree to which people engage in speech) or as 
categorical variable (i.e., the extent to which safety voice manifests as distinct types of speech) 
in relationship to safety concerns, and how such a conceptualisation relates to characteristics 
of hazardous scenarios (e.g., how people relate to risk and others). For this, I opted to use the 
hazard in the Walking the Plank scenario alongside known antecedents (Barzallo Salazar et al., 
2014; Burris, 2012; Duan et al., 2017; Tucker et al., 2008) because this provides a more optimal 
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evaluation of the new behavioural model: it enables a comparison with known findings within 
an established paradigm and thus reduces uncertainty on how new findings should be 
interpreted (i.e., alternative findings may be attributed to the limited number of changes). 
Thus, in Article 3, I evaluated the extent to which safety voice and silence can be scaled 
based on the distinct themes that people raise, and I evaluated this in relationship to safety 
voice antecedents and the temporal progression of hazards. By doing this, I propose and 
evaluate a conceptual model for the behavioural manifestation of safety voice and safety 
silence in terms of five types of speech (thematised around safety knowledge and motivation) 
that manifest differently in response to antecedents and over time (therefore contributing to 
research question 1: What is the behavioural nature of safety voice?). This enables systems 
perspectives on safety management (e.g., Leveson, 2002; Reason, 2000) to utilise more precise 
concepts for understanding how the lack of safety related information can contribute to 
accidents (Westrum, 2014). 
Furthermore, I provide textual measures for assessing the extent to which people are 
concerned about safety and engage in different types of safety voice and safety silence 
(therefore contributing to research question 2: What is the optimal way to investigate safety 
voice behaviour?), and I indicate that, because safety voice is contingent upon risk perception, 
interventions are more effective for people that are more concerned about safety (therefore 
contributing to research question 3: To what extent do interventions for promoting safety voice 
and reducing safety silence need to be tailored to the behavioural nature of safety voice?). 
In terms of terminology, I emphasise ‘safety silence’ because it provided for a consistent 
frame for the article (e.g., alignment of safety silence with reducing safety silence) and 
underscores the conceptual argument that safety voice and safety silence are 
phenomenologically strongly related in speech: safety silence manifests in less safety voice 
speech and not as its assumed absence (see Chapter 3) or binary opposite (see Chapter 4). 
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Study description 
In this Chapter, I present two studies. First, I present a pilot study (n = 237) to establish the 
manipulations used within the article. This online study used a video-vignette of the Walking 
the Plank paradigm and supported the use of the manipulations. Second, in the article I present 
a laboratory study (n = 392) that used the Walking the Plank paradigm developed in Chapter 4. 
Through a textual analysis of participants’ speech, I revealed five types of safety voice speech 
(based on safety knowledge and motivation) and indicate that these themes can be used to scale 
the extent to which people engage in safety silence. The proposed model advances the 
conceptual model for safety voice proposed in the previous chapters by conceptualising how 
(un)concerned voice and silence manifest in different degrees and types of speech (with the 
degree to which concerned individuals engage in safety silence being scalable in terms of five 
types of safety voice speech (i.e., informative, inquisitive, prohibitive, cautionary, and oblique 
safety voice; see Figure 5.1). Of significance for the prevention of harm, I revealed that 
conceptualising safety voice and silence in this manner is important because interventions only 
reduced specific types of safety silence (i.e., knowledge-based safety voice, not motivation-
Figure 5.1. Threat Mitigation Model of safety concerns and degrees of safety voice. 
Note: this model highlights that the dysfunctional momentum of threats towards accidents 
(Barton & Sutcliff, 2009) can be mitigated through safety voice that manifests as different 
degrees of knowledge- (i.e., informative, inquisitive) and motivation-based speech (i.e., 
prohibitive, cautionary), with antecedents impacting differently on concerns and speech. 
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based) and during particular stages of the hazard. Moreover, this revealed that the behavioural 
nature of safety voice is time-sensitive because the relationship between hazards and safety 
voice changes over time.  
To enable the direct reproducibility of analyses and contribute towards open science, the 
study data and Jupyter notebook (version 3.7) have been submitted as supplementary material 
to Safety Science and a copy of the Jupyter notebook (converted to a printable format) is 
provided in Appendix E25. 
Authorship 
I was responsible for designing and conceptualizing the study, data collection, formal data 
analysis and interpretation, and manuscript preparation (80%). Tom Reader and Alex Gillespie 
contributed to the conceptualisation of the study, refining the study design, interpreting results, 
writing Jupyter code and reviewing and editing the manuscript (20%). All data was collected 
at the Behavioural Research Lab at the LSE by research assistants executing the experimental 
protocol (Lindsie Arthur–Hulme, Nanne Houtsma and Alyssa Pandolfo). I was solely 
responsible for conceptualising, analysing and writing up the pilot study in this chapter. Further 
assistance was provided by Nelleke Noort-Van Dijk (video-editing the stimulus material) and 
Lindsie Arthur-Hulme (featuring in the stimulus material). 
  
                                                 
25 Until the study data has been published as supplemental material to Article 3, I can be contacted to 
provide this. 
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Pilot study to Article 3 
I conducted an online pilot study through Prolific (n = 237) to develop experimental 
manipulations for three variables known to shape safety voice: the awareness of hazards 
(Tucker et al., 2008), felt responsibility (e.g., Duan et al., 2017) and encouragements (e.g., 
Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Burris, 2012). 
A 30-second video-vignette of the hazard in the Walking the plank paradigm was presented 
(i.e., two people; the partner walking the plank elevated to chair level)26, preceded by 
information on the scenario presented in the video-vignette (i.e., you participate in a lab 
experiment; the plank used can only withstand 30kg/4.7 stone/66 pounds; only you are 
informed about the weight limit; your partner will test the plank as a footbridge). The 
manipulations were introduced independently alongside the vignette.  
The hazard salience manipulation (n = 80; Mage = 30.000 years, SDage = 9.626; nstudents = 31; 
nfemale = 43; nmissing_demographics = 3) requested participants to evaluate a picture of a man talking on 
his phone whilst crossing a busy street and asked “What aspects of this picture make it a 
hazardous situation, where harmful outcomes might occur?” (salient condition), or: “What 
aspects of this picture make it a typical situation, one you could encounter any day?” (control 
condition).  
The responsibility manipulation (n = 76; Mage = 30.620 years, SDage = 10.475; nstudents = 33; 
Nfemale = 29; nmissing_demographics = 4) requested participants to consider: “Please think of a situation 
from your life where ‘you’ (clear condition)/ ‘it was not clear who’ (unclear condition) was 
responsible for the outcomes of the situation.” Participants then briefly described the situation, 
                                                 
26 A pilot study supported the use of the video-vignette: the proportion of concerned participants on the 
vignette (78%; 95CI: 65-92%) was not different from Chapter 3, study 3 (i.e., 68%), t(36) = 1.513, 
p = .139. 
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what they did, and how they felt. This manipulation involved situations external to the 
presented hazard to avoid potentially instructing participants to take charge and speak-up. 
The encouragement manipulation (n = 81; Mage = 30.923 years, SDage = 10.536; nstudents = 30; 
nfemale = 37; nmissing_demographics = 2) described that the weight limit was provided by ‘the main 
researcher’ who, before walking out, introduced the participant to a research assistant that had 
not received any information about the plank. The research assistant stated one of two 
messages: ‘Please keep your thoughts and opinions to yourself. I do not like it when people 
share those, and I might then reduce your study reward because expressing your true feelings 
is not part of the task’ (discouraged condition). Conversely: ‘Please feel free to express your 
thoughts, and opinions. I like it when people share those, and it will not impact your study 
reward because expressing your true feelings is part of the task’ (encouraged condition). 
Measures 
Safety voice. A 5-point Likert scale (i.e., 1: Strongly agree; 5: Strongly Disagree) measured 
safety voice (‘I would have told her that walking the footbridge was a bad idea’). For binary 
calculation, the scale mid-point was coded as silence. 
Safety concerns. A similar 5-point Likert scale measured safety concerns with three 
questions: ‘Walking the plank was dangerous’, ‘The plank was likely to break’ (for hazard 
salience), and ‘I was concerned about her walking the plank’ (for responsibility and 
encouragements). The inclusion of these items varied because the manipulations were 
introduced at separate time points, and this is highlighted in the results. The concern variables 
were recoded into binary variables, with the neutral scale-point (i.e., 3: unsure) coded as the 
active form of the variable (i.e., concerned, likely, dangerous). 
Results and discussion 
Findings (summarised in table 5.1) revealed that the three manipulations were effective in 
altering responses to a safety voice item (‘I would have told her that walking the footbridge 
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was a bad idea’; the 5-point Likert scale with 1 = strongly agree was recoded with the scale 
mid-point as silence for binary calculation), but only as simple main-effect for the 
discouragement manipulation and as conditional effects for all manipulations on the predictive 
effect of safety concerns on safety voice (5-point Likert scale for: ‘The plank was likely to 
break’, ‘I was concerned about her walking the plank’). This supported the use of the 
manipulations for Article 3. 
To be more specific, salient hazards eliminated the effect of safety concerns on safety voice 
through a conditional effect. No simple effects were found for the influence of salient hazards 
on safety voice, OR = .556, SElog-odds = .490, p =.230, or perceiving the plank as dangerous, 
OR = .636, SElog-odds = .554, p =.414, and likely to break, OR = 1.658, SElog-odds = .507, p =.319. 
Yet, and indicating hazard salience reduced uncertainty, participants in the control condition 
were 4.928 times more likely to speak-up if they were concerned (i.e., in terms of likelihood 
of breaking), SElog-odds = .777, p =.040, not when hazards were salient, OR = 2.625, SElog-
odds = .773, p =.212. 
Highlighting clear responsibilities moderated the effect of safety concerns on safety voice. 
Whilst the manipulation did not influence safety voice directly, OR = .778, SElog-odds = .566, 
p = .657, or the extent that participants reported feeling responsible, F(1,74) = 2.341, p = .130, 
η2= .031, observed power = .327, stronger concerns only predicted safety voice when 
Table 5.1. Did the manipulations shape safety voice in the online pilot study? 
 OR Conclusion 
Simple main effects 
Hazard salience  .566 no 
Responsibility  .778 no 
Encouragements  25.396* yes 
 
Modification of the effect of safety concerns 
Hazard salience Control 4.928* yes 
 Salient 2.625 
Responsibility Unclear 2.182** yes 
Clear 1.132 
Encouragements Encouraged 13.062** yes 
Discouraged 2.187 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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responsibilities were diffuse, OR = 2.182, SElog-odds = .428, p = .008, but no-longer when 
responsibilities were clear, OR = 1.132, SElog-odds = .470, p = .068. 
Encouragements increased the likelihood of safety voice, especially when participants were 
concerned. Encouraged participants perceived the research assistant as more welcoming, 
F(1,79) = 16.200, p < .001, η2= .170, observed power = .978, and voiced more, OR = 25.28, 
SElog-odds = 1.40, p = .02. This interacted with the strength of safety concerns, OR = .35, SElog-
odds = .50, p = .04, as holding safety concerns led to 55% more safety voice when encouraged, 
OR = 13.062, SElog-odds = .877, p = .003, but not when discouraged, OR = 2.187, SElog-
odds = .778, p = .314.  
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Article 3:  
The sounds of safety silence: interventions and temporal patterns 
reduce unique thematic absences of talk about safety 
 
Submitted for publication in:  
Safety Science (submission date: 25 June 2020). 
Abstract 
Research shows that withholding safety concerns on encountering hazards – safety silence – 
is a critical contributor to accidents. Studies therefore aim to prevent accidental harm through 
interventions for reducing safety silence. Yet, the behaviour remains poorly understood: it is 
unclear how it manifests in speech, may be scaled based on the degrees and types of safety 
voice (speaking-up about safety), progresses over time, and may be optimally reduced 
considering these. To address this, we proposed a conceptual model for the manifestation of 
safety silence and used a laboratory experiment (N = 404) to evaluate the implications for the 
effectiveness of three interventions (salient hazards, clear responsibilities, encouragements) 
across stages of a hazard. Results indicated that safety silence is scalable in terms of the degree 
that concerned people engage in five types of safety voice at different points in time, and we 
revealed this is important because interventions only reduce safety silence at unique hazard 
stages and for knowledge-based speech when people are concerned. This indicates that safety 
silence is situated and manifests as nuanced speech, and interventions are most effective when 
timed appropriately and people have safety concerns to speak-up about. 
Keywords: safety voice; safety silence; harm prevention; intervention; speech; experiment. 
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Article highlights 
• Safety silence is the act of withholding safety concerns about hazardous situation. 
• Reducing safety silence is important because it can contribute to accidental harm. 
• Yet, the behaviour remains poorly understood: interventions require new concepts and 
measures. 
• Experimental data indicates safety silence manifests as five types of safety voice speech. 
• This new typology is important: interventions and timing only reduce select types of 
speech. 
• Evaluated concepts and measures enable new directions for research on safety voice and 
silence. 
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The words of the prophets are written on the subway walls, and 
tenement halls, and whispered in the sounds of silence. 
– Simon & Garfunkel  
Introduction 
Safety silence is the act of withholding safety concerns about accidental harm (Schwappach 
& Richard, 2018; Tucker et al., 2008). In social and organisational settings (e.g., private 
transportation, intensive care units), the act of speaking-up about safety (termed ‘safety voice’) 
is recognised as crucial for mitigating hazardous conditions (Okuyama et al., 2014). However, 
people often do not engage in safety voice when encountering a hazard (Noort et al., 2019b). 
This is undesirable because safety silence has contributed to tragic outcomes in transportation 
(e.g., aerospace; Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Cocklin, 2004; Moorhead et al., 1991; Tarnow, 
1999), offshore oil drilling (Reader & O’Connor, 2014) and healthcare (Bromiley & Mitchell, 
2009; Francis, 2013). Consequently, reducing safety silence is integral to improving 
organisational safety performance (M. A. Griffin & Neal, 2000; Hofmann et al., 2003) and an 
ethical and financial imperative (Novak, 2019). 
Safety voice theory suggests that interventions can reduce the likelihood for safety silence 
(Noort et al., 2019b). For instance, through improving hazard salience (Tucker et al., 2008), 
people’s felt responsibility (e.g., Duan et al., 2017) and leaders inclusiveness (e.g., Barzallo 
Salazar et al., 2014; Burris, 2012). Yet, it is unclear how interventions reduce safety silence 
because few insights exist regarding what concerned people do when they do not speak-up 
(e.g., speaking less overall, or only about safety), to what extent safety silence conveys clues 
that people are concerned, or the degree to which interventions target aspects of the behaviour 
(e.g., types, time-points). Presently, conceptual models recognise that safety voice is not a 
binary but may occur with different gradients (e.g., A. Jones & Kelly, 2014; Noort et al., 2019a) 
and distinct behaviours have been proposed for safety voice (e.g., explicit, respectful, oblique 
Chapter 5: A precise behavioural conceptualisation of safety voice and safety silence 173 
voice; Krenz et al., 2019; Pian-Smith et al., 2009) and silence (i.e., as withholding, absence of 
communication, or lack of involvement; Mumford, 2015). However, to our knowledge, this 
has not been theorised into a concepetual model for scaling types of safety voice and silence, 
and whilst measures have been developed (e.g., Krenz et al., 2019) it is unclear to what degree 
interventions reduce safety silence as a continuous (i.e., the degree and timing of speech) and 
categorical phenomenon (i.e., types of speech). 
Thus, a need remains for models and measures that address how safety silence manifests, 
and for evaluating how interventions reduce safety silence. Without this, the field does not 
provide conceptual clarity or measurement of the behaviour it is trying to change, or recognise 
that operators may engage in a mixture of voice and silence behaviours (with their frequency, 
urgency, and timing shaping the strength and effectiveness of voice). Insighst on the 
behaviour’s manifestation would enable the assessement of its quality and impact (Kolbe, 
Burtscher, et al., 2013). Therefore, through applying a validated experimental scenario for 
eliciting and observing the act of safety voice and silence (Noort et al., 2019a), we propose a 
conceptual model for how the behaviour of safety silence may be scaled and examine the 
degree to which safety silence is impacted by interventions and time. 
Conceptualising safety silence 
Safety silence refers to the act of withholding safety concerns during hazardous scenarios 
(e.g., Tucker & Turner, 2011) and is contrasted with safety voice: the act of raising safety 
concerns through discretionary verbal expressions (Conchie et al., 2012; Tucker et al., 2008). 
Although the literature focussing directly on safety silence is limited, it is implicit in research 
on communication and safety (Noort et al., 2019b). Due to its importance for safety 
management, safety silence is integral to behavioural models and measures of organisational 
safety (M. A. Griffin & Neal, 2000; Hofmann et al., 2003), safety culture and climate (Reader 
et al., 2015; Zohar, 2010), safety citizenship (Didla et al., 2009) and safety leadership (Barling 
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et al., 2002). Furthermore, by virtue of safety silence involving the withholding of 
communication (e.g., reporting errors, advocating safe practice, transmitting warnings), 
insights from other voice concepts have been applied to conceptualise the effects of antecedents 
on safety silence (e.g., whistleblowing, upward dissent, employee voice and silence; Kassing, 
2002; Morrison, 2014; Near & Miceli, 1985). 
However, safety silence is different from other behavioural safety concepts (e.g., hand-
washing, performing checklists) and voice/silence because it involves the withholding of 
concerns in any hazardous setting. Moreover, it extends to non-employees (e.g., patients 
reporting on deteriorating health, minibus passengers speaking-up about poor driving; 
Entwistle et al., 2010; Habyarimana & Jack, 2011). Therefore, safety silence requires a distinct 
conceptualisation to understand the types of behaviours that constitute the phenomenon, and 
their relationship to safety voice behaviours. Establishing this is important for reducing silence 
during critical incidents. For example, in high-risk setting safety silence is implicated in higher 
fatality rates, worse safety performance (Anicich et al., 2015; Kines et al., 2010), avoidable 
deaths (e.g., the Elaine Bromiley case; Fioratou, Flin, Glavin, & Patey, 2010) and aviation 
disasters (e.g., Tenerife collision, Air Florida 737, Swissair 111; Cocklin, 2004). This is 
because safety voice increases attention to safety (Kines et al., 2010), enables people to share 
observations and make concerns actionable (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009), corrects and deters 
harmful actions (e.g., Palmer, 2016; S. H. Schwartz & Gottlieb, 1976; Sexton & Helmreich, 
2003), and enables learning (Edmondson, 2003). Thus, safety silence is rooted in sensemaking 
about risk from hazards (Noort et al., 2019a; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c).  
Risk is important for conceptualising safety silence. Variation in risk perception (Slovic, 
1987) can alter the interpretation of safety silence and may reduce the effectiveness of 
interventions. For instance, if people are unconcerned about hazards (e.g., falling ill from 
COVID-19), then silence indicates people had nothing to say and speech would be unrelated 
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to safety. Conversely, for concerned people, silence would indicate that personal or contextual 
factors inhibited safety voice, with the extent that speech reflects safety themes indicating the 
strength of inhibiting factors. Safety silence is therefore not captured by the mere absence of 
voice (Brinsfield, 2013; van Dyne et al., 2003) or safety-related communication during 
hazardous situations (i.e., it is unclear whether concerns are withheld), and safety voice and 
safety silence may exist on a continuum. Few safety voice studies have investigated the content 
of speech and we argue that, in dynamic situations, people engage in speech about diverse 
safety themes, with their behaviour at different moments scaling from complete silence to 
explicitly raising the alarm.  
The manifestation of safety silence 
Psychological research on silence tends to conceptualise the phenomenon as the absence of 
verbalisation (Valle, 2019), talking less about a topic (e.g., risk; Mumford, 2015), or veiling 
the withholding of a topic through other speech (Morison & Macleod, 2014). Different 
linguistic types of silence have been conceptualised such as acoustic (i.e., no speech) and 
thematic silence (Kurzon, 2007, 2011). However, theoretical insights on the nature of safety 
silence are ambiguous because the literature has not clarified its manifestation and 
conceptualised it inconsistently as “a bounded act of withholding, a more general state of 
absence of communication, and a lack of being involved or active" (Mumford, 2015; p.34). For 
instance, distinct manifestations of safety silence are not addressed through statistics 
representing the extent of safety voice, post-hoc statements on silence, or available measures 
for safety voice and silence (Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016; Tucker & Turner, 2011). An 
exception to this are the different types of silence proposed (van Dyne et al., 2003) and 
established (Brinsfield, 2013) for employee silence such as defensive, deviant and relational 
silence. However, these pertain to motives for withholding voice, and do not scale how silence 
manifests in terms of the content people raise. We distinguish motives from actions because 
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identical motives (e.g., the desire to prevent harm) may lead to different utterances (e.g., ‘please 
be careful’, ‘stop doing that’) and are not necessarily expressed in content (e.g., when sharing 
safety limits). Research on aircrew conversations provides another notable exception (e.g., co-
pilots providing hints or questioning captains; U. Fischer & Orasanu, 2000; Sassen, 2005), but 
no model exists for the manifestation of safety silence in speech. Thus, research suggests safety 
silence may manifest in distinct types, but insights, data and measures remain limited. 
Additionally, it is uncertain whether insights on the manifestation of safety voice can be applied 
to the manifestation of safety silence. Studies have rarely conceptualised and operationalised 
safety silence in terms of the withholding of safety concerns (Noort et al., 2019a) and may have 
confounded concerned and unconcerned participants. There have been few attempts to 
investigate the degree to which antecedents reduce safety silence, or how this varies over time. 
This appears critical: without this, the effectiveness of interventions for reducing safety silence 
(e.g., providing encouragements; Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014) remains uncertain. 
Thus, we argue that safety voice and safety silence are not dichotomous: in dynamic safety 
critical scenarios concerned individuals may discuss a range of safety-related themes, with the 
manifestation of these in speech determining the quality and strength of safety voice and silence 
over time (Kolbe, Burtscher, et al., 2013). Conceptualising this is needed for disentangling 
distinct manifestations of the behaviour, and for evaluating interventions. Yet, to date, there is 
no conceptual model and little empirical data on how safety silence manifests. Through using 
an experimental paradigm and analysing speech, in the current study we aim to contribute a 
conceptual model for how safety silence can be scaled in relation to safety voice, and concrete 
indicators that can be used to test the effectiveness of interventions for reducing safety silence 
at different timepoints. 
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Current study: A behavioural investigation to scale safety silence 
Here, we investigate how safety silence may be scaled in terms of safety voice speech, and 
the implications of this for interventions, in an experimental scenario. The ‘Walking the Plank’ 
paradigm presents participants with an apparent safety problem (a research assistant walking 
across a ‘weak’ and elevated wooden plank; Noort et al., 2019a) that can only be mitigated 
through raising safety concerns. Because the scenario measures hazard perceptions, it enables 
the assessment of safety silence behaviours (Noort et al., 2019a). Through using this paradigm, 
to our knowledge the only one of its type, we can directly observe behaviour, test a model for 
scaling safety silence and evaluate when interventions are successful at reducing safety silence. 
Scaling safety silence 
Our first research question investigates the degree to which safety silence can be scaled 
based on safety voice speech. Theory suggest that, during safety-critical scenarios, people can 
say nothing (i.e., acoustic silence; Kurzon, 2011), engage in unrelated speech (i.e., veiled and 
thematic silence; Kurzon, 2011; Morison & Macleod, 2014), or raise concerns. We suggest 
that, when concerns are fully withheld, it appears self-evident that this may appear as no 
(acoustic) or unrelated speech (thematic silence). Conversely, safety voice may be understood 
as the strongest way to express concerns in speech for concerned participants. Yet, importantly, 
people may only partially withhold safety concerns and produce some, but less, meaningful 
communication on safety that is not captured by binary concepts (A. Jones & Kelly, 2014) 
because the degree to which specific themes (e.g., safety information, the desire to avoid harm) 
feature in conversations can vary. Safety silence may therefore manifest in speech as a 
continuous (i.e., the degree of safety voice speech) and categorical phenomenon (i.e., types of 
safety voice speech). Thus, during hazardous scenarios people characterised as engaging in 
safety silence may engage in some safety voice, and we propose that safety silence should be 
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conceptualised as the degree to which the withholding of safety concerns is manifested in 
speech that expresses distinct safety themes. 
Specifically, we propose that safety silence can be scaled based on distinct types of safety 
voice related to safety knowledge and safety motivation. Initial evidence exists for distinct 
ways to raise concerns (e.g., respectful, explicit, oblique; Friedman et al., 2015; Kassing, 2002; 
Krenz et al., 2019; Park et al., 2013; Pian-Smith et al., 2009) and whilst a unified model remains 
absent these may be used for conceptualising and scaling safety silence. In particular, we 
propose that because i) beliefs and intentions provide the content of communication (Searle, 
2008), and ii) because safety knowledge and motivation shape safety participation behaviours 
such as voice (Christian et al., 2009), this should manifest in distinct speech. For instance, 
encountered hazards can prompt different perceptions about safety (e.g., uncertainty on safety 
limits, concern for others’ wellbeing; the content of safety voice), and if people discuss safety 
concerns with others they make sense of perceived risks and evaluate intentions to avoid harm 
through safer action (Brinsfield, 2013; Gruman & Saks, 2014; Searle, 2008; Turner & Gray, 
2009). Thus, we propose that when people withhold safety concerns, speech reflects less 
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discussion about safety knowledge and motivations, and we suggest this appears as five types 
of safety voice speech (see Figure 5.2).  
First, through raising safety concerns people can discuss safety information. When people 
warn others they declare their safety beliefs (Searle, 2008) and evidence indicates that people 
raise safety concerns through appealing to facts or better solutions (Kassing, 2002), logical 
arguments (Schwappach & Gehring, 2014b), or, conversely, requesting clarifications (Pian-
Smith et al., 2009). This enables people to make sense of the nature of anticipated or 
encountered hazards (Weick, 2010) and evaluate appropriate actions. Thus, we expect that 
safety silence may manifest as less discussion of safety knowledge through less provision of 
safety information (i.e., informative safety voice) and fewer requests for clarifications (i.e., 
inquisitive voice). 
Figure 5.2. Model for the manifestation of (un)concerned voice and silence in speech. 
Note: coordinates for the five types of safety voice reflect correlations with safety voice and 
safety concern dictionaries, with the areas for no and unrelated speech reflecting these can 
occur for all degrees of concerns and voice, respectively. 
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Hypothesis 1a: Safety silence manifests as less informative safety voice. 
Hypothesis 1b: Safety silence manifests as less inquisitive safety voice. 
Second, through raising concerns people can express the desire for intended states of the 
environment (eg., taking action, avoiding harm; Searle, 2008). Because safety motivations lead 
to safety voice (Christian et al., 2009), we propose that safety silence should be reflected in 
less speech that clarifies the intention to avoid harm such as prohibitive statements (e.g., 
‘please, stop that’), or tentative cautionary statements (e.g., ‘be careful’). Prohibitive (i.e., 
explicit, blunt) statements enable clarity on the desire to avoid harm (Krenz et al., 2019) 
through crisply advocating for different actions (Pian-Smith et al., 2009) or threatening with 
resignation (Kassing, 2002). Cautionary statements express a desire to avoid harm whilst 
conveying more respect (Krenz et al., 2019). Because the motivation for avoiding harm reduces 
safety silence (Christian et al., 2009), this may be reflected in speech and safety silence may 
therefore involve less prohibitive and cautionary safety voice. 
Hypothesis 1c: Safety silence involves less prohibitive safety voice. 
Hypothesis 1d: Safety silence involves less cautionary safety voice. 
Finally, people are indicated to raise concerns through unclear utterances (e.g., ‘okay’, 
‘ha?’, ‘hmm?’, joar?’, ‘how?’; Krenz et al., 2019), and oblique speech (Pian-Smith et al., 2009) 
merely hinting at concerns held (U. Fischer & Orasanu, 2000). These utterances provide 
unclear content and thus the relationship with expressing safety knowledge and safety 
motivation is not straightforward. This manifestation of safety silence may emerge because the 
hesitancy to express safety concerns (e.g., due to higher cost of speaking-up) leads to mitigated 
speech (Edmondson, 1999; U. Fischer & Orasanu, 2000) that manifest in partial statements or 
utterances that are not explicit but imply concerns in-situ. Thus, we finally expect that safety 
silence may manifest in oblique speech.  
Hypothesis 1e: Safety silence involves less oblique safety voice. 
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Reducing safety silence 
Our second research question investigates the degree to which interventions reduce safety 
silence. Safety voice behaviour is attenuated (e.g., in occurrence, assertiveness of 
communication, repetition, explicitness) by situational variables (e.g., leadership styles, 
national culture; Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Rhee et al., 2014; Weiss et al., 2018) and it varies 
in effectiveness for how individuals and groups (e.g., safety managers, flight crews, operating 
teams) understand and decide on safety (e.g., problem-solving, being listened to; A. Jones & 
Kelly, 2014; Orasanu & U. Fischer, 1992). This means that it is important to investigate the 
relationship between situational variables and the manifestation of safety silence in order to 
design effective interventions (Noort et al., 2019a). Yet, few studies have directly observed 
safety voice whilst manipulating interventions (Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Friedman et al., 
2015; Hodges, 2018), and we are not aware of studies that manipulated interventions whilst 
assessing variation in participants’ safety concerns and speech. Without assessing this, studies 
i) assume that hazards elicit concerns, ii) confound concerned and unconcerned participants 
and iii) may not reduce the active withholding of safety concerns but increase the perception 
of risk. Accordingly, a need exists to evaluate the degree to which interventions can reduce 
safety silence. 
We propose that interventions for reducing safety silence work optimally in terms of 
manifesting in more safety voice speech when participants are more concerned. Research using 
the Walking the Plank paradigm has indicated that safety silence is associated with participants 
reporting they are unaware of hazards, feel less responsible and worry less about the 
consequences of speaking-up (Noort et al., 2019a). This is consistent with proposed 
interventions for hazard salience (Tucker et al., 2008), felt responsibility (e.g., Duan et al., 
2017) and encouragements (e.g., Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Burris, 2012). Through applying 
these manipulations, we enable the evaluation of our conceptual model against the literature. 
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First, safety voice is associated with people being aware (Lindberg et al., 2013; Manias, 
2015) and concerned about hazards (Gurung et al., 2017; Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016; 
Schwappach & Gehring, 2014a, 2014c). We suggest this leads to reduced safety silence 
because salient hazards (e.g., reminders of death) elicit risk perceptions through increasing 
perceived threat and uncertainty (i.e., outcomes are not clear a-priori; Burke et al., 2010). 
Theory on risk communication and uncertainty management suggests that uncertainty can be 
managed through information-sharing (e.g., speech) that creates shared awareness, 
(dis)confirms risk perceptions and evaluates appropriate actions (Brashers, 2001; Lindell & 
Perry, 2012). Increasing hazard salience should therefore manifest in less safety silence. 
Hypothesis 2a: Salient hazards reduce safety silence when people are concerned. 
Second, ample research has indicated that felt responsibility for situational outcomes 
increases voice (Aydon et al., 2016; Bickhoff et al., 2016; Duan et al., 2017; Jackson et al., 
2010; Lyndon, 2008; Malvey et al., 2013; Manias, 2015; Nembhard, Yuan, et al., 2015; 
Schwappach & Gehring, 2014a). This is because clear responsibilities increase the intention to 
communicate in order to i) decide on appropriate action (P. Fischer et al., 2011; Lindell & 
Perry, 2012; Weiss et al., 2018), ii) redefine optimal performance (Fuller et al., 2006), and iii) 
explicitly prevent harmful outcomes (Weiss et al., 2014). Clear responsibilities describe the 
accountability for situational outcomes (e.g., harm) and increase the willingness to accept 
accountability for future consequences (Fuller et al., 2006). This may legitimise the sharing of 
safety knowledge through group norms for communicating risk. Thus, safety silence may be 
reduced through increasing the extent people feel responsible for the outcomes of hazardous 
situations.  
Hypothesis 2b: Felt responsibility reduces safety silence when people are concerned. 
Third, encouragements can communicate favourable norms for speaking-up. Research 
indicates that people speak-up more to receptive leaders (e.g., through transformational 
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leadership styles; Bickhoff et al., 2016; Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006). This is because 
explicit communication is more likely when others are supportive (Brashers, 2001; Lindell & 
Perry, 2012) and the costs of safety voice are low (Edmondson, 1999; P. Fischer et al., 2006; 
Lindell & Perry, 2012). Supporting this, encouraged participants are shown to be more likely 
to speak-up (Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014). Thus, we expect that safety silence is reduced 
through providing encouragements. 
Hypothesis 2c: Encouragements reduce safety silence when people are concerned. 
We proposed that safety silence can manifests in speech as a continuous (i.e., degrees of 
speech) and categorical phenomenon (i.e., types of speech). This suggest that interventions 
may only reduce safety silence for specific manifestations. Because insights remain scant, we 
explore how interventions impact on reducing specific types of safety silence. Arguably, safety 
silence may be reduced most in terms of speech related to safety knowledge (i.e., inquisitive 
and informative safety voice). This is because hazard salience, felt responsibility and 
encouragements involve clarity on safety information and norms for communicating this. 
Through exploring this we aim to reveal whether interventions for reducing safety silence 
should be tailored to types of safety silence. 
The effect of time on reducing safety silence 
Our third research question investigates the degree to which safety silence manifests 
differently over time. Time provides a natural influence on safety silence, yet few studies have 
conceptualised temporal differences in safety silence, or the effect of interventions across 
stages of hazardous scenarios. An exception, Farh and Chen (2018) showed that intervention 
success depends on intervention timing (i.e., preparation versus execution of procedures). This 
indicates safety silence may manifest differently across stages of hazardous scenarios, with 
interventions targeting distinct aspects of safety silence. We suggest that, in temporal order, 
hazardous scenarios may i) be anticipated as a potential future state (e.g., designing new 
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systems, planning routes), ii) be physically encountered (e.g., medical alarms sounding), and 
iii) provide the potential for imminent harm (i.e., initiated actions with impending outcomes). 
In the first two stages, harm is not immediate and remains distal compared to initiated actions 
that require immediate action. Arguably, this may elicit more conceptual evaluations (i.e., 
knowledge-based speech) for the early phases of hazards, and more discussion of the intention 
to avoid harm for later stages (i.e., motivation-based speech). 
Hypothesis 3: As hazardous scenario progress, safety silence is manifested in less 
knowledge-based speech and more motivation-based speech. 
In addition, we explore intervention effects over time. Little evidence exists that enables 
explicit hypotheses, but because hazard salience, felt responsibility and encouragements 
involve clarity on safety information and norms for communicating, the interventions may be 
more effective for reducing safety silence during the early stages of the hazard.  
Method 
Design 
Within a laboratory environment, participants engaged in the validated Walking the Plank 
paradigm (Noort et al., 2019a). Under the guise of a creativity study, this paradigm presented 
an apparent hazard of walking a footbridge (i.e., the plank supposedly only held 30kg), and 
enabled the direct observation of safety silence in response to controlled hazards.  
The protocol had three stages. First, after obtaining informed consent, participants engaged 
in a 5-minute creativity task where they described the possible uses of a plank and four blocks 
of wood. Second, they engaged in task with a research assistant to test the feasibility and 
creativity of the ideas of a ‘previous participant’ (i.e., a standard set: shelving, mirror, juggling, 
footbridge, piece of art). Finally, they completed a questionnaire and were fully debriefed. For 
the footbridge idea, the protocol required the research assistant to i) introduce the footbridge 
idea (“Hmm. This idea is pretty obvious, but I haven't seen it before. Could you build a 
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footbridge, please?”), ii) prompt the participant to place the plank across two chairs, ii) state 
the intention to walk the plank (“I will now test the footbridge idea by walking over it”), and 
iii) walk the plank (stepping onto the footbridge at one chair, stepping off the footbridge at the 
other). 
An online pilot study using a video-vignette of the Walking the Plank paradigm (n = 237) 
indicated that hazard salience, OR = 4.928, SE = .777, p = .040, responsibilities, OR = 2.182, 
SE = .428, p = .008, and encouragements, OR = 13.062, SE = .877, p = .003, modified the 
effect (Vanderweele, 2009) of safety concerns on safety voice. Additionally, encouragement 
had a direct effect on safety voice, OR = 25.396, SE = 1.398, p = .021. These manipulations 
were therefore introduced within the protocol. 
For the hazard salience manipulation, participants evaluated a picture of a man talking on 
his phone whilst crossing a busy street, and were asked “What aspects of this picture make it a 
hazardous situation, where harmful outcomes might occur?” (salient condition), or: “What 
aspects of this picture make it a typical situation, one you could encounter any day?” (control 
condition). For the responsibility manipulation, participants read: “Please think of a situation 
from your life where ‘you’ (clear condition)/ ‘it was not clear who’ (unclear condition) was 
responsible for the outcomes of the situation.” Participants then described the situation, what 
they did, and how they felt. For the encouragement manipulation, the research assistant stated 
one of two messages: ‘Please keep your thoughts and opinions to yourself. I do not like it when 
people share those, and I might then reduce your study reward because expressing your true 
feelings is not part of the task’ (discouraged condition). Conversely: ‘Please feel free to express 
your thoughts, and opinions. I like it when people share those, and it will not impact your study 
reward because expressing your true feelings is part of the task’ (encouraged condition). The 
hazard salience and responsibility manipulations were presented electronically in counter-
balanced order before the creativity task. The encouragement manipulation was introduced by 
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the research assistant before the ‘previous participants ideas’ were tested. The eight conditions 
were randomised across all participants and research assistants were blind to the study 
hypotheses. 
Participants 
404 participants (nstudents = 377; nfemale = 277, Age M(sd) = 22.897(5.386), nmissing_demographics = 9) 
consented to participate (including anonymised data to be archived and used within public 
domains), completed the study and were rewarded for their time. The full dataset is available 
as supplementary material. Twelve participants were excluded from analyses (i.e., 10 technical 
issues with video recording, 2 non-responses to whether the scenario elicited concerns). 
Participants spoke fluent English with 97% being native speakers (n = 166) or speaking 
English for more than five years (n = 216). 
Measures 
Measures included self-report and behavioural measures tailored to the laboratory 
environment (for an overview, see Table 5.2). 
Safety concerns. Safety concerns were measured with a 5-point Likert scale item: ‘I was 
concerned about the footbridge idea’. To enable the identification of the continuous safety 
concern dictionary the item was adapted to concerned (i.e., ≥ 3) and unconcerned (i.e., ≤ 2). 
The concern dictionary scored the frequency of concerned words for participants’ speech. 
Safety silence. Safety silence was coded based on transcribed video-recordings of the 
hazardous scenario (i.e., introduction of the footbridge idea up to moving on to the next phase 
of the study). Safety voice was coded when participants verbally indicated they were concerned 
about the research assistant walking the plank (i.e., a risk was indicated, the situation 
prohibited, proceedings questioned, caution urged, or a concern suggested through an oblique 
expression). Otherwise the behaviour was coded as ‘not safety voice’, ICC(1,1) = .749, 
p < .001, and labelled ‘safety silence’ when participants held a safety concern. Seven 
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participants that withdrew their voice (i.e., they spoke-up, but backtracked and allowed the 
footbridge to be walked) were coded as safety voice because an option to respond was given. 
Conversely, independent conversational gasps and apologies were not considered safety voice. 
To measure safety silence and safety voice in speech, participant text was scored with 
i) LIWC2015 dictionaries for risk, perceptions, future-orientation, personal pronouns, negation 
and formalities (Pennebaker et al., 2015), ii) the communication vagueness scale (Hiller et al., 
Table 5.2. Overview of manipulations and measurement characteristics for study variables. 
Characteristic Detail Levels/Scale 
Protocol  






Self-report measures  
Safety voice ‘I told the RA that walking the 
footbridge was a bad idea (before the 
RA walked on it)’ 
5-point Likert scale 
(1: Strongly disagree) 
Concerns ‘I was concerned about the footbridge 
idea’ 
5-point Likert scale 
(1: Strongly disagree) 
Felt responsibility ‘I would feel obligated to raise any 
concerns I had’ 
5-point Likert scale 
(1: Strongly disagree) 
Perceived social 
risk 
‘I felt the RA was very unfamiliar to me’ 
‘I felt the RA might lead me to compare 
badly to him/her’ 
‘I felt the RA might reduce my influence 
over the situation’ 
‘I felt the RA might cause me to have 
strong negative feelings’ 
‘I felt the RA might exploit me’ 
‘I felt the RA might bring out the worst 
in me’ 
‘I felt the RA had a good understanding 
of the situation’ 
5-point Likert scale 
(1: Strongly disagree) 
Behavioural measures  
Safety silence Observed behaviour in video-
observations 






(Not) safety voice (0/1) 
 
Number of uttered  
Concerns Safety concern dictionary 
Disfluencies dictionary 
Number of uttered  
Immediacy of harm Observation of safety voice occurring 
during the footbridge idea 
Four time-points  
(1: introducing the 
footbridge) 
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1969), and iii) safety voice dictionaries (i.e., informative, inquisitive, prohibitive, cautionary, 
oblique; see Table 5.3). Safety voice dictionaries were developed through identifying words 
associated with coded safety voice behaviour, identifying synonyms using word vectors 
(Mikolov et al., 2013) and manually evaluating patterns through author discussion. Dictionary 
scores (i.e., continuous scales) are therefore distinct from observations (i.e., binary scales). 
Hazard stages. The timing of safety silence was assessed using four time-points (i.e., 
introducing the footbridge idea; placing the plank across the chairs; stating the intention to 
walk the plank; the research assistant stepping off the plank). Concerns raised after the research 
assistant walked the plank were not considered safety voice (i.e., harm could no longer be 
prevented). The timing was coded with ‘substantial’ interrater reliability (AC1 = .737, 95CI: 
.622 – .853). 
Questionnaire items. Felt obligation was measured with an adapted survey item (‘I would 
feel obligated to raise any concerns I had’; Liang et al., 2012) and six items measured social 
risk (α = .762; Noort et al., 2019a). 
 
Table 5.3. Description of safety concern and safety voice dictionaries. 
Dictionary Definition Word list 
Safety concern dictionaries 
Concerns Speech indicates a concern is held "actually", "although", "because", "believe", "but", "could", "doubt", "expect", "feel", "for", 
"guess", "hopefully", "if", "just", "know", "maybe", "mean", "not", possibly", "perhaps", 
"pretty", "probably", "rather", "really", "still", "suppose", "sure", "think", "though", 
"thought", "too", "uhm", "quite", "yet", "seems", "unless", "wonder" 
Disfluencies Interruptions in fluent speech "ah", "ahh", "ahhh", "ahhhh", "duh", "dunno", "eh", "ehh", "er", "erm", "errr", "gee", "geez", 
"hah", "haha", "hahah", "hahaha", "hahahah", "hahahaha", "heh", "hehe", "heheh", 
"hehehe", "hey", "hmm", "hmmm", "hmmmm", "hmmmmm", "huh", "humm", "nah", 
"nevermind", "nope", "oh", "ohh", "ohhh", "ooh", "oooh", "uh", "uhh", "uhhh", "uhm", 
"uhum", "umm", "ummm", "ummmm", "whoa", "yah" 
Safety voice dictionaries 
Informative Informing the other about hazards, 
outcomes or safe alternatives 
"4.7", "almost", "animal", "because", "bend", "break", "but", "child", "could", "dangerous", 
"enough", "even", "fall", "for", "harm", "hold", "hurt", "just", "kg", "kid", "kilo", 
"kilograms", "kilos", "least", "less", "limit", "load", "maximum", "much", "not", "only", 
"pounds", "restriction", "said", "says", "six", "sixty", "small", "so", "someone", "stable", 
"still", "stone", "support", "sustain", "take", "than", "thirty", "up", "very", "weigh", 
"weight", "when", "work", "would" 
Inquisitive Requesting hazard-related 
information from the other 
"?", "before", "did", "do", "gon", "have", "na", "to", "want", "wanted", "would", "yeah", 
"you", "are", "ask", "how", "sure", "understand", "why", "when", "who", "what", "where", 
"will", "really" 
Prohibitive Ending the unfolding hazard 
through explicitly indicating risk or 
a need to stop action 
"danger", "safe", "feasible", "quite", "fine", "good", "depends", "work", "exactly", "too", "n
ot", "won't", "'m not", "not gon", "can't", "n't", "try", "step", "test", "I", "me", "no no", "wa
it", "should", "wanted", "stop", "able", "afraid", "bad", "better", "keep", "me", "mind", "m
ust", "need", "no", "unless", "too", "wrong", "work" 
Cautionary Urging others to take care in 
dealing with the hazard 
"careful", "move", "let me", "wait", "too", "need", "help", "hand", "simply", "just", "keep", 
"should", "take", "try", "better" 
Oblique Hinting at holding a negative 
evaluation of the hazard 
"!", "ah", "alright", "anyway", "damn", "didn", "god", "gon", "gosh", "great", "guess", "ha", 
"haha", "hahaha", "heck", "hell", "hey", "hmm", "hmmm", "huh", "joar", "kidding", "lol", 
"oer", "ok", "okay", "oof", "ooh", "oohoo", "oops", "ow", "phoe", "phoo", "say", "shit", 
"sorry", "uh", "whoo", "whoops", "wow", "brave" 
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Results 
Analyses were conducted with Python 3.7 (using the pandas, numpy, scipy, statsmodels, 
spacy and scattertext packages). The Jupyter notebook and supporting files are provided as 
supplementary material. Accordingly, to improve readability, statistics are summarised, and 
non-significant statistics are presented as ‘ns’. 
Manipulation and dictionary checks 
Manipulation checks indicated the scenario and experimental manipulations worked as 
intended, with mixed success for the responsibility manipulation. 
Scenario. The scenario elicited safety concerns for 78.8% (95CI: 74.8 – 82.9%) of the 
participants, t(391) = 38.153, p < .001, and 47.7% (95CI: 42.7 – 52.7%) raised a safety concern, 
t(391) = 18.886, p < .001. Excluding unconcerned participants did not alter this: 50.2% (95CI: 
44.6 – 55.8%) of concerned participants spoke-up, t(308) = 17.607, p < .001. The distribution 
of (un)concerned safety voice and silence is presented in Table 5.4. 
Participants uttered 18,078 words (M = 46.117; SD = 37.559), with participants raising 
concerns uttering more words (M = 64.433; SD = 39.576) than those not raising concerns 
(M = 29.410; SD = 26.226), F(1,390) = 108.388, p < .001, η2 = .217. 
Manipulations. Hazard salience led to stronger concerns than the control condition, 
F(1,390) = 4.871, p = .028, η2= .012: a 1.78 times (95CI: 1.081-2.924) higher likelihood that 
participants were concerned, SE = .254, p = .023. The responsibility manipulation 
Table 5.4. Distribution of voice and silence.  
 Concerned Unconcerned Total 
 n %(SE) n %(SE) n %(SE) 
Voice  155 50(2.8) 32 39(5.4) 187 48(2.5) 
Silence 154 50(2.8) 51 61(5.4) 205 52(2.5) 
Total 309 79(2.1) 83 21(2.1) 392 100(-) 
Percentages total 100% within a column, except for the 
total of (un)concerned. (Adapted from Noort et al., 2019b) 
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unexpectedly did not increase felt responsibility, F(1,390) = .318, p = .573, η2= .001. Yet, 
suggesting participants in the responsibility condition felt a shared obligation with the research 
assistant, participants uttered more ‘we’, F(1,390) = 5.066, p = .025, η2= .001. Encouraged 
participants perceived less social risk from the research assistant, F(1,387) = 16.677, p < .001, 
η2 = .041, and uttered more words, F(1,390) = 6.504, p = .011, η2= .016. Furthermore, their 
speech was more informal, self-focussed and less negated, F(1,390)s ≥ 4.181, ps ≤ .042, η2s ≥ 
.011. 
Dictionary validation. Providing a novel measure for safety concerns, whether 
participants were concerned accurately related to dictionary scores for safety concern, 
F(1,390) = 4.446, p = .036, η2= .011. Indicating a possible tension between raising safety 
concerns and perceiving social risk, concerned participants’ speech was more disfluent, 
F(1,390) = 5.574, p = .004, η2= .022. Safety voice behaviours were coded with ‘substantial’ or 
better interrater reliability (Wongpakaran et al., 2013) in terms of whether it involved 
informative (AC1 = .768, 95CI: .633 – .903), inquisitive (AC1 = .959, 95CI: .911 – 1.007), 
prohibitive (AC1 = .837, 95CI: .731 – .944), cautionary (AC1 = .862, 95CI: .767 – .957), and 
oblique speech (AC1 = .688, 95CI: .536 – .839). After identifying synonyms, the dictionaries 
related accurately to the intended behaviour (e.g., informative versus not informative), 
F(1,390)s ≥ 26.169, ps < .001, η2s ≥ .063. Dictionaries provided one composite safety voice 
dictionary, and this accurately distinguished between participants observed to voice or remain 
silent, F(1,390) = 138.085, p < .001, η2 = .261. The safety voice dictionary was associated with 
self-reported safety voice, r = .490, p < .001, and only with the concern dictionary, r = .813, 
p < .001, not self-reported concerns, r = .077, p = .126. Means and correlations for study 
variables and manipulations are presented in Table 5.5.
 
 
Table 5.5. Spearman correlations, means and standard deviations of variables. 
    M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Salient hazard .49 .50             
2 Clear responsibility .50 .50 .015            
3 Encouraged .49 .50 .040 -.015           
4 Safety voice dictionary 16.86 15.33 .014 -.036 .144 
** 
         




        




       








      










     












    












   




















































N = 392; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Scaling safety silence 
Supporting hypotheses 1a-e, participants engaging in safety silence uttered words 
(M = 29.838, SD = 27.990), t(153) = 13.229, p < .001, and this involved non-zero scores on 
the safety voice dictionary (M = 9.474, SD = 10.348), t(153) = 11.362, p < .001. Specifically, 
people withholding safety concerns engaged in informative (M = 2.877, SD = 3.878), 
inquisitive (M = 3.714, SD =3.970), prohibitive (M = 1.75, SD = 2.771), cautionary (M = .331, 
SD = .724) and oblique safety voice (M = 1.617, SD = 1.931), t(153)s ≥ 5.680, ps < .001. The 
distinction between safety silence and safety voice was a matter of degree: participants that did 
not speak-up scored lower on the five safety voice dictionaries, F(1,390)s ≥ 4.900, ps ≤ .028, 
η2s ≥ .016. This illustrates safety themes are less present for safety silence and, importantly, 
indicates that safety silence can be scaled based on the degree of safety voice in speech. 
Reducing safety silence  
Supporting hypotheses 2a-c, safety silence was reduced through manipulating beliefs on 
safety and norms for speaking-up. However, only encouragements had a direct effect on safety 
voice, whilst hazard salience and responsibility modified the effect of safety concerns on safety 
voice. That is, concerned participants did not engage in less safety silence through manipulating 
hazard salience, b = -.459, t(305) = -.249, p = .804, and responsibility, b = -1.061, 
t(305) = -.576, p = .565. Yet encouragements reduced safety silence, b = 4.000, t(305) = 2.171, 
p = .031, with participants uttering more words on the safety voice dictionary. Underscoring 
the importance of assessing safety concerns, interventions only reduced safety silence for the 
levels of the manipulations. That is, stronger safety concerns reduced safety silence in terms of 
the safety voice dictionary, b = 1.287, t(390) = 2.032, p = .043, but only when hazards were 
salient, b = 1.956, t(388) = 2.049, p = .041, participants were discouraged, b = 1.695, 
t(388) = 1.970, p = .050, and (through a marginal effect) responsibilities were clear, b = 1.666, 
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t(388) = 1.757, p = .080. Yet, stronger concerns did not reduce safety silence when hazards 
were not salient, responsibilities unclear and participants were encouraged, ns.  
Probing effects. Further analyses suggested that stronger concerns did not universally reduce 
safety silence: stronger concerns only reduced unique manifestations of safety silence for the 
levels of the manipulations. That is, salient hazards only led to more inquisitive safety voice, 
b = .705, t(388) = 2.091, p = .037; clear responsibilities to more inquisitive safety voice, 
b = .698, t(388) = 2.083, p = .038, and less oblique safety voice, b = .226, t(388) = 2.157, 
p = .032; and discouragements only to more informative safety voice, b = .890, t(388) = 2.005, 
p = .046. Otherwise, safety concerns did not reduce safety silence on the safety voice 
dictionaries, ns. This indicates that sensemaking on safety knowledge is elicited by salient 
hazards, clear responsibilities and encouragements, whilst clear responsibilities reduce unclear 
speech. Furthermore, it suggests that safety motivation-based themes are not elicited by the 
manipulations and may be better addressed by alternative interventions. 
The effect of time on reducing safety silence 
Safety silence manifested differently for participants that initially spoke-up during the first 
(i.e., conceptualisation stage; n = 44), second (i.e., encounter stage; n = 39) or third stage (i.e., 
imminent danger stage; n = 104) of the hazard, F(1,184) = 13.686, p < .001, η2 = .129, and this 
indicates the need to compare the manifestation of safety silence across these stages. 
Specifically, in comparison to other stages, dictionary scores during the conceptualisation 
stage indicated that participants were more concerned, F(1,179) = 17.371, p < .001, η2 = .086, 
and this led to more informative, inquisitive and prohibitive, and less oblique and disfluent 
safety voice, F(1,179)s ≥ 4.846, ps ≤ .029, η2s ≥ .026. They did not engage in more cautionary 
safety voice than in the other stages, ns. Partially supporting hypothesis 3, this suggests 
participants at this time-point were orientated towards evaluating the idea of walking the plank, 
without perceived risk interrupting speech. The encounter stage only involved marginally more 
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informative safety voice, F(1,178) = 3.429, p = .066, η2 ≥ .018. This suggests that the second 
stage may involve sensemaking about the physical encounter of the walking the plank idea. 
Finally, when danger was imminent, participants engaged in more informative safety voice, 
F(1,178) = 54.728, p < .001, η2 = .228. However, their speech was also less concerned and 
prohibitive, F(1,178)s ≥ 8.080, ps ≤ .005, η2s ≥ .042. This suggests imminent harm is more 
effectively reduced through indicating safety knowledge rather than safety motivation. 
Interestingly, the imminent danger stage led to higher disfluency and oblique safety voice 
scores, F(1,178)s ≥ 10.704, ps ≤ .001, η2s ≥ .055, suggesting that mitigating imminent danger 
may be cognitively disruptive. 
Finally, encouragements reduced the likelihood for safety silence during the first stage of 
the hazard, OR = .205, z(305) = -2.672, p = .008, whereas clear responsibilities increased the 
likelihood that people spoke-up during the second stage, OR = .257, z(305) = 2.058, p = .040. 
Discussion 
We proposed a model for scaling safety silence based on five types of safety voice speech 
and evaluated when interventions can reduce safety silence. Our experimental investigation 
provided the first behavioural evidence that safety silence can be scaled upon the degree of 
safety voice speech for concerned participants and demonstrates that interventions for reducing 
safety silence are most effective when participants hold safety concerns. Additionally, 
interventions tend to reduce knowledge-based speech, but not motivation-based speech, and 
that the temporal progression of hazards leads, in temporal order, to conceptual evaluations, 
exploration of consequences, and attempts at mitigating the hazard. These findings have 
implications for conceptualising and reducing safety silence.  
Chapter 5: A precise behavioural conceptualisation of safety voice and safety silence 196 
Theoretical implications 
First, we revealed that safety silence can be scaled based on the degree of safety voice 
speech. Specifically, safety silence manifests in the degree that concerned individuals talk 
about safety knowledge (i.e., informative, inquisitive) and motivation (i.e., prohibitive, 
cautionary), or speak unclearly (i.e., oblique speech). We outlined a model capturing these 
themes in speech for (un)concerned participants and evidenced that safety silence contains 
meaningful information (i.e., extent of concerns and in-situ inhibiting effects). This conceptual 
model underscores propositions and findings that safety concerns can be raised through 
different means (Friedman et al., 2015; Kassing, 2002; Krenz et al., 2019; Pian-Smith et al., 
2009), and clarifies that the nature of safety silence is rooted in the veiling of concerns (Morison 
& Macleod, 2014) and degrees of thematic silence (Kurzon, 2007, 2011). Thus, we add to 
safety voice theory through evidencing the relationship between safety voice and safety silence 
in terms of five themes reflecting safety knowledge and safety motivation (Christian et al., 
2009; Searle, 2008). Furthermore, through providing the first text-based measures for assessing 
safety silence and safety concerns, we enable a novel stream of research on silence in text. For 
example, in online environments (e.g., tweets containing hashtags on safety; Purohit et al., 
2013), laboratory scenarios (de Ruiter & Albert, 2017; Kendrick, 2017), and field settings (e.g., 
cockpit voice recordings; U. Fischer & Orasanu, 2000; Sassen, 2005). 
Second, we revealed that scaling safety silence is important for designing interventions. That 
is, through evaluating hazard salience (Tucker et al., 2008), felt responsibility (e.g., Duan et 
al., 2017) and encouragements (e.g., Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Burris, 2012), we showed 
that interventions are most effective at reducing safety silence when participants are concerned, 
and for safety knowledge-based speech. This suggests that safety voice and silence involve 
sensemaking and interventions need to account for participants seeking information on risk 
(e.g., R. J. Griffin et al., 1999): to ascertain the presence and appropriateness of discussing 
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risks, people use in-situ information on hazards and anticipated responses. This corresponds to 
theory on risk communication (Lindell, 2018), harm prevention (P. Fischer et al., 2011) and 
safety climate (Zohar, 2010) that propose that people engage in social information processing 
to evaluate environmental (i.e., risk) and social cues (e.g., psychological safety; Edmondson & 
Lei, 2014). We expand these insights through indicating that information only elicits specific 
types of sensemaking and encourage future research to investigate when people are likely to 
discuss safety motivations. 
 Finally, we revealed that safety silence is time-bound. Speech reflecting safety knowledge 
was relevant across stages (with a marginal trend for the encounter stage). Conversely, speech 
reflecting motivations for avoiding harm (i.e., prohibitive safety voice) were only more 
prevalent when hazards were conceptual, and this may be explained by the cognitive disruption 
of imminent harm. This corresponds to recent findings indicating that nurses voice later, not 
less, dependent on leadership influences (Krenz et al., 2020) and underscores that studies need 
to account for the temporal nature of safety silence. For instance, research may identify how 
silence progresses over time in speech through directly observing how spirals of silence 
(Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Scheufle & Moy, 2000) emerge and change through the impact of 
others (e.g., through poor listening out for concerns), or applying safety voice dictionary scores 
to explain decision-making on uncertain risks (Brashers, 2001; Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
Practical applications 
Our findings indicate at least three applications. First, through providing new measures we 
enable the recognition of safety silence in applied settings. This is important for areas such as 
accident analyses, training programs, and automated speech recognition. For example, Tarnow 
(2000) described how the crash of Express II Airlines, Inc./Northwest Airlink 5719 was 
attributable to tense and hesitant communication, and Fischer and Orassanu (2000) described 
indirect speech contributing to the crash of Air Florida Flight 90. Because of this, training 
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programs aimed at safety-specific communication (e.g., Crew Resource Management, 
teamSTEPPS, LOFT; Kanki et al., 2019; King et al., 2008) typically emphasise communication 
styles (e.g., assertiveness) and collaboration on safety (e.g., shared mental models, adaptability, 
error management; Helmreich et al., 1999). However, these rarely train on specific speech 
(Leonard et al., 2004), or the measurement of safety silence. We indicate that safety silence can 
be identified within speech, and the presented dictionaries may be applied to conversations in 
field settings for recognising specific speech patterns that distinguish voice and silence. 
Practitioners may be trained to identify these patterns (e.g., in live or recorded speech), and 
research should investigate whether dictionaries for laboratory-based hazards can be 
generalised to field settings. For instance, through developing automated speech recognition 
software for speech within healthcare environments (e.g., medical reports, notes; Jiang et al., 
2017). 
Second, we indicate that safety silence is contingent upon the perception of risk and that 
interventions are therefore most optimal for concerned people. This appear especially useful 
for altering whether people discuss safety knowledge, and silence may therefore be optimally 
reduced through providing explicit safety information (e.g., in healthcare leaflets, through 
warning signs; Matthews et al., 2014; Pander Maat & Lentz, 2010), clear accountability 
structures, and inclusive leadership (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006; Weiss et al., 2018). 
Finally, practitioners may utilise the experimental paradigm itself for training purposes. 
Debriefing simulations can raise awareness amongst participants (Kolbe et al., 2015) and 
corresponding to this, we noted that the debriefing appeared to increase knowledge on the 
impact of beliefs on safety and perceived norms for speaking-up. The scenario may be 
especially relevant for training on mild risks and for people with no specific safety knowledge 
(e.g., patient, customers): the scenario does not require specialist knowledge and has a low 
threshold for participation. 
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Limitations 
First, the experimental paradigm has debated external validity (Noort et al., 2019a). A need 
remains to extend findings to natural speech in other contexts (e.g., in operating rooms, flight 
decks) and to scenarios that pose more substantial risk. This appears key because speech is 
highly context-dependent (e.g., informative speech included characteristics of the experimental 
scenario; Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). Yet, the criteria to establish fidelity are not clear (Nestel 
et al., 2017) and the standardised scenario reveals causal mechanisms with high internal 
validity that may be generalised with more certainty to settings with known characteristics 
(Noort et al., 2019a). We argue that the method is appropriate because hazards are presented 
ethically (through the perception of risk) and elicited safety concerns. To evidence the 
generalisability of concepts, we aim to establish safety voice during real-world hazards in 
future research. 
Second, the responsibility manipulation unexpectedly reduced felt obligation. This indicates 
interpretation of this manipulation is not straightforward and future research should examine 
this. For instance, reminding people of previously held responsibilities may have compensated 
the need to feel responsible in novel situations. Still, the manipulation reduced safety silence 
and led to more inclusive language indicating that participants may have felt shared rather than 
individual responsibility. 
Finally, the association between concerned speech and safety voice was very strong and this 
indicates that safety concerns and safety voice, though distinct concepts, may be less 
distinguishable in speech. Future research may expand on this. 
Conclusions 
Reducing safety silence is critical for safety management. We proposed a model for the 
manifestation of safety silence behaviour and showed that safety silence is scalable in terms of 
the degree of safety voice speech. Furthermore, we showed that interventions only reduced 
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safety silence about safety knowledge when participants were concerned, and at specific time-
points. Our findings underscore the importance of the behavioural investigation of safety 
silence and the need to assess the extent people perceive risks: safety silence is reduced most 
effectively when safety information is available, and this is manifested in speech. Future 
accidents may therefore be prevented through investigating the manifestation of safety silence 
in speech.
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CHAPTER 6: 
APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF SAFETY VOICE 
TO REAL-LIFE HAZARDS: THE NEED FOR SAFETY LISTENING 
Preface 
In the previous chapters, I built a behavioural methodology and a conceptualisation of safety 
voice as a nuanced behaviour that is deeply rooted within characteristics of the hazardous 
situations in terms of how safety threats elicit safety concerns and safety voice. For instance, I 
indicated that the behavioural nature of safety voice is characterised by ecological relationships 
to other variables (e.g., hazard-related antecedents; Chapter 3), and through a simulated hazard 
I revealed that safety voice is contingent on the extent to which people perceive risk within a 
hazardous situation (Chapter 4), the extent to which situational characteristics elicit variation 
in talk about safety, and the temporal progression of hazardous situations (see Chapter 4 and 
5). These findings contribute to safety management by underscoring that accidents can occur 
when safety voice is inhibited by social relationships (e.g., when there is low psychological 
safety; Edmondson, 1999) and the characteristics of hazardous situations (e.g., when hazards 
are not perceived as risky), with interventions needing to be tailored accordingly (e.g., to safety 
concerns and safety voice).  
However, a need exists for establishing and explaining the extent to which safety voice 
manifests during real-life, actual, hazards, and how this enables the mitigation of accidents 
when others listen. In the previous studies I did not present actual hazards but observed voice 
behaviour in simulated environments, and the literature has not clarified to what extent the 
concept of safety voice may be applied to real-life hazards (Krenz et al., 2020; Schwappach & 
Gehring, 2014c). For instance, using the Walking the Plank paradigm (n = 55), MSc students 
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at LSE27 were able to demonstrate that closed leadership inhibits safety voice behaviour, 
OR = .145, Wald(1) = 9.435, p = .002. However, similar to the studies in previous chapters and 
research by Barzallo Salazar and colleagues (2014), risk was operationalised in terms of 
perceived risk and simulated hazards, not actual hazards, and it controlled how others listened 
to safety voice. This practice ensures ethical standards (see Chapters 2 and 4), yet because of 
this, it remains assumed that the concept of safety voice is important for understanding how 
accidents are caused. Furthermore, it is unclear when safety voice is effective for preventing 
harm (e.g., when others listen), and even if safety voice occurs at all during actual hazards. 
This is important, because if safety voice may be understood as highly situated and nuanced 
behaviour important for managing safety threats, it should emerge in response to extreme levels 
of risk (e.g., fatal) posed by real-world accidents and in the context of others actually listening 
or dismissing safety concerns (‘safety listening’).  
Thus, in this chapter I set out to investigate the extent to which the concept of safety voice 
is important for understanding accident causation, and I present a study using naturally 
occurring data from historic aviation accidents. Aviation accidents provide naturally occurring 
cases where actual risk was confirmed to be present and high, with Cockpit Voice Recorder 
(CVR, also known as the ‘black box’) transcripts providing field-based data on communication 
prior to aviation accidents whereby participants do not need to be exposed to new risks. In 
addition, the global and hierarchical nature of the aviation industry enables the investigation of 
the extent to which safety behaviours during accidents are shaped by social characteristics such 
as norms for communicating with seniors (e.g., power distance). Finally, because included 
accidents occurred between 1962 and 2018, I was able to investigate the extent to which safety 
voice and safety listening changed during a historic period when safety management improved 
                                                 
27 This involved: Eleanor McSweeney, Grace Rahal, Kate Sitniewski and Lucy Zhong. I independently 
analysed the presented statistic. 
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significantly through the introduction of new theoretical models outlining how sociotechnical 
systems can be designed to prevent harm (Perrow, 2011; Reason, 2000; Vaughan, 1996; Zohar, 
1980), and training programs that aimed to improve how teams coordinate on safety (e.g., Crew 
Resource Management; Kanki et al., 2019). 
Thus, in this chapter, I advance safety management by clarifying how safety voice is 
relevant for understanding accident causation, evaluating the extent to which others listen to 
safety concerns, and providing insights into leadership effects on voice during accidents (Detert 
& Treviño, 2010). This enables the evaluation of the extent to which safety voice is highly 
situated, and a conceptualisation of accident causation that specifies that accidents may occur 
when hazards do not elicit an effective chain of safety concerns, safety voice and safety 
listening (therefore contributing to research question 1: What is the behavioural nature of safety 
voice?). Furthermore, in this chapter I illustrate how safety voice may be investigated in the 
field by utilising archival data and indicate the extent to which findings on safety voice and 
leadership can be generalised to genuine accidents (therefore contributing to research question 
2: What is the optimal way to investigate safety voice behaviour?). Finally, because 
interventions that aim to improve coordination and decision-making on safety such as CRM 
(Kanki et al., 2019) have been introduced across the aviation industry from the 1980s 
(Helmreich et al., 1990), the historic and global nature of the data enables an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of CRM training for improving safety voice and safety listening across contexts 
that vary in power distance (therefore contributing to research question 3: To what extent do 
interventions for promoting safety voice and reducing safety silence need to be tailored to the 
behavioural nature of safety voice?). 
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Study description 
Article 4 presents a study of safety voice during historic aviation accidents. A dataset was 
generated from 172 CVR transcripts that were available in three online databases. Transcripts 
were included in accident investigation reports and provided direct access to communication 
during actual accidents (n = 14,128 spoken messages). By evaluating the extent to which flight 
crew spoke-up across and during accidents and triangulating this data with safety listening and 
Hofstede’s Power Distance Index (e.g., Hofstede et al., 2010), I indicated that flight crew nearly 
always spoke-up across accidents (99%), and this was significantly higher compared to levels 
of safety voice established in the Walking the plank paradigm (see Chapter 4) and the 
systematic literature review (i.e., both 44%; see Chapter 3). This indicated that a lack of safety 
voice cannot be assumed to have caused accidents or be essential for preventing accidents, and 
it underscored the need to understand how safety voice can be made more effective. That is, 
accidents still occurred in the presence of safety voice, and findings underscored that this 
should emphasise safety listening because poor safety listening reduced the engagement of 
junior flight crew in safety voice. This provides the first evidence of the proposition by Barlow 
and colleagues (2019) on the essential role of ‘receivership’ (which I term ‘safety listening’) 
Figure 6.1. Threat Mitigation Model of safety concerns, safety voice and safety listening. 
Note: this model highlights that the dysfunctional momentum of threats towards accidents 
(Barton & Sutcliff, 2009) can be mitigated when safety threats successfully elicit safety 
concerns, safety voice and safety listening, with antecedents impacting on the relationships. 
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in mitigating accidents (this also enables the investiagation of leadership concepts from the 
field of employee voice within the context of real accidents; Detert & Treviño, 2010). 
Moreover, it contributes to safety management by extending the safety voice model developed 
across the previous chapters: ‘safety listening’ is an important step in mitigating safety threats 
through interpersonal communication during hazardous scenarios (see Figure 6.1, and Figure 
6.4 which presents the conceptual model without specified antecedents). 
Moreover, junior flight crew varied in the extent to which they spoke-up during accidents 
(e.g., once versus repeated), and this underscored the need to understand the role of safety voice 
for safety management as highly situated: junior flight crew spoke-up more in airlines from 
low power distance countries (i.e., indicating the importance of national culture) and when 
safety listening was stronger (i.e., indicating the need for safety listening interventions).  
Again, underscoring the situated nature of safety voice, results indicated that the extent of 
safety voice (during accidents) became less over the years, and this was explained by safety 
listening improving over time where power distance was low. This is important for safety 
management because it suggests that communication about safety concerns became more 
effective (i.e., less safety voice was necessary) and may even have prevented accidents in low 
power distance countries (i.e., because voice occurs more for near-misses than accidents; 
Blanco et al., 2009). Furthermore, it indicates that CRM training programs have only been 
partially effective: safety voice and safety listening changed after the introduction of these 
training programs in the early 1980s, but only for low power distance countries. 
Authorship 
I was responsible for designing the study, preparing the coding framework, analysing and 
interpreting the data and preparing the manuscript (80%). Dr Tom Reader and Dr Alex 
Gillespie contributed to conceptualising the study, the design of the coding framework and 
manuscript preparation (20%). Research assistants (Lindsie Arthur-Hulme, Alex Goddard, 
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coding for the interrater reliability analysis. 
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Safety voice and safety listening during aviation accidents: when 
speaking-up to power is not enough 
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Risk Analysis: an international journal (submission date: 22 July 2020) 
Abstract 
Speaking-up about perceived hazards, termed safety voice, is theorised as an important 
factor for mitigating accidents, but behavioural research during actual hazards has been scant. 
Research indicates safety voice is suppressed by high power distance between senior and junior 
staff and poor listening to safety concerns (safety listening). Yet, despite fruitful hypotheses 
and training programs, it remains unclear to what extent speaking-up poses a problem for safety 
management, how negative responses shape the behaviour, or how this can be explained by 
power distance. Moreover, this means it remains unclear how the concept of safety voice is 
relevant for understanding accidents. To address this, 172 Cockpit Voice Recorder transcripts 
of historic aviation accidents were identified, integrated into a novel dataset (n = 14,128 
conversational turns), coded in terms of safety voice and safety listening and triangulated with 
Hofstede’s power distance. Results revealed that flight crew spoke-up in all but two accidents, 
provided the first direct evidence that power distance and safety listening explain variation in 
safety voice during accidents, and indicated partial effectiveness of CRM training programs 
because safety voice and safety listening changed over the course of history, but only for low 
power distance environments. Thus, findings imply that accidents cannot be assumed to emerge 
from a lack of safety voice, or that the behaviour is sufficient for avoiding harm, and indicate 
Chapter 6: Applying the concept of safety voice to real-life hazards 207 
a need for improving interventions across environments. Findings underscore that the literature 
should be grounded in real accidents and make safety voice more effective through improving 
‘safety listening’. 
Keywords: safety voice; safety listening; accidents; power distance; CRM. 
Introduction 
Safety voice is the act of speaking-up about perceived hazards (Noort et al., 2019b; Tucker 
et al., 2008). For high reliability industries such as aviation, safety voice is assumed to be 
central to maintaining safe operations (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012) and where team members 
withhold safety concerns (‘safety silence’), or dismiss them (i.e., poor ‘safety listening’), this 
has contributed to tragic accidents due to information about risk not being shared or used 
(Cocklin, 2004; Cookson, 2015; NTSB, 1978). Explanations for the absence of safety voice 
and poor safety listening during safety critical scenarios often focus on cultural norms and 
asymmetric leader-follower relationships (i.e., power distance; Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Specifically, accidents are assumed to emerge from people not speaking-up due to fears for the 
social consequences of incorrectly raising concerns or undermining leaders (Enomoto & 
Geisler, 2017; Gladwell, 2008; Soeters & Boer, 2000; Tucker et al., 2008), and poor safety 
listening to voice is understood to arise from norms for communication (Hofstede et al., 2010; 
Kam & Bond, 2009) and expected asymmetries on expertise for managing safety (Tost et al., 
2012). Studies utilising vignette (Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c), laboratory (Noort et al., 
2019a), high-fidelity simulator scenarios (Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014) and case studies 
(Driscoll, 2002) have explored this extensively, and show that power dynamics shape how 
leaders respond to advice (Tost et al., 2012), and that when leaders listen poorly to safety 
concerns (Edmondson, 1999; Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006), junior team members are less 
likely to engage in safety voice, or delay speaking-up (Krenz et al., 2020), which impairs safety 
management.  
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Thus, safety voice and power distance are recognised as primary causes of organisational 
accidents (Conchie et al., 2012; Enomoto & Geisler, 2017; Gladwell, 2008; Reader et al., 2015; 
Soeters & Boer, 2000), and a range of interventions for reducing power distance in teams and 
enhancing speaking-up (e.g., psychological safety, training; Kanki et al., 2019; Kolbe, Weiss, 
et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2017) have been developed to improve safety voice and safety 
listening. Although laudable in intention, this remains grounded in little empirical evidence for 
the role of safety voice as a causal factor in accidents, and the influence of power distance upon 
the behaviour. Safety voice has largely been investigated through case studies, experiments, 
and self-report data (Noort et al., 2019a), and research has not established the extent to which 
an absence of safety voice, or poor safety listening, have directly contributed to accidents where 
actors (e.g., flight crews, patients) experienced serious threats to life (e.g., Raemer et al., 2016) 
outside of isolated accident investigations (e.g., Francis, 2013; NTSB, 1978). Determining this 
is important for ensuring that theory on the contribution of safety voice and power distance to 
accident causation, and interventions that flow from this, are grounded in observations 
examining how and to what extent they contribute to real accidents. 
We address this evidence gap in the current study, and through analysing cockpit voice 
recorder (CVR) transcripts of 172 historic aviation accidents, examine the role and nature of 
safety voice behaviours in accident mitigation. We establish to what extent safety voice 
i) manifests prior to accidents, ii) is ignored or dismissed by crew members, and iii) is 
explained by cultural norms for how junior and senior crew interact (i.e., power distance). We 
also consider how the introduction of Crew Resource Management (Helmreich et al., 1990; 
Kanki et al., 2019), an intervention designed to improve teamwork amongst safety-critical staff 
(e.g., flight crews, critical care teams), has increased safety voice. Our contribution is to 
systematically establish the role of safety voice, safety listening and power distance in real 
Chapter 6: Applying the concept of safety voice to real-life hazards 209 
accidents, and through this, advance understanding on to extent to which a lack of ineffective 
communication contributes to accidents. 
Safety voice for safety-critical staff 
Safety voice is the act of speaking-up about perceived hazards to others of equal or senior 
status in order to mitigate harm (Noort et al., 2019b; Tucker et al., 2008). Conversely, when 
people withhold safety concerns this is labelled ‘safety silence’ (Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 
2016). The concept draws from research on communication and safety management (Noort et 
al., 2019b) and especially employee voice research (Morrison, 2014; Noort et al., 2019b; 
Tucker et al., 2008). The central idea to this research is that individual team members may have 
critical information (e.g., on risk), and that the free flow of this information contributes to 
mitigating failures (Westrum, 2014). Because of this, and the harmful consequences of poorly 
sharing safety information (e.g., Kolbe et al., 2012; Novak, 2019), scholars have distinguished 
the concept of safety voice and provided a distinct literature (Conchie et al., 2012; Morrow et 
al., 2016; Noort et al., 2019b; Okuyama et al., 2014; Tucker et al., 2008) that extends beyond 
organisational environments (e.g., to non-smokers in public settings; Bigman et al., 2019), 
provides unique empirical data (Noort et al., 2019a), and captures the communication of safety 
concerns that emerge from perceived risks (e.g., Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c). 
Safety voice is of vital importance to environments where people need to decide and act on 
perceived risks, such as flight crews, nuclear control room teams, critical care teams, or oil rig 
maintenance teams. Highlighting unsafe conditions helps to interpret the environment, create 
shared situational awareness (Driscoll, 2002; Foushee, 1984), enables mitigating actions 
(Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Sexton & Helmreich, 2003), and improves safety performance 
(Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016; Manias, 2015), especially when junior members of technical 
teams speak-up (Kolbe et al., 2012). For instance, in aviation, flight crews continuously handle 
routine and novel hazardous scenarios (e.g., taking off in poor weather, deciding on warning 
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signals), and voicing and listening to concerns is deemed necessary for avoiding potentially 
fatal outcomes (e.g., crashes, mid-air collision). That is, operating aircraft requires effective 
coordination (e.g., to decide on risk, complete checklists, avoid opposing system input, etc.; 
Skogstad & Hellesoy, 1995) between pilots that share responsibilities for maintaining safe 
flight, yet have distinct tasks (e.g., flying the aircraft, monitoring radio communication), 
information (e.g., duplicated meters may provide divergent information), experience and 
seniority. 
Ineffective crew coordination, though rarely the sole causal factor, has contributed to 
accidents through loss of situational awareness and ineffective decision-making. For instance, 
status differences and poor coordination (e.g., the lack of raising or listening to safety concerns) 
contributed to fatal accidents in healthcare (e.g., the death of Elaine Bromiley after concerns 
about a difficult airway were dismissed; Bromiley & Mitchell, 2009; Fioratou et al., 2010), 
aviation (e.g., the crash of United Airlines 173 after fuel starvation was ignored; NTSB, 1978) 
and energy (e.g., the blow out of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig after concerns about a pressure 
test were not raised by contractors; Reader & O’Connor, 2014). Thus, the role of 
communication problems in accidents within a broad range of domains underlie the growth of 
the safety voice literature, and the focus of interventions to reduce safety silence and poor 
safety listening.  
To explain why junior team members do not engage in voice, and why senior team members 
do not listen effectively, studies have drawn on the concept of power distance (Botero & Van 
Dyne, 2009; Gladwell, 2008; Huang et al., 2005; Kwon et al., 2016; Landau, 2009; Liang et 
al., 2012; MacNab et al., 2007; Morrison, 2011, 2014; Newman et al., 2017; Rhee et al., 2014; 
Wilkinson et al., 2020), which “refers to the degree to which individuals, groups, or societies 
accept inequalities (…) as unavoidable, legitimate, or functional” (Daniels & Greguras, 2014, 
p.2). Studies indicate unfavourable effects of power distance for communicating issues to 
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leaders (Peadon et al., 2020) and subsequent interventions aim to enable leaders to listen better 
to safety voice (e.g., support, enacting change). Yet, researching this is challenging because 
safety voice emerges spontaneously and its infrequent occurrence cannot be readily controlled 
(e.g., prompting voice could bias findings; Noort et al., 2019a). To address this, and because 
introducing real hazards is unethical (APA, 2017), research has assessed safety voice through 
hazardous scenarios in interviews, focus-groups and surveys (e.g., prompting memories; 
Alingh et al., 2019; Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016), vignettes (Schwappach & Gehring, 
2014c), high-fidelity simulations (e.g., during technical procedures; Barzallo Salazar et al., 
2014; Foushee & Manos, 1981; H. P. R. Smith, 1979; Weiss et al., 2018), simulation-based 
training (Kanki et al., 2019; Kines et al., 2010; Kolbe, Weiss, et al., 2013; Leonard et al., 2004) 
and through laboratory experiments (e.g., presenting generic risks; Noort et al., 2019a). These 
approaches generated the insight that safety voice can be promoted (in terms of likelihood or 
onset) through leaders acting in low power distance ways. For instance, through providing 
encouragements, using inclusive language (Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Weiss et al., 2018) or 
shallower hierarchies (Krenz et al., 2020). Furthermore, the perception of risk may be necessary 
for successful interventions (Noort et al., 2019a), and the decision to raise safety concerns is a 
trade-off between the benefit of mitigating harm and the cost of leaders’ poor listening to safety 
voice (Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c). 
Yet, insights on the extent to which, and how precisely, safety voice contributes to real 
accidents remain scare and limited (Krenz et al., 2020; Noort et al., 2019a; Peadon et al., 2020), 
and this is especially true for the degree that leadership shapes safety voice during naturally 
occurring scenarios. Insights are largely drawn from case studies that are selectively chosen 
because of the role of safety voice in accident causation (e.g., Driscoll, 2002), studies that 
operationalise accidents instead of safety voice behaviour (Anicich et al., 2015; Enomoto & 
Geisler, 2017; Soeters & Boer, 2000), or inquests (Francis, 2013, 2015) that may poorly reveal 
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actual safety voice behaviour because data reflects participants’ perspectives on historic events 
(Noort et al., 2019a). Available evidence may therefore not accurately represent voice during 
accidents, and the problem posed by safety voice may be overestimated (e.g., if the frequency 
of safety voice is biased). Subtleties, like the strategies used to voice safety concerns and the 
ways in which voice is dismissed, have, to our knowledge, never been investigated in the 
context of real accidents. This has led to the widespread assumption that safety voice is a 
substantial contributory factor to accidents, and is therefore important for mitigating declining 
conditions, errors and accidents (e.g., employee voice, safety voice, psychological safety; 
Edmondson & Lei, 2014; Morrison, 2014; Okuyama et al., 2014), and a function of wider 
organisational environments (e.g., safety culture, safety citizenship; Reader et al., 2015; van 
Dyne et al., 2003). However, to date, there is no systematic exploration of the extent to which 
a lack of safety voice and poor listening (i.e., failures to report safety problems, dismissal of 
concerns) are a central and major contributing factor to serious accidents (Krenz et al., 2020), 
and the level of influence exerted by power on safety voice (rather than, for example, time, 
failure to notice information, error) remains a proposition (e.g., Kwon et al., 2016). 
Thus, whilst safety voice theory aims to explain how the behaviour contributes to accidents, 
and to develop interventions for improving speaking-up (O’Donovan & McAuliffe, 2020), 
there is a lack of data on to the extent to which, and how precisely, safety voice manifests and 
is listened to during accidents. Given the importance of safety voice as a conceptual frame for 
explaining failures in safety management, and for training programs aiming to improve 
coordination on safety (e.g., crew resource management, TeamSTEPPS; Kanki et al., 2019; 
King et al., 2008), it appears essential to consider its actual role in accident causation. For 
instance, without this, it is unclear how field-based behaviour should be mapped unto survey 
findings, or to what extent findings on power distance and safety listening generalise to the 
field. This idea is consistent with the broader observation from meta analyses that, whilst 
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flexible approaches to methodological realism are appropriate (i.e., there are no strict rules for 
what makes scenarios “real”; Nestel et al., 2017), psychological effects established in 
controlled settings (e.g., simulation or laboratory studies) can be substantially different in the 
field and vary in their direction (Mitchell, 2012), with effects on safety-related behaviour being 
stronger in archival data than self-reports (Christian et al., 2009). Specifically, and as we 
describe below, evidence is lacking for accidents where teams were not able to manage real 
and severe risk in terms of the extent to which people engage in safety voice and safety 
listening, or how power distance may explain this. We explore this through analysing CVR 
data capturing speech acts on flight decks prior to accidents. 
The current study 
Here, we investigate the extent to which safety voice varies during actual hazards that pose 
extreme risk, and how safety listening and power distance shape this. For aviation, this may be 
achieved through analysing transcripts from cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) from historic 
aviation accidents. CVRs were designed to capture and interpret sounds during accidents (e.g., 
flight crew communication, cues on hazards; Maher, 2018), and research on flight crew 
communication (U. Fischer & Orasanu, 2000; Foushee & Manos, 1981; Nevile & Walker, 
2005; Orasanu & U. Fischer, 1992; Sassen, 2005; Sexton & Helmreich, 2000) indicates CVR 
transcripts can be used to analyse in-situ interactions between flight crew. Thus, utilising CVR 
data, we investigate the degree to which aviation accidents elicit safety voice, and address three 
outstanding issues. 
Safety voice during aviation accidents 
Safety voice occurs in the context of hazards, and the mitigation of risk through speaking-up 
is central to the concept of safety voice. Typically, hazards are operationalised through actual 
risk being hypothesised (e.g., for vignettes, simulations; Krenz et al., 2020; Schwappach & 
Gehring, 2014c) or controlled (e.g., for laboratory scenarios; Noort et al., 2019a). This revealed 
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that stronger risk perceptions (e.g., for missed hand disinfection) are associated with more 
safety voice (Gurung et al., 2017; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014a, 2014c). Yet, through 
presenting scenarios with minimal risk, perceived risks are assumed to generalise to risk during 
actual hazards. Because this remains undetermined, however (Krenz et al., 2020), we do not 
know the extent to which visceral responses to risk (e.g., dread, fear) elicit safety voice 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Noort et al., 2019a). Establishing this is important because 
behavioural variations can indicate when intervention may be successful (e.g., if power 
distance shapes safety voice). Conversely, very frequent or infrequent safety voice would 
suggest, respectively, that the behaviour is ineffectual and interventions should improve safety 
voice’s effectiveness (e.g., when recipients listen), or that speaking-up does not pose a problem 
for accident causation (e.g., because it always mitigates harm, or risk simply does not elicit 
safety voice in practice). 
We propose that actual hazards, and especially fatal accidents, lead to more safety voice 
than typically established in the literature (i.e., approximately 44% of concerns are raised; 
Noort et al., 2019b) because cognitive evaluations of risk and visceral affective states of dread 
motivate stronger behavioural responses to mitigate harm. Probabilistic risk models highlight 
that hazards emerge from the accumulation of sociotechnical factors (e.g., resourcing, systems 
design, unsafe acts; Leveson, 2011; Reason, 2000), with greater risks (i.e., impact and 
likelihood; Renn, 1992) increasing the need for mitigating action. Yet, technical properties of 
risk are often difficult to evaluate (e.g., because information is ambiguous; Viscusi & 
Zeckhauser, 2015) and the psychometric approach therefore highlights that the response to 
hazards is rooted in analytic and affective risk perceptions (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 2004). 
Visceral affective states emerge where encountered risks are fatal, involuntary and personally 
relevant, with affect heuristics providing a strong motivation to alter unsafe conditions 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic, 1987, 2016). This is important, because safety voice theory 
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often explains behaviour in terms of employee motivation (e.g., safety participation or safety 
citizenship; Christian et al., 2009), and little analysis has considered motivations that emerge 
from potentially fatal contexts. Furthermore, high costs of speaking-up may be rationally 
traded-off with the larger cost posed by fatalities (Noort et al., 2019b; Schwappach & Gehring, 
2014a) because the higher expected utility of speaking-up increases voice (Murphy & 
Dingwall, 2007b). Thus, and in contrast to the literature’s assumption that accidents emerge 
from relatively low levels of safety voice (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Enomoto & Geisler, 2017; 
Gladwell, 2008; Kolbe et al., 2012; Noort et al., 2019b; Soeters & Boer, 2000; Tucker et al., 
2008), flight crew may frequently engage in safety voice due to the extreme level of risk posed 
by aviation accidents. To investigate this, we ask: 1a) to what extent did flight crew engage in 
safety voice across historic aviation accidents? 
Furthermore, we examine whether flight crew engagement in safety voice prior to accidents 
has changed over the course of history. Within the safety literature, the training of interpersonal 
skills is widely seen as key for improving safety voice and safety-related attitudes (O’Connor 
et al., 2008), and in aviation such training has been in place since the early 1980s through the 
implementation of Crew Resource Management training programs (“CRM”; Helmreich et al., 
1999; Kanki et al., 2019). Over time, these training programs became widespread (O’Connor 
et al., 2008, 2012) and increased in effectiveness through emphasising the design of social 
environments (e.g., teamworking and organisational culture) in addition to the correction of 
human error (Helmreich et al., 1999). CRM implementation may therefore have increased 
flight crew engagement in safety voice, and establishing this within the CVR data may inform 
the effectiveness of interventions for increasing safety voice. Thus, we ask 1b) to what extent 
has safety voice increased during aviation accidents since the 1980s? 
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Poor safety listening 
Because safety voice is aimed at others of equal or senior status, the field has aimed to 
identify when leadership practices are favourable for speaking-up (Detert & Treviño, 2010). 
Ample research indicates that the extent to which seniors listen effectively to safety voice (e.g., 
acknowledging and acting on concerns, versus ignoring or dismissing concerns) promotes 
subsequent voice (Edmondson, 1999; Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006). For instance, junior 
staff are especially more likely to speak-up (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006), or to do this 
sooner (Krenz et al., 2020), when leaders are expected to listen (Edmondson, 1999; Newman 
et al., 2017) and indicate that speaking-up is appropriate through acting in inclusive and 
encouraging ways (Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Bienefeld & Grote, 2014; Weiss et al., 2018). 
However, seniors tend to poorly listen to advice from junior staff (e.g., due to the social cost 
of advice-taking; Tost et al., 2012). This suggests that even if safety voice occurs frequently it 
may not be listened to, with poor safety listening (i.e., ignoring or dismissing safety concerns) 
emerging when concerns are deemed inappropriate (e.g., when concerns are considered as 
factually incorrect or violating social norms; Kam & Bond, 2009). For instance, no relationship 
between safety voice and safety listening would indicate safety voice is better predicted by risk 
perceptions than acting in socially appropriate ways. Conversely, when poor safety listening 
reduces safety voice during accidents this would indicate that risk perceptions only partly 
explain safety voice and that social motivations shape the behaviour, even during extreme 
personal risk. If so, unique interventions are required for safety listening as a distinct 
contributor to accidents, and safety voice behaviour would be central to situated sense-making 
on risk: people share and decide on perceptions about encountered hazards, with voicing and 
listening to safety concerns providing two distinct aspects of a larger phenomenon capturing 
on-going, dynamic safety conversations. Evaluating safety listening is therefore important for 
conceptualising safety voice, and thus, we ask: 2a) to what extent does safety listening predict 
safety voice engagement for junior staff during aviation accidents? 
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Furthermore, we also examine whether safety listening has changed over the course of 
history for flight crew. CRM training goals include improving how leaders engage in effective 
coordination on safety information inside the cockpit (Kanki et al., 2019). Thus, because CRM 
became more widespread and effective (Helmreich et al., 1999; O’Connor et al., 2008, 2012), 
it may be expected that safety listening improved, and establishing this is important for 
enabling interventions that make safety voice more effective. Thus, we ask 2b) to what extent 
has safety listening improved during aviation accidents since the 1980s? 
The role of power distance 
Safety voice occurs in hazardous situations that provide technical and social factors 
contributing to risk (Reason, 1990; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2016), and safety voice may be 
shaped by norms that outline how juniors communicate concerns to seniors. Ample research 
indicates that egalitarian relationships between leaders and followers promote open 
communication, and whilst the operationalisation of culture through dimensions such as power 
distance is debated (e.g., dimensions underrepresent cultural heterogeneity; Hofstede, 2002; 
McSweeney, 2002), power distance has provided fruitful hypotheses to explain variation in 
indicators of safety performance such as accident rates (Enomoto & Geisler, 2017; Soeters & 
Boer, 2000), fatalities (Anicich et al., 2015) and safety culture (Reader et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, power distance has been considered in relationship to voice (Kwon et al., 
2016; Liang et al., 2012; Morrison, 2011, 2014; Wilkinson et al., 2020). For example, flat 
hierarchies (Frosch et al., 2012; e.g., Malloy et al., 2009; Noland & Carmack, 2015) and a 
constructive ‘tone at the top’ (M. S. Schwartz et al., 2005) promote safety voice, and evidence 
indicates that employee’s power distance orientation (an individual-level construct) reduces 
voice (Botero & Van Dyne, 2009; Huang et al., 2005; Landau, 2009; Rhee et al., 2014). 
Hofstede’s power distance (Hofstede et al., 2010) may therefore provide a valuable proxy for 
investigating both safety voice and safety listening on the flight deck. Yet, little behavioural 
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evidence exists, especially during actual hazards, because research on the individual-level 
metric of power distance orientation (Botero & Van Dyne, 2009; Huang et al., 2005; Landau, 
2009; Rhee et al., 2014) has only used survey-based data for recalled and anticipated voice (i.e. 
preventing conclusions on behaviour; Noort et al., 2019a) and nation-level studies on power 
distance have operationalised accidents instead of safety voice behaviours (Enomoto & Geisler, 
2017). 
The power distance proposition for accident causation suggests that power distance explains 
accidents rates (Enomoto & Geisler, 2017) because strong norms dictate deference to seniors’ 
authority on safety issues (Botero & Van Dyne, 2009), which are ultimately their accountability 
(Tucker et al., 2008). This reduces safety voice for junior flight crew (Gladwell, 2008) through 
high power distance “(i) discouraging the correction of errors by superiors, (ii) placing primacy 
of communication and debate on a superior, (iii) generating unwillingness to challenge 
authority, and (iv) creating asymmetrical communication between management and 
subordinates” (Reader et al., 2015; p.775). Additionally, safety listening may explain the 
relationship between power distance and safety voice because violating social norms can elicit 
anger (Kam & Bond, 2009) and the social cost for taking advice (e.g., appearing incompetent; 
Tost et al., 2012) may be higher and elicit stronger responses to juniors speaking-up where 
power distance is higher. However, in the absence of direct evidence, we currently do not know 
the role of power distance for safety voice and safety listening during critical incidents. Thus, 
here we examine whether wider social norms on power distance shaped behaviour in the 
cockpit, and ask: 3) to what degree does power distance explain safety voice and safety 
listening during historic aviation accidents? 
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Method 
Dataset 
A new dataset was generated from transcripts available in published air crash investigation 
reports. By January 2018, 372 transcripts were obtained from three online databases (Aviation-
Safety Network, 2019b; Plane Crash Info, 2019; Tailstrike, 2019). After removing duplicate, 
irretrievable and non-English transcripts, the final dataset contained 172 transcripts, with a total 
length of 21,626 lines of transcript.  
Data was extracted from included transcripts: i) flight number, ii) date of incident, iii) audio 
source, iv) airline country registration, v) incident airspace, vi) flight phase, vii) crew and 
passenger numbers, viii) fatalities, ix) damage, x) attributed causal factors, xi) transcript 
conversational turn, xii) speaker. To provide interpretative context, narrative summaries and 
legends were included. In addition, each transcript line was coded using transcript legends and 
a coding scheme in terms of: i) turn number (i.e., sequential within transcripts), ii) turn type 
(i.e., conversation, background sounds, notes/information), iii) conversational turn (i.e., 
sequential for conversation turns within transcripts), iv) person speaking (captain, first officer, 
flight engineer, flight crew with unclear role, cabin crew, air traffic control, other aircraft, 
ground operations, other), v) the hazard raised (i.e., if one was raised, using the words of the 
conversational turn), vi) how others listened to the hazard raised (action, affirmed, disaffirmed, 
ignored, unclear), and vii) the type of hazard based on air traffic control classification schemes 
(i.e., ATC interaction, Crew interaction, Distraction, Equipment/fuel, Location, Manoeuvring, 
Weather, Pilot actions, Planning, Company actions, Other/unclear; NATS, 2013)28. 
                                                 
28 The NATS causal factor scheme is specific to aviation incidents but may map unto typologies with a 
broader application. For instance, unto levels 1-3 of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000): 1) unsafe acts (Manoeuvring, Pilot actions), 2a) unsafe 
environmental preconditions (Weather, Location, Equipment/fuel), 2b) unsafe operator preconditions 
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Accidents in the dataset occurred between 1962 and 2018 with 97% of the cases leading to 
substantial damage or the destruction of aircraft, and fatalities totalling 11,001. A crude 
estimation puts this at approximately 15% of historical aviation fatalities in commercial and 
corporate aviation since 196229. Most accidents occurred on approach (32.0%) or en route 
(32.0%) and were attributed to pilot actions (32.6%), see Table 6.1. Flights had an average 
crew of 7.120 (SD = 5.182) and 89.701 passengers (SD = 97.018), with on average 42.095 
survivors (SD = 90.191). Included flights were from airlines registered in 42 countries with an 
average power distance of 49.103 (SD = 17.043; range: 11-104; skewness = 1.157, SE = .194). 
Transcript text was based on audio sources from Cockpit Voice Recorders and/or Air Traffic 
Control radio communication and existed of verbal conversational turns (n = 19,393, 
m = 112.750; SD = 124.829) and other data (n = 2213; m = 12.866; SD = 14.452; e.g., 
                                                 
(distraction), 2c) unsafe personnel preconditions (ATC interaction, Crew Interaction) and 3) unsafe 
supervision (Company actions, Planning). 
29 Aviation-Safety Network lists 66,682 historical fatalities in commercial and corporate flights 
between 1962-2018 (Aviation-Safety Network, 2019a), yet the full number of aviation fatalities is 
uncertain. 
Table 6.1. Attributed causes of included accidents. 
Attributed cause n Example 
Pilot actions 56 Error during demonstration flight of Air France 296Q. 
Equipment/fuel 37 Avianca 52 crashed after poorly managed fuel starvation. 
Crew interaction 33 Miscommunication about arming spoilers during landing 
contributed to the crash of Air Canada 621. 
Company actions 29 Poor CRM training provided an unfavourable environment that 
enabled TAM 3064 to crash due to poor coordination. 
Distractions 26 Whilst distracted by a malfunction in the nose landing indication 
system, Eastern 401 noticed an unexpected descent too late. 
Weather 26 American 1420 crashed whilst attempting to land in a thunderstorm. 
ATC interaction 18 Ambiguous radio communication led Air Inter 148 to hit a 
mountain. 
Planning 11 Poor de-icing protocols led to ingested ice, power loss and the crash 
of SAS 751. 
Manoeuvring 7 A test flight turned into a fatal stall for Airborne Express 827. 
Location 6 Texas International 655 crashed into a mountain whilst not fully 
using all available navigational tools. 
Other/unclear 22 A bomb hit Air India 182. 
n = 164 (8 missing). Total causes exceed 172 because multiple causes could be attributed. 
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background sounds, transcriber notes). Flight crews (i.e., captains, first officers, flight 
engineers) provided 74.3% of the conversational turns (see Table 6.2). For the current study, 
analyses were performed on conversational turns from flight crew with an identified role (i.e., 
conversational turns from captains, first officers, flight engineers; n = 14,128), with transcripts 
averaging 106.001 conversational turns (SD = 51.727, range: 1-641). Four transcripts had less 
than 5 conversational turns. The full and coded dataset is provided as supplemental material. 
Measures 
Safety voice. Research assistants were trained on recognising safety voice through 
discussing illustrative examples and problematic cases, and the application of the coding 
scheme. They coded whether each conversational turn contained a hazard and described the 
hazard. If a turn contained a hazard this was coded as safety voice (1), otherwise this was coded 
as not safety voice (0) instead of ‘safety silence’ (i.e., this requires data on the extent to which 
flight crew were concerned). Illustrative examples are provided in Table 6.3. Good interrater 
reliability for safety voice was indicated for two randomly selected transcripts providing 291 
conversational turns (Gwet AC1 = .62, 95CI: .53-.71). 
Table 6.2. Frequencies of role for speakers of conversational turns. 
Speaker n Percentage 
Captain 6725 35.44% 
Junior flight crew 7403 39.00% 
Flight crew (role unclear) 1027 5.43% 
Cabin crew 215 1.13% 
Air traffic control 2575 13.61% 
Other aircraft 476 2.52% 
Ground operations 236 1.25% 
Other 310 1.64% 
Missing 471 - 
Total conversational turns 19393 
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Seniority. Seniority for flight crew was calculated based on the speaker of a conversational 
turn being senior (captain) or junior (first officer, flight engineer). Due to technical progression 
of aircraft, flight engineers have become less prevalent and the junior flight crew roles were 
therefore collapsed. 
 Power Distance. Power distance was operationalised through Hofstede’s Power Distance 
Index (PDI; Hofstede et al., 2010). PDI scores from 2015 (Hofstede, 2015) were obtained for 
airlines’ country registration where available, bar a United Nations flight. 
Safety listening. For every conversational turn containing safety voice, research assistants 
coded how others responded within the following three conversational turns (for illustrative 
Table 6.3. Illustrative extracts from CVR transcripts for safety voice and response to safety voice. 
Behaviour Response CVR transcript extract 
Case Speaker Conversational turn 
Not safety 
voice 
n/a Korean Air 
8509 
FE Before take-off check list complete 
FE Stabilized 






FO* I think you're... according to that runway you 
look like you're high. 
CAP** Now it's okay. 
FO Slightly left of runway. 
CAP Okay. 
Ignored Air Canada 
621 
 
FO* Here we have a green. The VASIS appear to be 
a little bit high but you are low on the glide 
path 
FO Takes a whole airfield that way 
CAP Yeah 
CAP** Okay 
Affirmed Tower Air 
41 
FO* I don't guess you'll be able to get much of a 
run-up. 
CAP** No. Just do the best we can. If it starts to move, 
we're going to take it. 
FO I see an airplane looks like it's clear down the 
end. 






CAP We can’t make Troutdale 
FO* We can’t make anything 
CAP** Okay, declare a mayday 
FO 
(Radio) 
Portland tower United one seventy-three heavy 
Mayday we’re, the engines are flaming out, 
we’re going down, we’re not going to be able to 
make the airport 
* Conversational turn containing safety voice. ** Key message for the response. CAP: Captain, FO: 
First Officer, FE: Flight Engineer. 
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examples, see Table 6.2). If a response to safety voice remained absent it was coded as ignored 
(0), if others disagreed or responded negatively it was coded as disaffirmed (-1), and favourable 
responses were coded as verbally affirmed (1) or immediate action (2). Indicating construct 
validity, poor safety listening was associated with accident investigation reports attributing the 
accident to poor crew communication (Spearman r = -.156, p = .050). 
Results  
Safety voice during aviation accidents 
Flight crew engaged in safety voice across accidents, but the degree of safety voice was low 
within transcripts. Safety voice occurred in all but two of the accidents (95CI: 97.2-100.5%), 
with only two accidents having no instances of safety voice (i.e., Air India 182, TAM 3054). 
This was not different from 100% (t(170) = -1.418, p = .158). Safety voice comprised 9.78% 
of the conversational turns (95CI: 9.29-10.27%; t(14085) = 390.065, p < .001) and was skewed 
towards no safety voice (skewness = 2.709, SE = .021). The proportion safety voice for flights 
where someone spoke-up, and that contained more than five conversational turns, ranged from 
1.13% (Asiana Airlines 214) to 67.3% (PSA 182). 
The degree to which flight crew engaged in safety voice changed over time, but surprisingly 
the degree of safety voice became less overall (OR = .925, Wald(1) = 810.191, p < .001), see 
Figure 6.2. This was consistent with accidents over time being more frequently attributed to 
poor crew interaction (OR = 1.065, Wald(1) = 9.387, p = .002). Flight crew were especially 
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less likely to engage in safety voice during historic accidents after the introduction of CRM in 
approximately 198130 (OR = .114, Wald(1) = 619.810, p < .001).  
Given the very high number of safety voice acts identified, we describe some of the cases 
to illustrate that the effectiveness of voice depends upon the constraints of the technical 
systems, and crew responses to voice. Often, crews voiced concerns after the point at which 
they could be addressed. For instance, USAF 27, where the co-pilot referred to the potential 
for bird strike by saying “lot of birds here”. The captain acknowledged (“Lotta birds here”), 
however the crew were unable to respond quickly enough to the hazard (which air traffic 
control had neglected to raise awareness of), leading to the loss of 4 crew and 20 passengers. 
In another case (SAS 751), the first officer voiced several times during an ongoing event (e.g., 
"We have problems with our engines, please... we need to go back to, ... to go back to Arlanda"), 
and despite the crew recognising the problem they could not resolve it because the problem 
                                                 
30 The year 1981 was chosen because CRM programs emerged in the early 1980s (Kanki et al., 2019). 
Yet, it should be noted that CRM was not simultaneously introduced across airlines. 
Figure 6.2. Historic trends of the proportion of safety voice and average response to safety voice 
within CVR transcripts. 
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was an underlying technical issue (ice on the wings). Finally, in another case, Saudia 163, 
safety voice was repeatedly engaged in (e.g., by the first officer continually raising concerns 
about smoke in the cabin). The captain and crew responded to this, however a lack of 
coordination amongst the crew rather than dismissal of safety voice was found to lead to the 
accident. 
Poor safety listening  
In general, poor safety listening reduced the overall proportion of safety voice in a transcript 
(β = -.200, F(1,156) = 6.499, p = .012, R2 = .040) and specifically for junior flight crew 
speaking-up (β = -.212, F(1,109) = 5.105, p = .026, R2 = .045). Listening behaviours 
(n = 1090) tended to be favourable but varied across accidents (M = .821; SE = .022; 
t(1089) = 37.665, p < .001): 82 accidents (e.g., Alaska airlines 261) only saw effective safety 
listening, 3 only one negative response (i.e., Aviation services, Crossair 498, Martinair 492), 
and 33 accidents saw repeated poor listening (range: 2-33 times; e.g., Texas International 655). 
Junior flight crew were listened to less, compared to senior flight crew (F(1,1088) = 4.590, 
p = .032, η2 = .004). Safety listening became more favourable over time (F(1,1080) = 26.621, 
p < .001, R2 = .024), with the introduction of CRM providing a strong historic turning point 
because listening became more favourable on average after this (F(1,1080) = 18.142, p < .001, 
η2 = .563), see Figure 6.2. 
To illustrate the nature of safety listening, we report on exemplar cases in which voice was 
ignored or dismissed. For instance, in Kalitta 808 which crashed due to a stall, two voice acts 
by a flight engineer about low airspeed ("You know, we're not getting our airspeed back there" 
and "Watch the, keep your airspeed up") were ignored by the crew, who were focussed on 
identifying the strobe light for landing (e.g., in response to concerns the captain asked "Where's 
the strobe?"). Similarly, for flight TWA 514 which crashed due to flying at an unsafe altitude, 
repeated attempts by the first officer to share concerns about the altitude measurement ("I hate 
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the altitude jumping around"; "Gives you a headache after a while, watching this jumping 
around like that") were not acknowledged by the captain, who was focussed on visually 
identifying the ground. In other cases, safety voice led to disagreement: during landing in a 
Metro II aircraft the first office voiced on the landing gear "is it down?", which led to confusion 
between the captain ("yeah gear's down") and the co-pilot ("No its up") which was not resolved 
in time. Similarly, in the case of Aeroflot 9981, a co-pilot's request to disengage from a 
dangerous landing ("No, let's...go around") was dismissed by the pilot ("Why are we going 
around?"), who then confirmed the action too late ("Tell them "go around").  
The role of power distance 
Power distance only explained the extent of safety voice, but not safety listening. The 
proportion of safety voice in a transcript was not predicted by direct effects for the seniority of 
the voicer (OR = 1.010, Wald(1) = .024, p = .877) and power distance (OR = .998, 
Wald(1) = .619, p = .431), and as shown in Table 6.3, this emerged due to an interaction-effect 
between seniority and power distance on safety voice (OR = 1.015, Wald(1) = 10.048, 
p = .002). Indicating that norms for engaging with seniors shape safety voice, power distance 
had a negative association with safety voice (Spearman r = -.034, p < .001)31, and only 
predicted safety voice for junior flight crew in low power distance countries (OR = .990, 
Wald(1) = 7.845, p = .005), but not for senior flight crew (OR = 1.005, Wald(1) = 2.538, 
p = .111). To illustrate this interaction: junior flight crew were 1.653 times less likely to engage 
safety voice with a 50-point increase in power distance (i.e., half the scale). Moreover, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.3, the identified historic decline in the extent of safety voice was 
especially strong for low power distance countries: a strong interaction-effect existed for power 
                                                 
31 The relationship between power distance and safety voice was estimated to be quadratic, with the 
likelihood for a conversational turn containing safety voice = .393 – .012(PDI) + 9.859*10-5(PDI2), 
F(2,12929) = 35.167, p < .001. 
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distance and year on the likelihood that a conversational turn involved safety voice 
(OR = 1.003, Wald(1) = 98.583, p < .001) and the amount of safety voice in a transcript 
(F(34,50) = 3.262, p < .001, η2 = .689).  
Surprisingly, power distance was not associated with poor safety listening to junior flight 
crew speaking-up (r = -.041, p = .681), with only a weak association (Spearman’s 
r = -.071, p = .033) indicating that voice may have been less ignored in high power distance 
airlines because it involved a more extreme act. Furthermore, safety listening did not explain 
the effect of power distance on safety voice because no mediation-effect was found in general 
(b = .000, SE = .002, 95CI: -.004 – .005) or for junior flight crew specifically (b = .008, 
SE = .025, 95CI: -.028 – .071), and no interaction-effects existed for power distance with 
seniority on safety listening (F(20,866) = 1.297, p = .172, η2 = .029) and with safety listening 
on the proportion of safety voice in a transcript (F(1,141) = .540, p = .464, η2 = .004). 
However, and consistent with the reduction in safety voice, an interaction-effect indicated that 
Figure 6.3. The probability of a conversational turn involving safety voice given the year of 
the accident and airline power distance. 
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safety listening only became more favourable over time for low power distance airlines 
(F(22,829) = 2.057, p = .003, η2 = .052). 
Discussion 
Through providing the first systematic and behavioural analysis of safety voice prior to 
aviation accidents, we demonstrated that safety-critical staff nearly always speak-up across 
hazardous situations. Safety voice was frequently listened to poorly, and this reduced the 
amount of safety voice in the lead-up to accidents. Confirming previous propositions, power 
distance explained the extent of safety voice, but no effect was found for safety listening. 
Moreover, the introduction of CRM training only led to historic changes in safety voice where 
power distance was low. These findings have important implications for safety voice theory 
and safety management. 
Theoretical implications 
We provided the first evidence that people engage in real safety voice behaviour during 
genuine accidents, and indicated they do this nearly always across accidents. This is important 
because the safety voice literature has assumed that accidents can emerge from a lack of safety 
voice (Kolbe et al., 2012; Noort et al., 2019b; Tucker et al., 2008), yet we indicated that 
accidents still occurred despite flight crew speaking-up. Thus, in contrast to prevailing thought, 
we indicate that accidents cannot be assumed to emerge from a lack of safety voice, or that the 
behaviour is sufficient for avoiding harm. This means that through relying on selective case 
studies, inquests and studies operationalising hazards (Anicich et al., 2015; Driscoll, 2002; 
Enomoto & Geisler, 2017; Francis, 2013, 2015; Soeters & Boer, 2000), research has provided 
insufficient insights on behaviour in the field and wrongly assumed the central problem is an 
absence of safety voice. Research should therefore be grounded in the analysis of safety voice 
during actual hazards, and progress from making safety voice more likely to making safety 
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voice more effective (i.e., for preventing harmful outcomes; Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Kolbe 
et al., 2012).  
Most importantly, we indicated that safety concerns were often ignored or rejected, and this 
suggests that safety listening may be conceptualised as an essential step in the chain between 
hazards eliciting concerns, people raising concerns and threats being mitigated (see Figure 6.4). 
This is important for making safety voice more effective because whilst the safety voice 
literature has established that anticipated responses from leaders are important (Barzallo 
Salazar et al., 2014; Bienefeld & Grote, 2014; Edmondson, 1999; Krenz et al., 2020; Nembhard 
& Edmondson, 2006; Newman et al., 2017; Weiss et al., 2018) it has underdeveloped the role 
of safety listening. Part of listening effectively to safety voice is responding in constructive 
ways (e.g., taking action, demonstrating personal interest; Detert & Burris, 2007), which may 
confirm risk perceptions and enables more voice (Lin & R. E. Johnson, 2015), and we support 
the generalisation of research on leaders’ poor safety listening from controlled environments 
(e.g., Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Weiss et al., 2018) through demonstrating that the degree 
to which flight crew spoke-up during aviation accidents was lower when concerns were poorly 
listened to. Thus we enable the application of concepts such as psychological safety 
(Edmondson & Lei, 2014) and advice taking (Tost et al., 2012) to real accidents, and we suggest 
future research investigates how safety voice can be made more effective through 
distinguishing between safety voice and safety listening, and the design of interventions that 
enable recipients to enact change (Barlow et al., 2019). For instance, through exploring how 
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the concept of loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) explains effective listening when 
people perceive risk.  
Our findings are consistent with the notion that the perception of risk provides motivation 
for sharing situational awareness and initiating decision-making (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; 
Christian et al., 2009; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic, 1987), and support vignette-based and 
experimental findings indicating that risk is central to safety voice (Noort et al., 2019a; 
Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c). However, few safety voice studies have assessed risk or 
delineated leading indicators of accidents (e.g., unsafe acts, or their preconditions; Reason, 
1990; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2016). Yet, because we indicated that safety voice is more 
prevalent during accident than typically established in the literature32, this indicates a need for 
outlining how findings from other methodologies (e.g., surveys, interviews, experiments; 
Noort et al., 2019b) may be mapped unto real hazards in terms of distinct sociotechnical risk 
factors (Appelbaum, 1997). For instance, future studies may enable the comparison of safety 
voice and safety listening across hazardous situations through carefully describing how hazard 
                                                 
32 A one-sample T-test revealed the proportion safety voice was significantly different from literatures 
indicating people only speak-up in 44% of the cases in which they are concerned (t(170) = 66.494, 
p < .001). 
Figure 6.4. Threat Mitigation model of safety voice.  
Note: the model highlights that the dysfunctional momentum of threats towards accident (Barton 
& Sutcliffe, 2009) can be mitigated (dotted line), when threats elicit higher degrees of safety 
concerns, safety voice and safety listening.  
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characteristics (i.e., in terms of technical or physical properties and levels of risk) elicit visceral 
states which are difficult to recall or forecast (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Noort et al., 2019a). 
In addition, we showed that whilst safety voice occurred across accidents, the amount of 
safety voice varied across transcripts. This is important for safety voice theory because it 
confirms that factors beyond physical risk influence the degree to which people speak-up about 
safety (Noort et al., 2019b) and thus, whilst it is essential to increase the effectiveness of the 
behaviour, scope remains for increasing the degree to which people speak-up. In particular, 
whilst leader behaviours (e.g., power distance, leadership styles) have been proposed to cause 
accidents through reducing safety voice (Gladwell, 2008; Kwon et al., 2016; Liang et al., 2012; 
Morrison, 2011, 2014; Wilkinson et al., 2020), we provided the first direct and systematic 
evidence that social structures can reduce safety voice during actual accidents. Additionally, 
we provide an important nuance to the power distance proposition for accident causation 
through highlighting that power distance reduces safety voice, but not through leaders listening 
more poorly in high distance environments. Thus, we confirm research indicating that power 
distance contributes to accident rates (Enomoto & Geisler, 2017; Soeters & Boer, 2000), 
evidence the generalisability of findings on the individual level construct of power distance 
orientation (Botero & Van Dyne, 2009) to influences on safety voice within safety-critical 
teams, and indicate the need to investigate how power distance and safety listening 
independently reduce safety voice. Moreover, we make tractable the investigation of 
established safety voice antecedents (e.g., leaders using inclusive language; Weiss et al., 2018) 
and interventions (e.g., education-based training; O’Donovan & McAuliffe, 2020) during real-
life hazards. Finally, this contributes to the wider safety management literature (e.g., risk 
perception, safety citizenship, safety culture; Didla et al., 2009; Guldenmund, 2000; Slovic, 
1987) through indicating that the investigation of sedentary risks (e.g., on behaviours that 
maintain relatively stable risk) may be supplemented by the investigation of safety voice and 
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safety listening because it provides access to social mechanisms explaining how people 
communicate during emergencies. 
Fourth, we indicated that the introduction of CRM provided a good explanation of historic 
trends in safety voice and safety listening, yet we found that safety voice declined over time. 
This is surprising because it contradicts the literature that suggests CRM improves speaking-up 
(Kanki et al., 2019), but it may be explained by CRM improving safety listening (e.g., through 
increases psychological safety; Edmondson, 1999) and thus reducing the need for repeated 
safety voice (i.e., because cooperative relationships increase shared situational awareness; 
Driscoll, 2002; Foushee, 1984) or even preventing accidents (and thus the inclusion in the 
dataset). This would support the use of CRM training, and through providing the first evidence 
on reduced effectiveness of CRM in higher power distance contexts, we indicated a need for 
research to improve CRM training across cultural contexts.  
Finally, investigating safety voice and safety listening through a cultural lens can extend 
safety voice theory through the identification of additional cultural predictors of safety voice. 
Safety voice research has rarely done this (Noort et al., 2019b), but this would be valuable for 
the design of new interventions. Future research may identify cross-cultural differences in 
safety voice due to face-saving (Mao, 1994), global differences in leadership values and 
practices (House et al., 2004), or other national culture dimensions (e.g., individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, long-term orientation; Hofstede et al., 2010). Yet, it may 
prove more optimal to develop the concept of safety voice as an integral activity to 
organisational politics (Antonsen, 2009) and sense-making on risk (Douglas, 1992; Weick, 
1995). These approaches describe how cultural processes emerge in response to challenges for 
dealing with risk, and adopting them may extend existing perspectives (e.g., highlighting that 
safety voice results from voice climate; Morrison et al., 2011) through indicating how safety 
voice and safety listening dynamically constitute safety culture. For instance, through 
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longitudinal investigations on the sense-making process through which the behaviours lead to 
institutional change. 
Practical implications 
Our results have practical implication for safety management and safety-critical teams. First, 
unlike previously assumed (Kolbe et al., 2012; Noort et al., 2019b; Tucker et al., 2008), safety 
voice occurs during accidents but its effectiveness for avoiding harm needs to improve: we 
indicated a gap between safety voice and the mitigation of harm. This means that whilst safety 
voice is necessary for avoiding accidents, it provides incomplete protection (e.g., in terms of 
Reason’s Swiss Cheese model; Reason, 1990) without practitioners recognising and 
responding appropriately to concerns raised (e.g., through engaging in open conversation, 
taking action). Thus, whilst safety voice contributes to the mitigation of risk, steps need to be 
evaluated for increasing the effectiveness of safety voice, for instance through improving safety 
listening, and this should be incorporated into training programs such as CRM (Kanki et al., 
2019). 
Second, our findings support the scope and benefit of CRM training programs. This is 
because variation in the degree of safety voice during accidents indicates interventions may 
improve the behaviour, and the historic introduction of CRM led to better safety listening and, 
as argued above, safety voice. However, whilst research has indicated the impact of cultural 
norms on safety behaviours and accidents (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996; Reader et al., 2015; 
Soeters & Boer, 2000), we indicated that CRM training remains insufficiently tailored to high 
power distance environments. This is especially pressing for safety management in these 
environments because research indicates that accidents are more likely where norms do not 
support egalitarian interactions (Enomoto & Geisler, 2017). After research increasing CRM’s 
overall effectiveness (Helmreich et al., 1990), the next phase of CRM implementation should 
therefore tailor training programs to specific environments. 
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Limitations 
Four limitations exist for the current study. Below we suggest how these may be addressed 
and indicate steps for future research utilising the CVR dataset. 
First, the quality of the dataset is dependent on included CVR transcripts, the condition of 
the source files after accidents occurred, and the standard of transcription (Sassen, 2005). 
Included transcripts were available at the online databases and written in English, and other 
transcripts may have been missed. However, the dataset incorporated approximately 15% of 
commercial and corporate aviation fatalities since 1962 and thus the data provides substantial 
coverage of known cases. Not all original audio files were accessible, and we needed to assume 
reasonable transcription accuracy. We suggest this is appropriate because providing accurate 
transcripts is in the interest of accident investigations, and transcription uncertainties were 
indicated in the transcripts (e.g., ‘unintelligible’). Future research may enhance the dataset 
through extending the number of transcripts (e.g., new accidents, or from alternative sources), 
or directly testing the transcription quality. 
Second, the analyses only enable tentative conclusions on the occurrence of safety silence 
and outcomes. We demonstrated a high degree of safety voice across accidents and because 
people speak-up in response to perceived hazards (Noort et al., 2019a) it is highly probable that 
flight crew spoke-up because they perceived risk during the accidents. However, whilst 
conclusions on the extent of safety voice were possible, the absence of safety voice does not 
readily constitute safety silence (i.e., flight crew may not speak-up because they are not 
concerned; Noort et al., 2019a). Future research may investigate text-based measures for 
assessing safety concerns in flight crew speech and apply these to establish conclusions on 
safety silence. Additionally, normal flights and near-misses were not included in the dataset 
and this means that conclusions are not straightforward on the extent that safety voice would 
have avoided harm. Because of this the attribution of blame is not only undesirable, but invalid. 
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Safety voice theory may advance considerably through establishing how safety voice enables 
the avoidance of harm, and this may be optimally achieved through triangulating the CVR 
dataset with near-misses and safety performance data (Blanco et al., 2009). 
Third, we established good interrater reliability for safety voice, yet this was based on a 
small subset of the data and interrater reliability may be different for the complete dataset. We 
aimed to provide consistent coding through employing research assistants highly familiar with 
observing safety voice and providing substantive training on the CVR data, and provided the 
CVR dataset for future research.  
Finally, the appropriateness of using Hofstede’s dimensions has been debated (Hofstede, 
2002; McSweeney, 2002). People within countries display a broad range of psychological 
tendencies (Kitayama et al., 2009), and whilst cultures remain relatively stable, 172 accidents 
may not reflect the heterogeneity of cultures. We suggested that national-level data may be 
used as a proxy for power distance on the flight deck, and through presenting variation in the 
degree to which people raise concerns across 14,128 conversational turns from pilots from 42 
countries we provide a first step in this direction. The literature may further reduce potential 
biases from homogenous samples through replicating these findings for other hazards and 
industries. 
Conclusion 
Safety voice is theorised as an important mitigating factor for maintaining safety, but 
behavioural research during actual hazards has been scant. We showed that historic accidents 
that posed fatal risk elicited high levels of safety voice, but variation in the degree to which 
safety voice dominated conversations for junior flight crew was reduced by poor safety 
listening and high power distance. We showed that the literature cannot assume that safety 
voice does not occur during accidents or that it is sufficient for avoiding harm: accidents 
occurred despite high degrees of safety voice and a need exists to improve the effectiveness of 
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safety voice through enabling people to listen more effectively to safety voice. This is 
especially important for tailoring CRM training programs to high power distance 
environments. Across sociocultural contexts, people mitigate hazards through engaging in 
conversation with others, and the field needs to incorporate how people enact safety voice 
because raising and listening to safety concerns provide unique challenges for avoiding 
accidents. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
Safety voice (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Conchie et al., 2012; Tucker et al., 2008) contributes 
to the prevention of injuries and accidents through people making sense of how perceived risk 
from hazards may be mitigated. The safety voice literature has stressed that interventions are 
needed because coordination on safety is challenging and well-intended individuals often fail 
to speak-up upon encountering safety threats (Conchie et al., 2012), with safety silence being 
identified as contributing to tragic accidents across safety-critical industries (e.g., healthcare, 
energey, aerospace; Bromiley & Mitchell, 2009; e.g., Moorhead et al., 1991; NTSB, 1978; 
Reader & O’Connor, 2014). Thus, and by drawing predominantly from safety management 
(e.g., safety culture; Guldenmund, 2000) and voice research (e.g., employee voice; Hirschman, 
1970; Morrison, 2011) and adopting positivist approaches (Kenny et al., 2020), the literature 
has treated safety voice as a key factor in understanding accident causation (e.g., by using 
illustrative examples of tragic mishaps; Bienefeld & Grote, 2012) and has indicated that the 
likelihood of people raising safety concerns can be increased by favourable antecedents (e.g., 
psychological safety, favourable leader behaviours; Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016; Weiss et 
al., 2018). In this thesis, I contributed towards safety management by providing a unified and 
distinct concept of safety voice, and highlighting that safety voice may be investigated within 
sociotechnical approaches (Appelbaum, 1997; Leveson, 2002; Reason, 2000) because I 
provided the first systematic evidence that the phenomenon is highly ecological and situated in 
the social and technical characteristics of hazardous scenarios. 
To date, the safety voice literature has remained disintegrated and has not clarified to what 
extent safety voice is relevant for understanding why accidents occur. In particular, whilst 
safety management theories have incorporated concepts and measures that capture safety voice 
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(e.g., Julian Barling et al., 2002; Didla et al., 2009; Guldenmund, 2000; Neal & M. A. Griffin, 
2004; Zohar, 1980), it remains unclear how safety voice should be optimally conceptualised, 
assessed and intervened in. Accordingly, in this thesis, across four articles, I undertook fourteen 
studies (nparticipants = 1,222, narchival = 220) that contributed insights towards three research 
questions (see Table 1.1): 1) What is the behavioural nature of safety voice?; 2) What is the 
optimal way to investigate safety voice behaviour?; and, 3) To what extent do interventions for 
promoting safety voice and reducing safety silence need to be tailored to the behavioural 
nature of safety voice?  
In summary, these studies evidenced that safety voice is highly situated in hazards and social 
interactions: the behavioural nature of safety voice can be conceptualised in ecological terms 
across levels of analysis (e.g., hazards, teams, organisations, Chapter 3), and as i) contingent 
upon hazardous situations in terms of temporal development and risk (e.g., risk eliciting safety 
concerns; Chapters 3-6), ii) manifested in the degree to which concerned individuals engage in 
safety voice speech that varies according to contextually relevant themes (i.e., safety 
knowledge and motivations) and the temporal progression of hazardous scenarios (Chapter 5), 
and iii) dependent on favourable behaviours from others (e.g., safety listening) for mitigating 
accidents in hypothetical and real hazardous scenarios (Chapters 4-6). As I highlighted within 
the four presented articles, these findings contribute in important ways to research on safety 
voice and safety management and have contributed towards the development of the Threat 
Mitigation Model of safety concerns, safety voice and safety listening (see Figure 7.1). Below, 
I briefly summarise specific contributions to the safety voice and safety management literatures 
before zooming out to the broader implications for theory, method and interventions. 
Overview of specific contributions 
First, the proposed ecological framework for safety voice provides the first systematic 
delineation of safety voice across levels of analysis. This is important because the systematic 
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literature review revealed that safety voice research is grounded in distinct safety (Aydon et 
al., 2016; Guldenmund, 2000; Haavik et al., 2015; H. L. Johnson & Kimsey, 2012; Lyndon, 
2008; Reason, 1990) and communication research (e.g., Hirsschman’s EVL framework, 
Morrison’s employee voice; Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Hirschman, 1970; Morrison, 2011; 
Okuyama et al., 2014; Tucker et al., 2008). These have previously conceptualised multi-level 
models (e.g., the Swiss Cheese Model; Reason, 1990), yet safety voice research has not clearly 
delineated findings across levels of analysis (Morrow et al., 2016; Okuyama et al., 2014). Thus, 
by providing an integrated concept that is delineated across levels of analysis, I enable the 
application of Erez and Gati’s conceptualisation of multiple layers of analysis (Erez & Gati, 
2004) to the safety voice literature, and the investigation of safety voice within systems 
perspectives of safety management (Leveson, 2011; Reason, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2016) that incorporate immediate (e.g., hazard and individual antecedents) and leading 
indicators of safety voice (e.g., antecedents related to the institution and external context).  
Furthermore, previous research had not evidenced how safety voice behaviour is related to 
the perception of risk (i.e., to my awareness only one study has established how risk perceptions 
shape safety voice; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c) or the progression of time (i.e., studies 
have not delineated phases of hazards, or associated these with interventions; Farh & Chen, 
2018; Krenz et al., 2020), and had not provided a systematic analysis of safety voice behaviour 
during actual accidents (Krenz et al., 2020). Thus, by evidencing that safety voice is highly 
contingent upon the characteristics of hazards (e.g., risk, time, others’ behaviour) in 
experimental scenarios and the field (i.e., aviation accidents), I underscore the importance of 
the literature to ground safety voice research in real accidents and assess risk perceptions to 
enable insights into the generalisability to high-stakes hazards. In particular, the literature had 
provided valuable but limited evidence on the manifestation of safety voice in speech (i.e., 
studies have provided limited insights into the words used; Krenz et al., 2019), and no 
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systematic evaluation existed on safety silence and safety listening. I demonstrated that 
conceptualising safety silence based on the extent to which people that perceive risk engage in 
distinct types of safety voice speech is essential for designing successful interventions. 
Moreover, conceptualising safety listening is essential for understanding how safety voice can 
be effective in mitigating accidents. 
Furthermore, in terms of methods, I identified that the literature has produced valuable 
insights through post-hoc and self-report measures (see Chapter 3; e.g., the themes people use 
to describe their safety voice/silence; Morrow et al., 2016) and would benefit from direct 
behavioural observations (e.g., through experiments or analysis of archives containing field-
based safety voice) that make tractable the testing of new hypotheses (see Chapters 4-6). In 
particular, few paradigms existed for conducting laboratory experiments on safety voice 
(Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Hodges, 2018) and their limitations were unclear. Thus, by 
evaluating the Walking the Plank paradigm I provided a new experimental paradigm and 
demonstrated that safety voice experiments can overcome the literature’s methodological and 
ethical challenges for assessing the behavioural nature of safety voice, overcoming the reliance 
on memory and imagination and establishing causal relationships (see Chapters 4 and 5). In 
addition, I illustrated how the investigation of safety voice may obtain empirical and ethical 
insights into the nature of the behaviour during real-life hazards by investigating historic 
accidents (see Chapters 2 and 6), and underscored the importance by revealing that real hazards 
elicit substantially more safety voice compared to the average levels of safety voice found in 
the literature (i.e., ±44%; see Chapters 3 and 6). 
Finally, O’Donnovan and McAuliffe (2020) indicated that the safety voice literature has 
only had mixed success for safety voice interventions, and I revealed that this may be explained 
because the prevailing literature has rarely accounted for the extent to which interventions are 
shaped by the relationship between safety voice and hazardous situations (e.g., risk perceptions, 
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actual hazards, temporal progression of hazards). I revealed that this is essential for improving 
intervention success because safety voice can be conceptualised as ecological and contingent 
upon hazardous situations: safety voice measures and interventions need to account for the 
degree to which people are concerned about hazards (i.e., to establish safety silence) and how 
others listen to safety concerns, and tailor designs to the intended context and stage of hazards 
(e.g., national culture, conceptualisation stage; see Chapters 4-6).  
These specific contributions to the literature provide an integrated concept for safety voice 
and a new direction for research (e.g., closing gaps revealed in the ecological framework, 
directly observing behaviour to characterise the behavioural nature of safety voice, integrating 
related concepts on voice and harm-prevention, evaluating the extent to which research has 
accurately operationalised safety silence, see Chapter 3-6). Moreover, they indicate broader 
contributions to theory, method and the application of safety voice to safety management. 
Implications for theory and methods 
In addition to the specific contributions identified and summarised in the articles, an analysis 
of these contributions highlights more broad ranging implications for theory and method 
related to safety voice and safety management. Thus, and to avoid repeating the previous 
chapters, here I zoom out and evaluate the wider implications of my findings for 
conceptualising and assessing safety voice. Based on this, I suggest new directions for research. 
Safety voice provides a unique concept, but draws on intersecting ideas 
By systematically reviewing research capturing safety voice behaviour, I demonstrated that 
the concept of safety voice draws upon research across diverse domains (i.e., safety, 
communication and team-working) and methodologies (e.g., ethnography, surveys, 
simulations). The specific focus on safety voice behaviour enabled the synthesis of evidence, 
the provision of an integrated definition, a proposal for a unified framework and a conceptual 
comparison with employee voice. This is important for advancing safety voice theory because 
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previous systematic literature reviews did not outline the range of theoretical backgrounds 
(Morrow et al., 2016; Okuyama et al., 2014). This indicates that distinct voice and safety 
domains draw on intersecting ideas (especially on the act of speaking-up) and I therefore 
support the argument by Wilkinson and colleagues (2020) that a conversion of terminology 
and models should be evaluated. However, and confirming Tucker and colleagues’ (2008) 
proposition, I showed that integration of concepts may not be straightforward because safety 
voice provides unique scope (see Chapter 3) and data (i.e., Chapter 4 highlighted that employee 
voice was not associated with safety voice) compared to employee voice (Morrison, 2011, 
2014). For safety voice theory, this means that whilst frameworks may be proposed by drawing 
on related research, I indicate a conceptual gap: it is unclear how concepts drawing on similar 
ideas can provide different empirical findings.  
I contributed towards conceptualising the distinction between employee voice and safety 
voice, and this may feed into a Delphi study (Linstone & Turoff, 1975) to build an integrated 
voice model explaining variation across voice concepts. For instance, and arguably, future 
research may contribute a single model that clarifies how distinct voice concepts emerge from 
variation in terms of the context (e.g., hazards, organisations), content of speech (e.g., 
expressed themes; promotive or prohibitive voice, Liang et al., 2012), motive (e.g., Brinsfield, 
2013; Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016), voicer (e.g., bystanders; P. Fischer et al., 2011), 
recipients (e.g., authority figures or equals; Kaposi, 2017; Wu Liu et al., 2010), timing (e.g., 
hazard stages, duration until voice occurs; Krenz et al., 2020) and outcomes (e.g., Bashshur & 
Oc, 2014).  
Thus, and addressing the need identified by Wilkinson and colleagues (2020) for evaluating 
and integrating intersecting ideas on voice, Figure 7.1 provides a model for how voice can 
mitigate threats (e.g., poor working conditions, unsafe operation) in order to avoid failures 
(e.g., accidents, organisational decline, etc.). This conceptual model integrates concepts and 
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evidence developed and outlined in the previous chapters, highlights the advancements in 
knowledge compared to the safety voice literature, and underscores the essential role of safety 
concerns (see Chapter 4-5), safety-related content (see Chapter 5) and listening by others (see 
Chapter 6). Thus, it adds to safety management by highlighting how principles of Reason’s 
Swiss Cheese model (e.g., that safety management provides different layers of threat 
mitigation; Reason, 1990) can be applied to voice behaviours, with concerns, voice and 
listening providing distinct, and stacked, factors for understanding how failure (e.g., accidents) 
may be mitigated. Thus, this model makes tractable new hypotheses on i) the extent to which 
Figure 7.1. Threat Mitigation Model of concerns, voice and listening.  
Note: this model extends the models developed in Chapters 1-6 to voice failures more 
broadly. It highlights that, within a given context (e.g., hazardous scenarios, organisations), 
the momentum of threat towards failure (bold line; Barton & Sutcliff, 2009) can be 
mitigated through effective commination that may itself be mitigated when antecedents 
reduce concerns, voice and listening. For the purpose of a clear presentation, variables are 
summarised. 
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intersecting ideas in the broader voice literature may be integrated (e.g., motivations for 
silence; Brinsfield, 2013; Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016), ii) the effects of safety listening 
on mitigating threats (Barlow et al., 2019; Burris et al., 2013; A. Jones & Kelly, 2014), and iii) 
the distinct impacts of concerns, voice and listening on accident causation. 
The behavioural nature of safety voice is situated  
Revealing the ecological nature of safety voice contributes towards understanding safety 
voice as a situated phenomenon. I revealed that safety voice varies according to at least 32 
second-order antecedents across “Erez and Gati’s (2004) levels of analysis for the individual, 
group, institutional and external context” (Noort et al., 2019b, p.383). This underscores that 
the behavioural nature of safety voice is contingent upon individual and contextual variables 
(Okuyama et al., 2014)⁠. By delineating previous findings, I showed that this situated nature of 
safety voice can be conceptualised in ecological terms (i.e., as related to variables across levels 
of analysis). For instance, and confirming the conclusion in the doctoral thesis of James Detert 
(2003), Chapter 3 indicated that leadership styles provide individual (e.g., perceived costs of 
voicing concerns; Maxfield et al., 2013), group (A. Jones et al., 2016) and institutional level 
antecedents to effective safety voice (e.g., hierarchy; Noland & Carmack, 2015), and I added 
to this by revealing that leadership shapes safety voice (i.e., safety listening, power distance) 
during real hazardous situations (i.e., during aviation accidents; see Chapter 6). 
This is important for safety voice theory because it means that safety voice may be 
conceptualised in holistic (i.e., emphasising that behaviour is situated in context and history) 
rather than atomistic terms (i.e., reducing behaviour to self-contained components; Fay, 1996) 
and be shaped through Erez and Gati’s (2004) dynamic feedback processes (e.g., between 
antecedents across levels of analysis, or safety voice, concerns and listening). Yet, whilst 
multilevel models exist for safety management (e.g., Reason, 1990; Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2000) and dynamic feedback processes are shown to impact negatively on employee voice (Lin 
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& R. E. Johnson, 2014), few safety voice studies have clarified how their variables (e.g., 
hazards, voice, antecedents) are delineated across levels of analysis (cf. Nembhard, Yuan, et 
al., 2015) and time (cf. Krenz et al., 2020). This is important because without a situated 
understanding of safety voice, mixed success for interventions may not be understood 
(O’Donovan & McAuliffe, 2020), variation in the degree or content of safety voice and silence 
may not be explained (e.g., because contexts provide cues on risk; see Chapters 5 and 6), and 
accident investigations would be ineffective. For instance, in terms of recognising thematic 
variations in speech (see Chapter 5) or describing how voice and silence emerged during a 
hazardous scenario (e.g., from fatal risk posed by aviation accidents, poor safety listening; see 
Figure 7.1). 
Thus, by indicating the ecological nature of safety voice, I outline the scope for investigating 
safety voice within complex (i.e., dynamic and multi-level) feedback processes that can impact 
on safety (e.g., when the initial dismissal of concerns reduces subsequent safety voice and sets 
precedent) and ultimately lead to accidents such as with United Airlines Flight 173 (NTSB, 
1978) and Deepwater Horizon (Reader & O’Connor, 2014). For instance, research on safety 
citizenship (Reader et al., 2016) indicates that safety-related behaviours may be explained by 
variables across levels of analysis (e.g., citizenship behaviour, perceived organisational 
support), and research may explain how accidents are enabled by identifying causal priority 
(Boyce et al., 2015) between voicing and listening. This is consistent with systems and 
sociotechnical approaches to safety (Appelbaum, 1997; Leveson, 2002; Reason, 2000) and 
structural theories of culture (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Schein & Scheiner, 2016) that 
together describe how, over time, feedback on effectiveness enables behaviour to become 
learned, legitimised and normative for subsequent behaviour (i.e., become normalised; 
Vaughan, 1999). Thus, by providing an ecological conceptualisation, and evidencing the 
unfavourable effect of poor safety listening, I enable the interpretation of accidents such as 
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with the Challenger space shuttle (Moorhead et al., 1991; Vaughan, 1996) in terms of 
concerned individuals (e.g., Thiokol engineers) learning to be silent based on previous safety 
voice: poor safety listening indicated that safety voice was considered inappropriate and 
ineffective for maintaining good relationships (also see: Edmondson, 1999).  
Furthermore, the situated nature of safety voice may be optimally understood as reflecting 
the fact that safety voice emerges within the interaction between individuals, others and hazards 
(also see Figure 7.1). Previous research has provided ample evidence that safety voice is shaped 
by the interaction between individuals and others (A. Jones et al., 2016). However, the literature 
has provided surprisingly little behavioural evidence on the mechanisms through which hazards 
shape safety voice (with self-reported data indicating people tend to explain safety voice due 
to the higher impact of hazards; Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c) and has given little 
consideration to whether people understand the threats they encounter (e.g., Barzallo Salazar 
et al., 2014), and has not assessed safety voice during actual risks (see Chapter 6; Krenz et al., 
2020), or how others listen to safety concerns during actual hazards. Thus, it appears that the 
literature has assumed that hazards elicit safety voice, whilst studies have not assessed safety 
concerns (cf. Schwappach & Gehring, 2014c).  
Yet, I indicated that this assumption, though intuitive33, is only partially warranted. I 
evidenced that people perceived risk based on available information in their environment (e.g., 
the maximum load of the plank in the Walking the plank paradigm) and raised more safety 
concerns when safety margins became smaller (Chapter 4), when harm was more proximal in 
time (Chapter 5), or when the actual probabilities of harmful outcomes were very high 
(Chapter 6). This suggests that the extent to which people engage in safety voice depends on 
                                                 
33 A repeated question in response to the presentation of the early findings of this thesis was whether 
people might simply not raise safety concerns because the risks are too minor. This explanation has 
intuitive appeal: why, after all, would someone raise concerns about safe situations? However, as 
discussed here, the data indicates that a more nuanced understanding of the role of risk is appropriate. 
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technical hazard characteristics. Nevertheless, I provide an important nuance to this assumption 
that hazards elicit safety voice by showing that actual risk is neither necessary, nor the sole 
explanation for safety silence. That is, the perception of risk was enough for the Walking the 
Plank studies that presented no actual risk, and the extent to which people engaged in safety 
voice during historic aviation accidents remained high but varied due to power distance and 
safety listening. Together, this contributes two important theoretical insights.  
First, it indicates that safety voice is only loosely contingent upon actual risk because people 
vary in their risk perceptions (e.g., due to a lack of awareness, or different attitude towards the 
hazard; Slovic, 1987). Second, whilst to the best of my awareness research has not done this to 
date, it implies that safety voice may be conceptualised as situated sensemaking (e.g., Weick, 
1995, 2010) that emerges from the interaction between a person (i.e., safety concerns, safety 
voice), other people (i.e., safety listening) and hazardous situations (i.e., in terms of the 
sociotechnical and systemic factors providing risk; Appelbaum, 1997; Reason, 2000). This 
triangular relationship (i.e., self-other-hazard) is consistent with the ecological nature of safety 
voice (i.e., it emphasises dynamic interaction over time) and theories on the social construction 
of knowledge and risk (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Searle, 1995; 
Turner & Gray, 2009).  
Moreover, it provides a novel perspective on safety voice that moves beyond the literature’s 
tendency to design research based on positivist and individualistic philosophies that reduce the 
importance of historic and situated factors (Kenny et al., 2020; Turner & Gray, 2009). Such a 
perspective on safety voice may explain how accidents emerge from the dynamic formation, 
justification, contestation, and prioritisation of opposing risk perceptions (e.g., safety risks 
versus interpersonal risks; Edmondson, 1999; Slovic, 1986) and enable new hypotheses on the 
dynamic between safety concerns, safety voice and safety listening. More broadly, for the field 
of social psychology, this may provide an alternative reading of Milgram’s seminal findings 
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on obedience (Blass, 1999; Milgram, 1974) whereby participants’ risk perception is altered 
through the experimenter providing repeated instructions: this may have reduced the rational 
likelihood of the participant being correct (Krueger & Massey, 2009) and delegitimised 
participants’ safety concerns through poor safety listening. 
Safety voice and safety silence both involve nuanced speech 
By evaluating the model for the manifestation of (un)concerned voice and silence (see 
Chapters 4 and 5) I showed for the first time that safety silence can be scaled based on the 
extent of safety voice speech for concerned people. This highlighted that the words used reflect 
the hazardous situation in terms of the stages of hazards (e.g., when harm is a concept versus 
imminent), available information (e.g., maximum load of the plank) and individuals’ 
motivations for preventing harm, and it advances safety voice theory by indicating that the 
behavioural manifestation of safety voice and safety silence i) can be investigated within a 
single continuous conceptualisation for distinct themes in speech, and ii) reflects the process 
of situated sensemaking discussed above (i.e., capturing the dynamic of safety concerns, safety 
voice and safety listening as leading indicators of accidents). This is important because, and 
despite previous research having defined safety voice as communication (Tucker et al., 2008), 
very few studies have investigated safety voice in terms of the content communicated through 
speech (a notable expection is provided by Krenz et al., 2019). This is surprising, and my 
findings underscore the importance of investigating safety voice in-situ because the content for 
speech is provided by cultural and historic contexts (e.g., Gillespie & Cornish, 2010).  
Future research should move beyond investigating the occurrence of safety voice and 
address how trends in its content across situations enable a more optimal mitigation of 
accidents. This emphasis on the content of voice corresponds to Mumfords’ (2015) and 
Kurzon’s (2007, 2011) conceptualisations of the extent to which themes appear in speech, and 
it would advance the safety voice literature because it could i) reduce the literature’s tendency 
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to investigate perceptions of behaviour (i.e., ±76% of safety voice studies, see Chapters 3-4) 
by focussing on what people actually say and do, and ii) avoid dichotomous operationalisations 
(Manapragada & Bruk-Lee, 2016; Tucker & Turner, 2011) by making tractable hypotheses on 
the extent to which accidents can be prevented by the range of ways that hazards manifest in 
the extent that people raise distinct safety voice content (e.g., as distinct themes in speech, on 
continuous scales; see Chapter 5). In addition, research should investigate speech for safety 
listening as words used by leaders impact on safety voice (Weiss et al., 2018). 
Research on natural language processing indicates that semantic computations can be 
performed on the meaning of words and sentences (e.g., “king” – “male” = “queen”; 
Pennington et al., 2014; Vylomova et al., 2016) and this may be applied to translate safety 
voice dictionaries meaningfully across hazardous situations (e.g., informative voice – “weak 
plank” + “uncleared runway”) to understand how safety voice content, or the lack thereof, 
contributes to accidents. For instance, in this way the proposed safety voice dictionaries may 
be ‘translated’ to accident investigations in healthcare and energy (e.g., if speech data is 
recorded during accidents) and the investigation of safety concerns in patient complaint letters 
(Gillespie & Reader, 2016; Reader et al., 2014). It may be particularly interesting to explore 
whether a system may be developed to capture and analyse language automatically in order to 
warn safety operators in real-time about withheld concerns during medical procedures (e.g., 
surgical operations), on the flight deck or in online environments such as social media or 
internet fora (e.g., intelligence operations aiming to capture threats early). 
Safety silence may emerge when social factors trump technical factors 
Indicating the importance of risk perceptions for safety voice (Loewenstein et al., 2001; 
Slovic, 1987), I showed that people engaged in safety voice in response to risk (as perceived 
and evident post-hoc from outcomes), but withheld safety concerns when social demands were 
unfavourable (e.g., responsibilities, norms and values for engaging with others, poor safety 
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listening). This confirms the value of previous research on safety voice antecedents (Barzallo 
Salazar et al., 2014; Burris, 2012; Duan et al., 2017; Tucker et al., 2008) for establishing safety 
voice in the laboratory environment, and confirms previous research suggesting that social 
motivations play a vital role in voice behaviours (e.g., Edmondson, 1999). Moreover, I extend 
this research because I showed that this effect remained when participants were more 
concerned (Chapter 4) or were poorly listened to during high-risk accidents (Chapter 6). This 
supports the notion that safety silence emerges from a poor expected utility from speaking-up 
(Murphy & Dingwall, 2007b) and indicates that the act of safety silence may be rational 
(Krueger & Massey, 2009) and prosocial.  
Classic social psychological research indicates that undesirable behaviours can emerge 
because most people are prosocial (van den Bos & Lind, 2013; van den Bos, van Lange, et al., 
2011): most people intend to engage in good behaviour and process social information on how 
they are expected to act on perceived risk (e.g., intervene, conform to social norms, obey 
authority figures; Asch, 1956; Darley & Latane, 1968; Milgram, 1974). I did not present 
evidence indicating that participants in this thesis held prosocial values (for an illustation on 
how social values may be evaluated in relationship to undesirable behaviour, see: van den Bos, 
van Lange, et al., 2011), yet my findings are consistent with participants processing social 
information in order to decide on appropriate and socially desirable action (e.g., less safety 
voice for poor safety listening and high power distance).  
To the extent that this proposition holds (i.e., voice and silence have also been 
conceptualised as emerging from pro-self motives; Brinsfield, 2013), arguably, safety silence 
emerges because acting in prosocial ways can be more important to individuals than preventing 
harm, even to the point where harms are personal (e.g., air crashes). For instance, because they 
downplay the risk of dying but consider voice socially inappropriate (e.g., due to power 
distance norms, see Chapter 6; Hofstede et al., 2010). This suggests that accident analyses and 
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investigations should investigate the social motives that people had for engaging in safety 
silence. Furthermore, this proposition is significant because it indicates that safety voice 
research may contribute insights to classic social psychological paradigms (Asch, 1956; Latane 
& Darley, 1968; Milgram, 1974) by indicating the extent to which people are willing to 
sacrifice their own safety when the situation demands it (i.e., Asch’s conformity studies 
involved no threats to physical safety, Milgram’s obedience and Latane and Darley’s bystander 
effect studies involved safety threats that were apparent and victimised others). Whilst social 
psychological research has informed safety management theories that incorporate safety voice 
behaviours (Didla et al., 2009; Guldenmund, 2000; Neal et al., 2000), I am aware of little 
explicit conceptual exchange between the safety voice literature and classic social 
psychological research (cf. Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Pian-Smith et al., 2009; Weiss et al., 
2018). Future research may adopt a version of the Walking the plank paradigm whereby 
participants walk across the plank alongside the research assistant to assess and conceptualise 
the extent to which safety silence can involve self-sacrifice. 
A need exists for a broader methodological toolbox 
Finally, the findings underscore the importance of expanding the methodological toolbox 
for investigating safety voice, and safety-related behaviours more broadly. I revealed a need to 
address existing shortfalls for assessing safety voice because most studies (i.e., approximately 
76%, see Chapter 3) rely on data that emerges from methods that ask people to report on 
previous safety voice behaviour, or to imagine hypothetical scenarios. These limit the 
possibility of obtaining behavioural data, rely on memory and imagination, and hinder the 
investigation of mechanisms, and I indicated that this can be addressed through experiments 
such as the Walking the plank paradigm. Furthermore, I indicated that self-reports tended to 
poorly correspond to observed behaviour with one-in-five participants misreporting on safety 
voice. This is important for the safety voice literature because it underscores the need to i) 
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move beyond the reliance on post-hoc and report-based methodologies and ii) clarify how 
findings from report-based measures can be generalised to behaviour with more certainty. For 
instance, whilst the critical incident interview study by Aydon and colleagues (2016) is 
amongst the most comprehensive publications within the literature, and one of my favourite 
readings during this thesis, because of these methodological limitations the identified 
antecedents (e.g., supportive role models, low workload, learning opportunities) would benefit 
from direct behavioural observation in controlled environments. 
To this end, I made tractable new research by providing a manual for the Walking the Plank 
paradigm (see Appendix C), and additional files will be made available as supplementary 
materials (i.e., the safety voice dictionaries and the CVR dataset) upon publication of the 
submitted articles34. For instance, and in addition to the suggested directions in Chapter 4, 
scholars may want to use these materials to triangulate new evidence across methodologies. 
For example, I would encourage future research to triangulate other datasets with the CVR 
dataset, apply the safety voice dictionaries to investigate how variables of interest (e.g., power 
distance) shape speech, or to explore to what extent available safety voice questionnaire items 
(Tucker et al., 2008) capture observed speech.  
Finally, the proposed Walking the Plank paradigm may be adapted for investigating broader 
safety-related phenomena. For instance, because the paradigm enables the observation of 
psychological phenomena during an apparent hazard, it can be used for exploring hypotheses 
on the extent to which people have situational awareness about hazards (Stanton et al., 2001), 
rely on others for information about hazardous situations (e.g., the bystander effect; P. Fischer 
et al., 2011), are obedient when authority figures fall victim to hazards (i.e., extending research 
on obedience to authority; Milgram, 1974), engage in safety citizenship behaviours (Didla et 
                                                 
34 These materials can also be provided upon request. 
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al., 2009), or are willing to self-sacrifice to avoid harm to others by walking the plank oneself35. 
In particular, the Walking the Plank paradigm might be used in an experimental investigation 
of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS; Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2016). For instance, and whilst it appears unlikely that experiments can fully simulate complex 
safety management systems, the paradigm may be adapted to investigate the interactions 
between organisational influences (e.g., by providing a safety training and outlining safety 
accountabilities beforehand), inadequate supervision (e.g., by confederates failing to correct 
hazards) and unsafe preconditions (e.g., by assessing adverse mental states). I encourage future 
research to adapt the provided protocol of the Walking the Plank paradigm (see Appendix C) 
to explore these options in research on safety voice and safety behaviours more broadly. 
Implications for preventing harm 
Insights on conceptualising and assessing the behavioural nature of safety voice have 
implications for researchers and practitioners aiming to prevent harm, and lessons can be 
learned for designing interventions. 
Interventions need to improve the effectiveness of safety voice 
First, research has assumed that safety voice emerges from safety threats and is essential for 
avoiding accidents (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012; Enomoto & Geisler, 2017; Gladwell, 2008; 
Noort et al., 2019b; Soeters & Boer, 2000; Tucker et al., 2008). Yet, my evidence only 
supported a loose contingency upon risk and the need for good safety listening. That is, I 
indicated that whilst risk from hazards (perceived and actual) predicts safety voice, safety voice 
                                                 
35 In an early pilot that involved a version of the paradigm where potential victims sat on the plank 
(discussed in Chapter 2), I observed two cases in which participants offered to sit on the plank instead 
of the research assistant. Whilst this happened infrequently and it might have been that participants 
felt they could mitigate risk by not fully sitting on the plank, this means the Walking the Plank 
paradigm enables research on heroism and self-sacrifice. 
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requires that people need to be aware and concerned about hazards (see Chapter 5) and, 
moreover, aviation accidents still occurred when people spoke-up to a high degree (see Chapter 
6) because safety listening was often inadequate. Furthermore, despite risks during aviation 
accidents being extreme, variation persisted in the extent to which flight crew spoke-up. This 
means that the literature cannot assume that safety voice is sufficient for avoiding accidents 
(i.e., social factors inhibit the mitigation of accidents), or that accidents occur because people 
fail to speak-up (i.e., voice and accidents co-occurred). This supports a proposition by Jones 
and Kelly (2014) that listening is an important factor in avoiding accidents, which I 
conceptualised as ‘safety listening’, and contradicts a central assumption in the literature (i.e., 
that interventions are best targeted at making safety voice more likely). Essentially, my findings 
underscore that safety management interventions need to make safety voice more likely and 
effective by enabling people to be concerned about safety and engage in safety voice and safety 
listening.  
Interventions need to be tailored to hazardous scenarios 
Second, the thesis indicates that safety voice interventions are optimally designed by being 
tailored towards the situation. That is, the interventions investigated in this thesis (i.e., hazard 
salience, responsibility, encouragements, CRM; Barzallo Salazar et al., 2014; Burris, 2012; 
Duan et al., 2017; Helmreich et al., 1990; Kanki et al., 2019; Tucker et al., 2008) varied in their 
effectiveness based on (perceived) properties of the hazardous situation. Interventions were 
more effective when participants engaged in knowledge-based safety voice and held stronger 
safety concerns. This means that interventions should be designed according to the level of 
risk, with low levels of risk requiring different interventions (i.e., to increase the extent to which 
people are concerned) from high degrees of risk (i.e., to remove inhibitors to safety voice and 
safety listening). Whilst safety voice research has not distinguished between levels of risk in 
the design of interventions, this has long been a central notion in how risk research informs 
Chapter 7: Discussion and outlook 255 
safety management (Renn, 1998), and applying this to safety voice may enable better 
interventions through a solid grounding in the properties of hazards that people encounter.  
In addition, intervention success varied according to the stage of the hazard (see Chapter 5) 
and cultural norms. For instance, in Chapter 6, I indicated that the introduction of CRM training 
has led to historic changes in safety voice and safety listening. Yet, and indicating the 
importance of addressing the situated nature of safety voice, safety voice and safety listening 
only improved for airlines registered in low power distance countries. This suggests that the 
situated nature of safety voice reduces the effectiveness of generic interventions, and may 
explain why safety voice interventions (O’Donovan & McAuliffe, 2020) and antecedents (see 
Chapter 3) have had mixed success. This is particularly important because studies rarely 
establish the extent to which scenarios elicit safety concerns (cf. Schwappach & Gehring, 
2014c), the aspects of safety voice that are altered by interventions, the timing of changes in 
safety voice (cf. Krenz et al., 2020)⁠, how others listen to safety voice during real accidents, or 
the impact of national culture on interventions (see Chapter 3 and 6). Thus, I expand safety 
voice theory by indicating that previously indicated antecedents (Chapter 3) may have nuanced 
in-situ effects on safety voice behaviour (e.g., shared safety knowledge may only improve the 
sharing of information, not motivations to prevent harm; Phelps & Reed, 2016).  
Finally, this contributes to the safety management literature by indicating that after thirty 
years a need still exists (Helmreich et al., 1990) to improve the training effectiveness of 
programs that aim to improve communication during safety-critical scenarios (Kanki et al., 
2019; King et al., 2008; Omura et al., 2017) in high power distance countries. Furthermore, 
this also suggests that the behaviour-based safety interventions reviewed by Tuncel and 
colleagues (2006; though without reference to national culture) may benefit from being tailored 
to national cultural environments. 
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Limitations 
Limitations were discussed within the presented articles, and for the purpose of conciseness 
here I only discuss limitations of general importance for conceptualising, assessing and 
intervening on safety voice. 
First, the scope of this research was limited by the choices made. By focussing on safety 
voice as an individual behaviour rather than collective action (Wilkinson et al., 2020), or shared 
perceptions on behavioural trends within groups (e.g., voice climate; Ditchburn & Hames, 
2014), the systematic review and presented studies did not capture safety voice that does not 
involve acts of interpersonal communication. This choice enabled targeted studies (e.g., 
enabling fewer variables and participants), provided a manageable number of articles to be 
systematically reviewed and provided insights specific to the behavioural nature of safety 
voice. However, it means that further research is needed to evaluate how findings on safety 
voice can be generalised beyond interpersonal communication (e.g., to warning symbols, or 
press conferences during times of crisis; Matthews et al., 2014; Mullin, 2003). 
Furthermore, to reiterate, the systematic literature review was limited to the articles retrieved 
by the search strategy and inclusion criteria, and relevant articles may not have been included 
when these were not uncovered by the search terms. Where I became aware of relevant articles 
not covered by the systematic literature review (e.g., Weiss et al., 2014, 2017, 2018) or when 
key articles were published during the duration of the thesis (Krenz et al., 2020, e.g., 2019; 
Peadon et al., 2020) ⁠, I aimed for a complete account by integrating this work in other sections 
of this thesis. In addition, by emphasising the act of speaking-up about safety, research 
contained in other literatures such as protective action decision-making (Lindell & Perry, 2012) 
or risk and crisis communication (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005) may have been missed⁠. I aimed 
to mitigate this by systematically reviewing research on safety voice and reviewing relevant 
literature within other sections of this thesis (e.g., the protective action decision-model was 
Chapter 7: Discussion and outlook 257 
cited in Chapter 5; crisis communication was referred to in Chapter 6). However, the extent to 
which other literatures (beyond voice, safety and teamworking, see Chapter 3) draw on similar 
ideas as safety voice remains an empirical question for future research. 
Second, I aimed for high internal validity for the presented studies, but additional research 
is needed to establish whether findings replicate. In particular, I established that the Walking 
the Plank paradigm can address challenges to obtaining data on safety voice behaviour, but the 
safety concern measure in these studies involved a single, self-reported item that was 
completed after the scenario. Single item questionnaires can be successful (Konrath et al., 
2018; Robins et al., 2001) and I agreed with others (P. Fischer et al., 2006) that post-scenario 
procedures are necessary to maintain successful deception. Moreover, I aimed to address this 
issue by providing a safety concern dictionary that indicated a strong relationship to safety 
voice speech. Yet, this measure was developed and evaluated within the same dataset (i.e., 
potentially providing common methods bias; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) and I encourage future 
research intending to adopt the report-based measure to increase the number of items. In 
addition, future research may utilise the provided CVR dataset to reveal whether the indicated 
good reliability holds beyond the modest sample of the data, and develop intersubjective 
measures. Whilst my results indicate safety voice is a sensemaking process (e.g., people voiced 
less when others engaged in poor safety listening), analyses for Chapter 5 captured individuals’ 
utterances and future research should investigate how safety concerns can be tracked in 
conversation (for a method, see: Heasman & Gillespie, 2019) because sensemaking is 
intersubjective (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). 
Third, and of special importance to internal validity, it was not always clear to what extent 
studies established safety silence. Because safety concerns are rarely assessed (see Chapter 4), 
the systematic review could not establish whether less safety voice involved concerned or 
unconcerned silence. This means that the systematic literature review provides no clear 
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conclusions on safety silence. This is a limitation of the literature and, to reiterate, this indicates 
that safety voice studies need to establish the extent to which people are concerned in order to 
establish safety silence (when this is of interest to researchers). The analysis of the CVR 
transcripts illustrates this: in the study I could only draw conclusions on safety voice and safety 
listening, but not on safety silence, because I could not assess the extent to which the safety 
concern dictionary could be validly applied to the dataset. That is, the interpretation of social-
psychological phenomena beyond a text itself (e.g., cognitive states such as safety concerns) is 
limited because it involves the interpretation of speakers’ intended meaning (for a discussion 
of methods and assumptions underpinning the analysis of speech, see: Hammersley, 2003). The 
limited number of utterances for individual pilots requires a better understanding of how pilots 
understood their context (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010) than the historic nature of the data 
permitted (i.e., new data could not be obtained to triangulate other safety concern measures). 
It may be fruitful to explore the extent to which safety concerns can be inferred form high 
levels of safety voice or situational characteristics because safety silence can be scaled based 
on the extent of safety voice speech. Indeed, safety voice and concern dictionaries may be 
tailored to specific contexts, and future research should establish the validity of the dictionaries 
in new contexts by ascertaining the extent to which participants in the given context are 
concerned. However, arguably, researchers should provide clarity by only adopting the term 
‘safety silence’ when concerns can be ascertained.  
Fourth, in terms of external validity, I suggested that additional research is needed to 
establish the extent to which findings from the Walking the plank paradigm generalise to other 
contexts. To reiterate, the external validity of experiments is debated (Jiménez-Buedo & Miller, 
2010) and I indicated that the findings from the Walking the plank paradigm can generalise: 
the findings on poor safety listening (i.e., worry and discouragements; Chapters 4 and 5) were 
reflected in the unfavourable effect of high power distance and safety listening in natural 
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environments (Chapter 6). Furthermore, the behaviour-report gap indicated in Chapter 4 shows 
that conclusions based on direct observations may be generalised to report-based measures, 
and vice versa, when inaccurate self-reports are accounted for. 
Finally, additional research is needed to provide empirical evidence for propositions that 
remain conceptual. Above, I derived theoretical insights and whilst I indicated how my 
evidence supports these propositions, more data is needed on the Threat Mitigation Model. 
Furthermore, whilst my findings have clear implications for threat mitigation because safety 
voice outcomes can include the prevention of harm (Blanco et al., 2009; Seiden et al., 2006; 
Tucker & Turner, 2015), I did not present novel data on the extent to which safety voice 
prevents harm. This is because the Walking the Plank paradigm did not contain actual risk and 
the CVR study did not present an appropriate control group for normal flights or near-misses. 
Yet, future research may investigate how the prevention of harm varies according to the 
nuanced manifestation of safety concerns, safety voice, and safety listening. 
Concluding remarks 
By presenting four articles, in this thesis I contributed insights into how safety voice should 
be optimally conceptualised, assessed and intervened on. Insights were contributed towards 
conceptualising safety voice as a unique concept for understanding the extent to which safety 
critical information flows effectively during hazardous scenarios (Westrum, 2014), with the 
situated nature of safety voice supporting its incorporation into sociotechnical models (e.g., the 
Swiss Cheese model; Perrow, 2011; Reason, 1990; Vaughan, 1999) because the social and 
technical properties of hazardous scenarios can prevent accidents when they elicit safety 
concerns, safety voice and safety listening. 
In this thesis, I addressed a need for better understanding the behavioural nature of safety 
voice, and I showed that safety voice has a unique scope compared to research on safety 
management and employee voice through its narrow emphasis on the communication of safety 
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knowledge and motivations during hazardous scenarios, and broad context of application. 
Safety voice and safety silence, though distinct acts, can be captured within the same theoretical 
models because safety silence can be scaled based upon the extent to which concerned 
individuals speak-up during hazardous situations. In particular, the acts of safety voice and 
silence are manifested as highly nuanced speech that are elicited by, and reflect, the technical 
(i.e., perceived and actual risk, progression of time) and social characteristics (i.e., norms for 
communication) of encountered hazards. Moreover, understanding the interaction between 
social and technical factors is essential for understanding how safety voice may prevent 
accidents, because safety voice nearly always occurs when levels of real risk are high. Yet, the 
extent of safety voice engagement varies according to social properties of hazardous scenarios 
such as safety listening and norms for communication. Thus, I revealed the behavioural nature 
of safety voice to be highly ecological (i.e., with antecedents, the act of safety voice and 
outcomes being identifiable across levels of analysis) and situated (i.e., with safety threats 
eliciting degrees of safety concerns, safety voice and safety listening), and proposed the Threat 
Mitigation Model of safety voice. This enables better safety management by providing a 
specific concept for the interpersonal communication of concerned individuals within 
sociotechnical systems (Appelbaum, 1997; Reason, 2000) that emphasises that failures in 
safety management can emerge when sociotechnical systems poorly enable people to be 
concerned, to voice and to listen. 
Because of this ecological and situated nature of safety voice, the assessment of safety voice 
and interventions to reduce safety silence, should be grounded in direct behavioural 
observations that establish the extent to which people engage in safety voice and safety 
listening, and ascertain the extent to which hazardous scenarios pose actual levels of risk or 
elicit risk perceptions. The literature has relied on methodologies that provide valuable insights, 
but rarely directly establish safety voice behaviours, or safety concerns, during hazardous 
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scenarios. I identified nine methodological shortfalls of the literature and made tractable the 
investigation of new hypotheses by providing and illustrating a novel experimental paradigm 
(i.e., Walking the Plank) and dataset containing actual, field-based, safety voice behaviours 
(i.e., the CVR dataset). Moreover, and underscoring the situated nature of safety voice, I 
indicated that interventions for reducing safety silence require that people are concerned. Yet, 
interventions should not only improve the likelihood of safety voice, but improve its 
effectiveness (e.g., by improving safety listening) because accidents can still occur when 
safety-critical staff are concerned and speak-up. 
Thus, in this thesis, I revealed that safety voice enables a better understanding of accident 
causation than broader safety management concepts (e.g., safety culture, safety citizenship, 
safety leadership) by providing new insights into the extent to which people engage in 
interpersonal communication about safety within sociotechnical systems: safety voice 
behaviour is rooted in the social and technical properties of hazardous situations that impact on 
the extent to which people are concerned, voice and listen, with all being required to enable 
accident mitigation. Future research should design studies and interventions that move beyond 
antecedents that increase the likelihood of safety voice and establish how hazardous scenarios 
enable individuals to be concerned about safety, engage in a higher degree of nuanced speech 
about safety themes, and listen effectively when concerns are raised. Thus, the investigation of 
safety voice may become more nuanced and contextual, informative for how accidents emerge, 
and effective in designing interventions aimed at improving communication to mitigate safety 
threats. In particular, establishing and addressing the social and technical properties of 
hazardous scenarios is essential for preventing accidents by enabling individuals to listen and 
speak-up about safety concerns. 
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APPENDICES 
The following appendices are provided as supplemental material to this thesis: 
Appendix A. The systematic review protocol. 
Appendix B. Ethics approval. 
Appendix C. The Walking the Plank manual. 
Appendix D. The Walking the Plank study materials. 
Appendix E. The Jupyter notebook for Article 3. 
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1) Which definitions, conceptualisations and theoretical backgrounds characterise 
safety voice? 
2) What is the ecological nature of safety voice in terms of inhibiting (promoting) 
relationships between safety voice and antecedents, pragmatics, and outcomes 
across levels of analysis? 
3) Which methodologies have been used for researching safety voice, how suitable 
are they, and what methodological challenges remain? 
Researchers Doctoral student (lead): Mark C. Noort 
Supervisor:  Tom W. Reader 
Co-supervisor:  Alex T. Gillespie 
Study goals Primary: Answer the research question listed above. 
Secondary: Evaluate the quality of primary studies on safety voice 
  Summarise results from primary studies on safety voice 
  Calculate an overall effect of predictors of safety voice (if a meta-
  analysis can be performed)  
  Identify and understand any heterogeneity in the results  
  Identify new research questions 
  Identify the extent of the gap regarding the disinhibition of safety 
  voice 
Search steps Identification:  Search electronic databases for publications 
Screening:  Select potential papers based on inclusion/exclusion criteria for title 
  and abstracts. 
Eligibility:  Access full text articles to assess eligibility. Request full-text  
  copies of inaccessible papers from the LSE libraries, or authors. 
Hand-search: Search for additional articles using the reference list of key articles 
  and published literature reviews. 
Search engines PubMed 
EBSCOhost 
Search databases Anthropology plus 
Business source complete 
CINAHL Plus with full text 
Communication and mass media complete 
Criminal justice abstracts with full text 
History of science, technology, medicine 
International political science abstracts 
MEDLINE 
Peace research abstracts 
PsycArticles 
PsycINFO 
SocINDEX with full text 
Definitions A discreet speech act to prevent physical harm, where the receiver might be willing 
and able to take action. 
Search terms Abstracts and titles need to have the combination of safety and voice. Given it 
involves safety in safety-critical team it is opted to not include synonyms of safety 
(e.g., harm, injury, etc.). 
 





*Safe* AND voic*  
*Safe* AND speak* 
*Safe* AND silenc* 
 

















Articles published anytime. 
Timing of 
searches 
At the beginning of the literature review (March 2017) 
Prior to data analysis, to ensure up-to-date results (estimated: Mid-April 2017) 
Screening and 
selection 
Titles and abstracts of results retrieved through the electronic and hand searches will 
be screened for meeting the inclusion criteria by the lead author. 
Reliability will be ensured through independent coding of a subset (i.e., 15%) of the 
titles and abstracts by a second researcher. Disagreements will be resolved in 
discussion with all authors.  
If any amendments are required to the search strategy these will be implemented 
through repeating the screening process, until a satisfactory result is achieved. 
Risk of bias 
(quality) 
assessment 





Types of papers Include Peer-reviewed articles 







On-going, unpublished trials 
Errata (unless they refer to extracted information) 
Conference proceedings (e.g., keynotes, panel discussions) 
Language Include English 
 Exclude All other languages 
Types of subject Include Studied whether people raise a safety concern to another person 
Behavioural 






Primarily about ethics 
Primarily about law 
Intimate partner violence 
Studies on drugs or therapies, not focussing on raising concerns 
Types of study Include Empirical, primary study 
Quantitative  
Qualitative 
(Note: the number of Qual/Quant will be coded, to allow for a go/no-go 
decision on the meta-analysis. Qualitative papers will be included if 
there are insufficient papers and vice versa). 
 Exclude No original research (data) 
Conceptual papers without data  
Authors advocate for a group 
People speak up when prompted (e.g., focus group) 
Call to speak up about an issue 
Types of 
participants 
Include Interpersonal (i.e., OB) 
From/to all staff roles 
From/to all hierarchical positions 
 Exclude Non-adult participants 
Mental health patients 
Not unions or organisations advocating on an issue 
Types of 
predictors  
Include All to be included. 
 Exclude None. 




Include Outcomes of safety voice are discussed. 





Using a set Excel extraction form, the following information was extracted from included full-text 
articles. To ensure reliability, a subset (15%) of the included full-text articles was independently coded 











Participants Country (of study) 
Sample details (e.g., size, gender, age, demographics, etc.) 
Sample before and after exclusion criteria applied (e.g., outliers) 
Industry and organisation(s) 
Unit of analysis (i.e., individual, dyads, teams, organisations) 
Other 
Unique / part of longitudinal data set 
Methods Study design (e.g., Quant/Qual, experimental, interviews, etc.) 
Details of intervention/manipulation 




Cochrane quality indicators  
Comparability of study groups (+ inclusion of control group) 
Randomly selected/Convenience-based? 
Was randomisation performed blindly? 
Representativeness of sample 
Exclusions made (participants, settings, etc.) 
Treatment of missing data 
Ethics: approval and informed consent obtained 
Theoretical 
Background 
Definition of safety voice (literal) 













Outcomes Details on safety voice outcomes, if any. 
Proposed 
intervention 





Search v3 (final) 























VoIP[Title/Abstract] OR “Language 






































Limit to English  
(peer-reviewed: EBSCO) 
 














Search v2 (refined) 























































PC[Title/Abstract] OR Pitch[Title/Abstract] 
OR Intonation[Title/Abstract] OR 
Anatomy[Title/Abstract] OR 
vocal[Title/Abstract] OR 


























6 Limit to English, Dutch, (peer-reviewed: 
EBSCO) 
 














Search v1 (first formal search) 
Search  Terms (example from 
PubMED) 

































Raise[Title/Abstract] OR Raise? 
[Title/Abstract] OR 
Raising[Title/Abstract] OR 
“speak up” [Title/Abstract] OR 
“speaks up” [Title/Abstract] OR 
“speaking up” [Title/Abstract] 
OR “spoke up” [Title/Abstract] 
OR “speak out” [Title/Abstract] 
OR “speaks out” [Title/Abstract] 
OR “speaking out” 





























































































































Appendix B: Ethics approval 














#1051: Ethics approval (Cockpit Voice Recorder study), January 2020 
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Appendix C: Walking the Plank manual 
Introduction36 
‘Safety voice’ is the act of speaking-up about 
safety issues. It is defined as “explicit 
communication that is 1) discretionary, 2) aimed at 
improving a perceived unsafe situation, and 3) 
addressed to others of equal or senior status” (Noort et al., 2019b) and through speaking up 
about safety, hazards can be identified and mitigated.  
This manual outlines the protocol for the investigation of safety voice through using the 
Walking the Plank paradigm. Five stages are required to enable the direct observation of safety 
voice behaviours, and these involve i) participant welcome and informed consent, ii) creativity 
task, iii) demonstration and evaluation of creative ideas, iv) wrap-up questionnaire, and v) 
debrief. To enable interpretation and amendments to the protocol, and successful execution of 
the protocol, we have provided detailed information for each stage of the Walking the Plank 
paradigm, a checklist for materials and key decisions, appendices to illustrate study materials, 
illustrative pictures.  
The Walking the Plank paradigm makes 
accessible safety voice behaviours, and you are 
encouraged to tailor procedures for the purpose 
of your research. Researching safety voice is 
                                                 
36 This appendix has been reformatted for a consistent lay-out within the thesis. The original manual is 




fascinating, and we trust that future research will find this paradigm useful for identifying novel 
concepts for speaking-up about safety, and new ways for people to create safety. 
 
Mark C. Noort 
 
And on behalf of: 
Dr Tom W. Reader, 
Dr Alex Gillespie. 
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Walking the Plank: an overview 
The Walking the plank paradigm consists of 3 core stages: i) a creativity task (to introduce 
the limits of the plank), ii) demonstration and evaluation of creative ideas (to introduce the 
hazard and observe safety voice/silence), and iii) wrap-up questionnaire (to ascertain safety 
concerns and study variables of interest). These stages are flanked by a participant welcome 
(to register participants and obtain informed consent) and debrief (to clarify the true study 
intent and ensure participants leave in the same psychological state they came in with). The 
study takes ±30-minutes per participant to complete. 
To enable these stages, the protocol puts requirements on the general behaviour of research 
assistants, the laboratory setting and materials. The checklist provided at the end of this manual 
summarises these requirements. The pictures illustrate the environment and materials used to 
develop the paradigm. 
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General behaviour of research assistants 
• During Welcome and Stages 1-3 
o Behaviours of the research assistant can have a strong influence on participant 
behaviours and can alter the outcomes of the study (e.g., positive, open, warm 
behaviours may encourage speaking up, and vice versa). Unless these behaviours 
form part of the study manipulations (e.g., leaders that display openness or 
closedness to participants’ views), it is thus important to consider the following: 
 Be neutral and factual towards the participant (think ‘be professional’), 
neither too friendly nor too distant. 
o Prompts can be made when participants do not follow through on instructions 
(e.g., making an idea). 
o If experimental manipulations put requirements on behaviour, act in line with 
conditions throughout the welcome and stages 1-3.  
• During the Debrief 
o The debrief has two purposes: clarify the true study intention and make the 
participant feel well. Hence, during the debrief: always be friendly, warm, open to 
questions, etc. 
Laboratory environment  
• A reception area for welcoming participants and paying out rewards 
• Observation room with video recording facilities, or see-through mirror 
• Quite experiment room(s) 
• (optional) Provision of participant recruitment 
Example of a reception area (entrance). 
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Materials 
• 3 chairs 
• A plank of wood (plywood, L: 120cm, W: 20cm, H:1.8cm)  
• Blocks of wood (plywood, L: 3cm, W: 20cm, H:1.8cm) 
• Table for the participant to sit at 
• Questionnaire delivery method (i.e., iPad/PC, pen-and-paper). 










1) Provide seating for participants arriving early 
2) Ensure that the observation equipment cannot 
be seen from the reception area 
Observation room 
3) Start the video recording of the Experiment 
room(s) used. 
4) Ensure that the following are placed at a 
logical location, so you are ready to pick these 
up when you need them: 
i) A few working pens. 
ii) Participant sign-up sheet (if laboratory 
provides advanced recruitment) 
iii) Study information (BRIEF) / Informed 
consent sheet 
iv) Study information (DEBRIEF) 
v) The Creativity-Feasibility form  
vi) Payment confirmation sheet (if laboratory 
requires receipts) 
vii) Money (i.e., participant reward) 
Experiment room 
5) Set up: 
i) Chairs: Duct tape/mark two chairs to the 
ground at a distance on which the plank can 
be placed stably as a ‘footbridge’ between 
them.  
ii) Plank of woods: place the plank casually 
standing upright against one of the chairs.  
iii) Blocks of wood: place these casually at the 
base of the plank. 
iv) Table & chair: Place a single chair at the 
table for the participant to sit at while 
writing (no duct taping). The participant 
needs to face the plank and chairs. 
v) iPad: ensure a link has been added to 
favourites, so it can be easily re-started for 
the next participant. 
 
  
Reception area (seating) 
Observation Room equipment 
Location of chairs discretely marked to the ground 







A reception area for welcoming participants and paying out 
rewards 
 
Observation room with video recording facilities, or see-through 
mirror 
 
Quite experiment room(s)  
Participant recruitment  
Key decisions Manipulations: Which experimental manipulations are 
implemented and require tailoring of the protocol? 
 
General behaviour of research assistants: how should research 
assistants behave in light of the experimental manipulations? 
(default = ‘professional’) 
 
Logistics Ethical approval obtained   
Laboratory space and time booked  
Participant recruitment arranged  
Research assistants allocated to timeslots  
Materials A plank of wood (plywood, L: 120cm, W: 20cm, H:1.8cm)   
Blocks of wood (plywood, L: 3cm, W: 20cm, H:1.8cm)  
3 chairs  
Table for the participant to sit at  




(made in Excel to track: participant IDs, timeslots, safety voice 
behaviours, condition allocation, notes) 
 





Informed consent / brief form (printed in sufficient numbers)  
Debrief form (printed in sufficient numbers)  




Payment confirmation sheet (may come as laboratory facility)  






Stage 1: Participant Welcome 
Dependent on the laboratory facilities, participants may enter the laboratory in varying ways. 
However, a reception area with seating is recommended. 
 
1) Participant arrives in reception area 
2) When the participant time slot is about to start: 
(1) Check whether the participant has arrived. 
(late participants should be denied participation, unless this can be accommodated) 
(2) Request participant ID code (if the laboratory utilises this) and note down 
attendance on the participant sheet. 
3) Register the participant and acquire informed consent 
(1) Provide the ‘Study Information (BRIEF) / Informed consent’ sheet (see 
appendix D). 
(2) Say:  
“Here is some high-level information about what to expect in the study. 
Please read this carefully and answer the questions on the back of the 
sheet”. 
(3) Ensure the participant has agreed to all informed consent questions. 




Stage 2: ‘Creativity’ Task 
1) Take the participant through to the experiment room. 
2) Say: 
“Please follow me.” 
3) Direct the participant to sit down. 
4) Say:   
“I am the research assistant for this study about creativity. The study 
involves 3 stages. First, you conduct a creativity task to develop 
creative ideas, then the feasibility and creativity of these ideas will be 
tested. Finally, there is a closing questionnaire.” 
5) Provide the Creativity Task and step back. 
(1) This can be either paper-based, or via an online questionnaire tool (e.g., Qualtrics, 
SurveyMonkey, etc.) 
(2) To dodge questions, say:  
“The instructions make everything clear, please follow the instructions 
as provided.”  
6) Walk out of the experiment room for 5 minutes while the participant completes the task. 
(1) Keep track of the time  
(a) For iPad-based creativity tasks: these can be built to automatically transition 
(include a message to collect the research assistant) but make sure to keep track 
of participants as they may not collect the researcher. 




Stage 3: Demonstration and evaluation of Creative ideas 
1) Take the ‘Feasibility-Creativity form’ with you. 
2) Walk back into the Experiment room. 
3) Explain the demonstration and evaluation of the creative ideas: 
(1) Say: 
“Okay. The next stage involves testing these ideas for two things: 
feasibility, either a yes or no, and creativity on a scale of 1-5 with 5 
being high. However, your ideas will be tested by the next participant, 
and the ideas of the previous participant are tested.” 
4) Go through the list of creative ideas from the ‘previous participant’. For each idea: 
(1) Build: Let the participant build the idea. 
(2) Engage: Engage with the idea briefly (as if quickly evaluating what is built). 
(3) Feasibility: Ask whether the participant considers the idea feasible (request a: 
yes/no). 
(4) Creativity:  Ask whether the participant considers the idea creative (request 
a: 1-5). 
5) Upon encountering the ‘footbridge’ idea. 
(1) Say:   
“Hmm. That is actually pretty obvious, but I have not seen it before: 
could you please build a footbridge?” 
(2) Follow the same order: build, engage, feasibility, creativity. 
(a) If required, prompt participants to build a footbridge using the two chairs (unless 
they voice).  
(3) Before walking towards the plank, say:    
“I will now to test whether this is a footbridge.”  
6) The research assistant walks up to the plank across the two chairs and walks over it. 
7) Observe voice vs silence: 
(1) Note down on the form whether the participant speaks up about the plank being 
unsafe to walk on (before you have walked on it). For example, speaking up can 
sound like: “The plank stated a maximum weight”, “That should be fine for a child 
(not you)” 
(2) Voice should only be coded if it occurs between two time-points:  
(a) After: the participant is asked to build the footbridge 
(b) Before: the RA is finished walking the plank and has stepped onto the ground. 
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Stage 4: Wrap-up Questionnaire 
1) Finish demonstrating the creative ideas. 
2) Say:    
“For the final stage of the study, please complete this questionnaire.” 
3) Provide the wrap-up questionnaire 
(1) If paper-and-pen-base:  provide questionnaire and pen.  
(2) If electronic:   provide iPad/PC.  
Note: the electronic questionnaire can be built to automatically advanced from the 
Creativity Task during Stage 3, but ensure this takes sufficient time for the RA to 
not see the questionnaire prematurely. 
4) Leave the room while the participant completes the questionnaire. 
  
Appendices 322 
Stage 5: Debrief 
Note: The intention of the debrief is to provide participants with a sense that they contributed 
to research, and explain to them that it was not about creativity, but speaking up about safety. 
This tends to work best when research assistants treat the debrief as an informal, open, and 
friendly conversation. 
 
1) Take with you the Information sheet (DEBRIEF) and catch the participant before they 
come back to the waiting room and take them back to the experiment room. 
2) Say:    
“Thank you. This is the end of the study.  
However, I’d like to just take 2 minutes to debrief you on the study.  
I have to admit something: you may have guessed this study is actually 
not about creativity, but about how people speak-up and the factors 
that influence this.” 
3) Provide Participant Debrief Information Sheet. Say:    
“Please take your time to read this and ask me any question you would 
have.” 
4) Discuss questions with the participants (or refer to the lead researcher). 
5) Ensure the participant completes the debrief questions. 
(1) If a participant considers the research unethical: talk this through with them (they 
often misread the questions) and inform the lead researcher. 
6) Take participants back to the reception area. Say: 
Okay. Unless you have any remaining questions, let’s go back and get 
you the reward for your time. Please follow me. 
7) Pay the participant their reward. 
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Appendix D: Walking the Plank Materials 
Participant Information Sheet (Brief) 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before deciding to participate it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please 
take time to read the following information about the study and don’t feel rushed. 
 
What is this research about?  
You will engage in a task about creativity and associated factors. 
 
Who is doing this research? 
This study is led by [name], [role] at [department], [institution]. 
 
Why have you asked me to participate? 
You have been recruited via [recruitment method]. 
 
What will participation involve? 
• Participation involves a number of tasks around creativity 
• Some participant may receive a closing questionnaire or interview 
• A video recording may be made 
 
How long will participation take? 
Up to 30 minutes. 
 
What about confidentiality? 
Your data will be saved anonymously. Video recordings will be analysed by the experimenter 
and not be shared beyond the research team (unless you give explicit and voluntary approval 
after the study). 
 
If you are willing to participate,  
then please sign the Consent Form on the reverse of this page. 




Informed Consent Form 
 
Project:  Study on Creativity  
Researcher:  [names] 
Supervisor:  [names] 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
To be completed by the Research Participant 
 
Please answer each of the following questions: 
Do you feel you have been given sufficient information about the research to 
enable you to decide whether or not to participate in the research? Yes No 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions about the research? Yes No 
Do you understand that your participation is voluntary, and that you are free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving a reason, and without penalty? Yes No 
Are you willing to take part in the research? Yes No 
Are you aware that the study will be video recorded? Yes No 
Will you allow the research team to use anonymized quotes in presentations 
and publications? Yes No 
Will you allow the anonymized data to be archived, to enable secondary 
analysis and training future researchers? Yes No 
 
 
The lab employs a no-name policy. 
Please sign with your ID Code: 
 







You were invited to take part in a research study. However, to not invalidate findings (by 
participants knowing the true intention), the true nature of this research had to be kept hidden.  
Please take time to read the following information. Feel free to discuss issues with anyone, 
and if there is anything which is not clear or if you have any questions, feel free to ask. Take 
your time reading, and don’t feel rushed. 
What was this research actually about?  
This study was not only about creativity. It investigated whether people speak-up about 
unsafe events. To promote safety, it investigated ‘speaking up’ about the ‘footbridge’ idea 
and factors that influence this.  
 
Key to understand: 
1. All materials used are tested and safe. 
2. Research assistants played a role following an outlined script. 
 
What about confidentiality? 
This remains unchanged. We will treat your data video recording in strictest confidentiality. 
Your video will not be shared beyond the research team unless you give permission below. 
What if I have changed my mind?  
You are completely free to withdraw your participation without any consequence, or loss of 
reward for your time. Please indicate this to us if this case. Your answers and video recording 
will then be destroyed. 
What if I want to raise a concern about this study? 
We are open to listen to any concerns you have and are committed to working with you to 
resolve these (after all, this is what we study). If you want to raise any remaining issues, 
please contact the experimenter’s supervisor ([email]), the [name laboratory] ([email]) or the 
[name institution] ethics committee ([email]).  
 
Given this debrief information: 
1. Do you give permission to use your data for analyses?  Yes / No 
2. Would you consider this research to be unethical?  Yes / No 
3. Would you allow future participants to take part?   Yes / No 
 
The lab employs a no-name policy. 
Please sign with your ID code: 
 
Participants ID code:  ______________________               Date: __________ 
 
A copy of this Debrief Information Sheet is available for your records.  
(please enquire if you would like a copy)
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The creativity-feasibility form 
Participant 
ID 
Shelving Mirror Juggling Footbridge Piece of art 
Notes 
Creativity Feasibility Creativity Feasibility Creativity Feasibility Creativity Feasibility Voice? Creativity Feasibility 
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Appendix E: Jupyter notebook for Article 3 
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